Scientific Crossbreeding by Hvidtfeldt, Rolf
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
Scientific Crossbreeding
Hvidtfeldt, Rolf
Publication date:
2016
Document Version
Accepted author manuscript, peer reviewed version
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Hvidtfeldt, R. (2016). Scientific Crossbreeding. University of Southern Denmark.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: December 25, 2020
Scientific Crossbreeding
 
 3
 
 4
 
 5
Scientific
Crossbreeding
Rolf Hvidtfeldt
PhD thesis
Scientific Crossbreeding
PhD-Thesis 
September 2016
Author: Rolf Hvidtfeldt
Supervisor: Nikolaj Nottelmann
Philosophy
Department for the Study of Culture
University of Southern Denmark
82.447 words
529.762 characters
≈ 252 normalsider á 2.100 anslag 
This thesis is the intellectual property of the author.
Printed by Print & Sign 
 6
Contents:
Illustrations: 10..................................................................................................
Preface 13...........................................................................................................
1 — Introduction 17...........................................................................................
The (epistemic) fundamentals of interdisciplinarity 18................................................
Interdisciplinarity Studies 20.......................................................................................
My alternative 21........................................................................................................
Does everybody represent? 22..................................................................................
The intermediate layer 24...........................................................................................
Tools, algorithms, and basic assumptions 25........................................................
An example 27............................................................................................................
Why engage in this kind of madness? 28..............................................................
A bit of terminological explication 29..........................................................................
Targets 31..............................................................................................................
Approaches 32.......................................................................................................
“Distance” and “proximity” 33.................................................................................
Summing up 34..........................................................................................................
2 — Disciplines and approaches 39.................................................................
What are these things called ‘disciplines’? 41............................................................
Distinctive discussions of “discipline” 42....................................................................
Problems of disciplinarity 43..................................................................................
Three dimensions (plus some) of disciplinarity 45......................................................
Social aspects only 46...........................................................................................
Objects only 46......................................................................................................
Objects and tools combined 47..............................................................................
All included? 49......................................................................................................
Where does this leave us? 49................................................................................
Approaches 51...........................................................................................................
Approaches vs. fields 54........................................................................................
Distance vs. proximity revisited 54.........................................................................
More on temporality 55..........................................................................................
Summing up 57..........................................................................................................
3 — Interdisciplinarity Studies 59....................................................................
What is interdisciplinarity? 61.....................................................................................
Knowledge generation and integration 62..................................................................
Interdisciplinarity is not new 64..................................................................................
More recent developments: The turn-turn 66.............................................................
Literature studies 67..............................................................................................
Psychoanalytic literature studies 68.......................................................................
A different approach 69..........................................................................................
The evolutionary turn 69........................................................................................
The neurological turn 71........................................................................................
What is the point? 74.............................................................................................
More reasonable reasons for interdisciplinarity 74.....................................................
Specialisation vs. integration 76............................................................................
 7
Three modes of integration 78....................................................................................
The polymath mode 78..........................................................................................
The social mode 79................................................................................................
The educational mode 79......................................................................................
All of the above 79.................................................................................................
Science without a core set? 79...................................................................................
Degenerating hard core sets 80.............................................................................
Summing up 81..........................................................................................................
4 — The relevance of philosophy 85................................................................
Relevant philosophical approaches to interdisciplinarity 87.......................................
Kitcher’s historical perspective 88..........................................................................
Weisberg’s vehicle perspective 89.........................................................................
Pluralism and representation 90.................................................................................
Summing up 92..........................................................................................................
5 — Representation 95......................................................................................
The basics 97.............................................................................................................
Enter Ronald Giere 99................................................................................................
Constructive Realism 100......................................................................................
Perspectival Realism 102......................................................................................
The expanded and enriched X 104............................................................................
Deflation 105..........................................................................................................
To model (mathematically) or not to model (at all) 106...............................................
The propositions 109.............................................................................................
Weisberg on construal; assignment; fidelity 110....................................................
Use & similarity 111....................................................................................................
Summing up 113.........................................................................................................
6 – Pluralisms, perspectives, and potential problems 119............................
Pluralism—what is it? 120..........................................................................................
The Pluralisms 123.....................................................................................................
#1 – Internal pluralism 123.....................................................................................
#2 – External pluralism 124..................................................................................
#3 – Metaphysical (nomological) pluralism and CP-clauses 124...........................
#4 – Epistemic (representational) pluralism 125....................................................
Perspectivism 126......................................................................................................
Perspectives of theory 128....................................................................................
Laws and perspectives 131...................................................................................
Distortions 131............................................................................................................
Idealisation 131......................................................................................................
ID-idealisation 135.................................................................................................
Approximation 135.................................................................................................
Distortions of scale 136..........................................................................................
Simpson’s distortions 137...........................................................................................
Distortion of variance 138......................................................................................
The case of operational definition 143........................................................................
Operational definition makes its way into psychopathology 146............................
Current problems facing operational definition in psychopathology 149................
Final remarks on OD? 150.....................................................................................
Simpson’s revisited 152..............................................................................................
Summing up 153........................................................................................................
 8
7 – Representational crossbreeding 157.........................................................
The simple Duplex 158...............................................................................................
Social integration 161............................................................................................
Target integration 162............................................................................................
Targeting a different target by means of the same approach? 163........................
Purpose integration 164.........................................................................................
Approach integration 165...........................................................................................
The method 169.........................................................................................................
Transferring vehicles 170.......................................................................................
Inserting elements of approaches as parts of vehicles 172...................................
Transferring elements of the intermediate layer 172..............................................
Two strategies 174.....................................................................................................
Strategy 1: De-idealisation 174..............................................................................
Strategy 2: Bold conjectures 176...........................................................................
Summing up 176........................................................................................................
8 — Phenomenology imported with EASE 181...............................................
So, what is psychiatry and psychopathology? 183.....................................................
What is Schizophrenia? 186.......................................................................................
What is EASE, then? 188...........................................................................................
The NP2014 approach 194........................................................................................
Parent approaches? 194........................................................................................
How distant are the parent approaches? 197........................................................
The vehicle of the integrated approach 197...........................................................
The target 200............................................................................................................
The intermediate layer 202.........................................................................................
1) The importance of in-depth qualitative analysis 202..........................................
2) The significance of quantification 202................................................................
The elements 203.......................................................................................................
Target group delimitations (definitions/algorithms) 203..........................................
Exclusion criteria 204.............................................................................................
Semistructured interviews, expertise, and the Likert scale 205.............................
Dichotomisation 207..............................................................................................
Statistical tools 208................................................................................................
The vehicle 209......................................................................................................
The verdict 209...........................................................................................................
The good news 213...............................................................................................
What causes the problems? 214...........................................................................
To do-list: 214.........................................................................................................
Summing up 216........................................................................................................
9 — Conclusion 219...........................................................................................
A brief reflexive moment 221.................................................................................
Future opportunities 221........................................................................................
References 225...................................................................................................
Appendix A 240..................................................................................................
English summary 242........................................................................................
Dansk resumé 244.............................................................................................
 9
Illustrations:
Figure 1: The pet-effect. 27...........................................................................................................
Figure 2: The simple pendulum. 31..............................................................................................
A couple of brains 72....................................................................................................................
Figure 3: The Certainty Trough. 74...............................................................................................
Figure 4: Similarity and definition. 101..........................................................................................
Figure 5: The simple pendulum returns. 129................................................................................
Figure 6: The diathesis-stress model 133.....................................................................................
Figure 7: The Giere duplex. 159...................................................................................................
Figure 8: The Giere duplex—approach-style. 159........................................................................
Figure 9: The Giere n-plex. 160....................................................................................................
Figure 10: The small black box. 160.............................................................................................
Figure 11: The larger black box. 162............................................................................................
Figure 12: A stylised approach. 166..............................................................................................
Figure 13: Integrating approaches. 167........................................................................................
Figure 14: Transferral of elements. 173........................................................................................
Figure 15: The simple pendulum once more. 175........................................................................
Figure 16: The less simple pendulum. 175...................................................................................
Figure 17: The NP2014 approach. 201.........................................................................................
 10
 
 11
 
 12
Preface
Interdisciplinarity is a very topical subject, as can be seen from the frequency 
with which the word appears in philosophical debate and academic 
discussion. Everyone invokes interdisciplinarity; no one dares say a word 
against it. Its success is all the more remarkable in that even those who 
advocate this new image of knowledge would often find it hard to define. The 
appeal to interdisciplinarity is seen as a kind of epistemological panacea, 
designed to cure all the ills the scientific consciousness of our age is heir to. 
(Gusford 1977, p. 580)
Before embarking on this thesis, a few remarks are in place by way of pre-
face.
The thesis before you is about interdisciplinary science.  It will be obvious 1
to most that interdisciplinarity is a quite popular phenomenon in science today. 
One important question is »why?«. On the one hand, it appears that many ac-
tivities which fit the concept “interdisciplinarity” reasonably well have delivered 
remarkable results. On the other hand, it is quite clear that we do not have 
good criteria for evaluating interdisciplinarity at our disposal. There is always a 
danger of being allured by phenomena which you do not know how to system-
atically assess.
With this thesis, I offer a framework for evaluating the extent to which 
particular cases of interdisciplinarity contribute to raising epistemic standards. 
The central contribution of this thesis is an application of recent philosophy of 
scientific representation to cases of interdisciplinarity. This requires some 
adaptions to the philosophical framework and some discussion of how best to 
distinguish between different scientific approaches. The reward is a method, 
approach based analysis, for assessing relevant epistemic aspects of cases 
of interdisciplinary science. The thesis, thus, constitutes an attempt at de-
veloping a framework which might serve as a method for evaluating existing 
interdisciplinary projects as well as provide guidance for the ambitious prac-
titioner of scientific crossbreeding.
The home of this project is in philosophy of science. In the circles of people 
usually devoted to the study of interdisciplinarity, philosophy of science is not 
especially popular. Therefore, I believe there is reason to assume that those 
 A few passages throughout this thesis are somewhat reminiscent of a recent publication of 1
mine: (Hvidtfeldt 2016a). As the attentive reader will be quick to notice, many aspects of the 
suggested approach have been developed considerably since the publication of this paper, 
however.
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engaged in what I refer to as ‘Interdisciplinarity Studies’ might not welcome 
my efforts with great enthusiasm. As I will discuss below, it is a broadly estab-
lished »truth« in Interdisciplinarity Studies that philosophy of science is a re-
dundant (and rather annoying) intellectual exercise with little relevance for 
actual scientific activities.
Without doubt, there are some core problems within philosophy of science. 
One is the trade off between philosophical scholarship and genuine scientific 
expertise among theorists. In many cases philosophers end up discussing 
issues which practitioners of the relevant types are actually in a much better 
position to handle (due to their deeper knowledge of the subject matter). On 
the other hand, many scientists are not motivated, and lack the training, for 
carrying out philosophical work with the conceptual rigour required. In some 
ways, then, philosophy of science is build on compromise.
It is my impression, though, that at least some ways of doing philosophy of 
science have unmistakeable utility. If I did not believe so, I would have spent 
my time the last couple of years on something else. But philosophers should 
attempt to curb their propensity for trying to come up with a priori answers to 
questions which are essentially a posteriori in nature. One such question is, of 
course, whether or not philosophy of science contribute to developing science 
towards higher standards. This is, in the end, a matter for empirical research.
To handle such questions we should, perhaps, establish a few new discip-
lines. A couple of suggestions could be »empirical meta-philosophy of scien-
ce« and »science studies studies«. We could categorise such enterprises as 
reflexive intradisciplinarity (intelligently?) designed to get to the bottom of what 
theorising about science is actually good for. It would be nice to have experts 
trained in these topics who could declare categorically ex cathedra that philo-
sophy of science is immensely important.
Until that is established, I can only hope that reading (and writing) this 
thesis comes across as at least worth the effort.
This thesis has indeed required substantial effort and has been a long time in 
the making. Parts of the inspiration for this project popped up while I was a 
master student at the University of Copenhagen; other parts occurred to me 
while I was working as a research assistant at a psychiatric facility in the 
Capital Region of Denmark. I would like to take this opportunity to thank a 
number of colleagues and friends for constructive discussions of some of the 
elements that make up this manuscript. These discussions have helped me 
considerably towards developing and refining the original raw ideas.
To different extents and in different ways, the following have all provided 
helpful comments and suggestions as well as general encouragement along 
the way. They have all contributed in each their way to the maturation of this 
project—probably without realising the full impact of their contributions.
I list in no particular order: Signe Wolsgård Krøyer, Finn Collin, Jan Faye, 
Mikkel Gerken, Esben Nedenskov Petersen, Jens Hebor, Sara Green, Søren 
Harnow Klausen, Caroline Schaffalitsky de Muckadell, Søren Engelsen, 
Cynthia M. Grund, Stig Børsen Hansen, Carl Bache, Lars Grassmé Binderup, 
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Nina Bonderup Dohn, Peter Wolsing, Jørgen Hass, Anne-Marie Søndergaard 
Christensen, Emily Hartz, Josef Parnas, and David Budtz Pedersen.
 During my stay in Sydney in the first half of 2015 I received helpful, in-
spiring, and (in some cases) even friendly comments and suggestions from, 
among others, John Matthewsson, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Dominic Murphy, 
Alan Chalmers, Paul Griffiths, Ofer Gal, Georg Repnikov, Sahar Tavakoli, Ian 
Lawson, and Chloe Collins.
I have further received helpful suggestions from a number of anonymous 
referees commenting on early drafts of (Hvidtfeldt 2016a).
Most importantly, of course, my supervisor Nikolaj Nottelmann has acted as 
a very dedicated and helpful mentor in his brave attempt at correcting my 
misguidances while at all times striking a balance between the carrot and the 
stick (with a slight sway towards the latter, if I’m not mistaking).
Even though all the people mentioned (and forgotten) above have provided 
helpful comments and encouragement, I have no reason to believe (and 
considerable reason to doubt) that they or anybody else would approve this 
manuscript in its entirety. I take full responsibility for all the shortcomings 
exhibited in the following. It is clear that no one else can be blamed for any-
thing that has made its way into this text.
Gratefulness is also due to my parents (without whom… and so on and so 
forth), all my brothers and sisters, brothers and sisters in law, and nephews 
and nieces.
Projects such as the one resulting in the manuscript before you take their 
toll—not just on the individual actually putting it together, but also on the 
members of his or her nuclear family. In this respect, I must thank and 
apologise to my wife and our children: You have been incredibly patient and 
supportive even though your husband and father has been far more tense, 
preoccupied, and, indeed, absent than you (and I) would have preferred. I am 
fortunate and grateful!
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1 — Introduction
ABSTRACT. In this chapter, the enterprise of this thesis is intro-
duced along with the general reasons why the topics discussed 
below are considered interesting at all. The positions and theoreti-
cal elements on which the discussions of the following chapters will 
be based are presented. The most central concepts of the frame-
work developed in this thesis as well as some terminology that will 
be crucial in the subsequent analyses are outlined. All in all, this 
chapter should serve to prepare the reader for the more detailed 
discussions in the rest of the thesis.
’Interdisciplinarity’ has more buzz than most current scientific buzzwords.  And 2
indeed there are good reasons to believe that combinations of different 
scientific approaches are central to the processes through which we develop 
and expand our understanding of reality in the broadest sense. The history of 
science is rich with cases of successful scientific achievements more or less 
due to efforts, which can reasonably be considered interdisciplinary. On the 
other hand, everybody has his or her favourite horror story featuring some 
specific obviously misguided or even faux interdisciplinary collaborations.
Curiously, however, very little effort has been put into the development of 
ways to distinguish between »good« and »bad« interdisciplinarity. In the 
words of Nancy Cartwright: 
Within each of the disciplines separately, both pure and applied, we find well 
developed, detailed methodologies both for judging claims to knowledge and 
for putting them to use. But we have no articulated methodologies for 
interdisciplinary work, not even anything so vague and general as the filtered-
down versions of good scientific method we are taught at school. (Cartwright 
1999, p. 18)
There is no lack of academic interest in interdisciplinarity, though. Indeed, 
there is a large and growing literature on the topic. One might even speak of a 
virtual discipline of Interdisciplinarity Studies. But in Interdisciplinarity Studies 
the predominant part of the efforts are focused on what I shall single out as 
the social aspects of interdisciplinary collaborations, whereas the epistemic 
 Throughout this thesis (except for this footnote) ’single inverted commas’ are used when 2
referring to a word, whereas “double inverted commas” are used when referring to concepts. 
Following one of several Scandinavian traditions »double angle quotation marks« are used 
for in-text quotations as well as scare quotes.
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vices and virtues of interdisciplinarity are only rarely and cursorily discussed. 
Consequently, if we aim to understand whether and under which circumstan-
ces interdisciplinarity leads to beneficial epistemic results, there is a need for 
developing the required tools of assessment more or less from scratch. That 
is the primary goal of this thesis, then: To develop a framework, an articulated 
methodology, for evaluating epistemic aspects of interdisciplinarity.
To develop a more adequate way of capturing what is at stake in 
interdisciplinarity, I suggest drawing inspiration from the contemporary philo-
sophical literature on scientific representation. The development of a repres-
entation based approach to the analysis of interdisciplinarity, and the discus-
sion of the consequences of representing interdisciplinarity in this way, are the 
two main contributions offered by this thesis.
The framework developed in this thesis entices one to draw conclusions 
which run counter to some quite firmly established convictions. In some eyes, 
these conclusions might come across as unduly strict and conservative. So in 
order to avoid misunderstandings, let me make clear right from the start, that 
the present critical examination of interdisciplinarity is not intended as a 
general refusal of the value of interdisciplinary efforts. On the contrary, various 
combinations of different concepts, methods, models, theories, perspectives, 
and approaches are certainly central to the processes through which we 
develop and expand our knowledge of reality (in the broadest sense) as well 
as our ability to intervene in its various aspects and processes.
To add one final, important qualification: This thesis offers a novel frame-
work for analysing interdisciplinarity. Though it is a good one, it is only one out 
of several possible and relevant frameworks. In the framework of this thesis, 
the integration of distinct scientific activities are idealised and represented in a 
certain way—a way which emphasises aspects of interdisciplinarity which are 
out of focus in most ways of analysing this phenomenon. That I focus on diffe-
rent aspects to the analysis of interdisciplinarity compared to standard ap-
proaches does not mean that I consider standard approaches completely 
misguided. Still I hope the reader will agree, that viewing interdisciplinarity in 
the perspective developed below draws out interesting and relevant aspects, 
which may have the potency to alter the way in which we view interdisciplina-
rity.
The (epistemic) fundamentals of interdisciplinarity
Let us start off with the following somewhat banal observation: The concept 
“interdisciplinarity” presupposes, as a minimum, that some sort of inter-action 
and integration between at least two relevantly different parent disciplines 
takes place. Further, and at least as banal, there is a temporal aspect: It is 
presupposed in the concept of interdisciplinarity that there is a pre-interaction 
state of affairs in which the involved disciplines are distinct, and that there is a 
post-interaction, or integrated, state of affairs in which, unless the effort has 
been completely futile, some product of the integration of the parent disciplin-
es has come into existence.
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The basic idea in interdisciplinarity is, thus, to combine two or more scienti-
fic disciplines into an integrated approach (loosely speaking). The motivation 
for this kind of scientific crossbreeding is that through the combination of 
different scientific disciplines it might be possible to construct hybrids, which 
are somehow superior to (at least one of) the parent disciplines. 
Scientific quality is, of course, a difficult and controversial philosophical 
issue in itself and can be construed in many quite different ways. Ultimately, 
determination of whether superiority has been achieved is, at least to some 
extent, dependent on the purposes the scientific enterprises in question are 
intended to serve. If one were to mention paradigmatic examples of improved 
scientific quality, reasonable examples might be increased explanatory power, 
adding of detail or nuance, improved accuracy (e.g. in terms of prediction and/
or distinction), improved reliability, improved validity, increased scope, more 
general implications, increased conceptual coordination, improvements in 
terms of cognitive economy (aka simplicity), or improvements in ability to 
intervene in relevant processes and produce, prevent, or control specific 
phenomena.
These are all  more or less standard textbook suggestions for evaluating 3
scientific quality, which might all be relevant to discussions of epistemic 
enhancements due to interdisciplinarity. It bears emphasis once again that 
explicit discussions of how and to what extent interdisciplinary activities result 
in scientific or epistemic improvements are rarely encountered in existing 
treatments of the topic of interdisciplinarity.
In this thesis, then, ‘interdisciplinarity’ is used to refer to scientific activities 
which involve integration of (elements of) theoretical knowledge from different 
scientific backgrounds. By epistemic assessment of interdisciplinarity I mean 
the evaluation of how the integrated »knowledge« fares when evaluated along 
dimensions of scientific quality such as those listed above. This may reason-
ably involve a comparison with the epistemic vices and virtues of the parent 
disciplines.
Apart from epistemic issues, various other aspects of the activities involved 
in scientific practice may be considered good or bad by the involved scientists 
or other stakeholders. For instance, it is valuable to be able to maintain a 
living and it is quite attractive and very difficult to obtain (and retain) a job in 
academia. Consequently one might expect that there is ample motivation for 
opportunistic interdisciplinarity. This possibility has received little attention in 
the existing literature—possibly because it presupposes a critical examination 
of whether interdisciplinary collaborations are implicitly good. Further, as the 
literature within Interdisciplinarity Studies clearly demonstrates, there are lots 
of other non-epistemic issues relevant to analyses of interdisciplinarity. This is 
mentioned in order to make clear that even though focus will be on epistemic 
aspects of interdisciplinarity in the following, other (e.g. social) analytical di-
mensions should not be disregarded. Certainly all sorts of aspects of scientific 
 Depending on one’s favourite textbook.3
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collaborations can have important consequences for the general improvement 
of science.
This thesis, however, primarily addresses epistemic aspects of interdiscipli-
narity. It is a working hypothesis of the thesis that epistemic aspects should to 
a larger extent be included in analyses and evaluations of interdisciplinary 
collaborations. It is a further hypothesis that interdisciplinary research activiti-
es, as other research activities, ought to be carried out cautiously and system-
atically in order to get the most out of the effort, while at all times maintaining 
a clear view for what benefits are gained through a specific effort. Throughout 
the thesis, I will provide examples which illustrate the predicaments one might 
end up in, if the attitude towards certain potential epistemic pitfalls are too lax.
For us to arrive at a method by which we can evaluate the extent to which 
particular cases of interdisciplinarity live up to the above-mentioned ideals, 
there are many issues which require considerably more attention than they 
usually get. If, as it is sometimes argued,  interdisciplinary work should be 4
allowed to proceed in a less stringent manner than more traditional 
disciplinary science, at least there should be some sort of argument for why 
and in which respects such an attitude is considered beneficial. Such an 
argument might also be carried out within the framework developed below.
Interdisciplinarity Studies
One of the basic reasons for developing an alternative approach to the 
analysis of interdisciplinarity is that epistemic issues are insufficiently dealt 
with in the existing literature on the topic. Despite the undeniable qualities of 
the Interdisciplinarity Studies literature, it has a significant gap, since a 
number of philosophical, and most pressingly epistemic, issues related to 
interdisciplinarity are largely unaddressed.
The absence of measures, or apparent attempts to develop measures, for 
the epistemic benefits of interdisciplinary collaborations may be partly due to 
that Interdisciplinarity Studies is to a large extent entangled with work by 
scholars from sociology and/or science studies. As science studies icons 
Collins and Evans has stated, »[t]he dominant and fruitful trend of science 
studies research in the last decades has been to replace epistemological 
questions with social questions« (Collins & Evans 2002, p. 236). There is no 
doubt that this trend has been dominant, and it has certainly also been 
successful—at least when measured in terms of popularity. But determining 
the extent to which it has been fruitful is, of course, a more difficult matter, 
which is closely related to the evaluation of science in general. I will argue that 
to a considerable extent the focus on social aspects has blocked the light for 
relevant epistemic concerns.
 An anonymous referee commenting on an early version of (Hvidtfeldt 2016a) responded to 4
my claim that interdisciplinary activities ought to be carried out »cautiously, systematically, 
and stringently« with the comment: »hm… but you know, in ID it is precisely the opposite 
attitude that you need…«.
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My alternative
This thesis presents an alternative approach to the analysis of interdisciplina-
rity. The discussion takes as a starting point a confrontation with the thought 
that conventional taxonomies of disciplines provide fruitful ground for analys-
ing combinations of scientific approaches. It is then suggested that a focus on 
activities of representation  might reveal a much more interesting level of 5
detail. A fundamental assumption of this thesis, an assumption which is 
endorsed by a large group of influential contemporary philosophers of science 
(e.g. Cartwright 1999; Giere 2006b; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Van Fraassen 1980; 
2008; Weisberg 2013a), is that representation is the central scientific activity. 
The further claim of this thesis is: 
Representation is the central scientific activity, and if interdisciplinarity 
has any significant effect on scientific practice, then the effect of inter-
disciplinarity must somehow be reflected in the representational activi-
ties as displayed in the products and outputs in the post-interaction 
states of affairs.
»What are the products and outputs of science?« one might reasonably ask. 
For present purposes my answer is this: Most tangibly the products of science 
are the publications produced. But it is obviously the propositional content of 
these publications that are of interest. In this treatment, it is assumed that 
there are, basically, two relevant types of propositional content.
The first type of propositional content of scientific publications consists of 
(more or less) specified ways of representing (more or less) specified 
phenomena by means of (more or less) specified vehicles of representation. 
Sometimes a publication includes presentations of novel vehicles of 
representation; sometimes the central idea is an application of an established 
vehicle of representation to an object different from what has traditionally 
been targeted by means of the particular vehicle of representation applied. 
Finally, sometimes publications are about the re-application of a previously 
presented vehicle of representation (perhaps with certain adjustments) to a 
previously targeted object in order to reassess its value or previous results 
achieved (so-called replications). In the following, I use the expressions 
‘scientific approach’ or simply ‘approach’ to refer to a specific way of using a 
specific vehicle to represent a specific target. How to explicate scientific 
approaches is going to be a central part of the machinery of this thesis. I will 
address this matter in more detail later in this chapter and return to different 
aspects of this complex issue throughout the thesis.
The second type of propositional content consists of the conclusions and 
recommendations which result from the analytical process in which vehicles of 
 Chapters 5,6, and 7 below are devoted to a thorough discussion of the philosophy of 5
representation and the adaptions thereof I consider to be required in order to develop a 
representation based account of interdisciplinary science.
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representation play a central part. I will refer to these conclusions and 
recommendations as the outputs of science, since those are often what make 
their way to the headlines of newspapers and thereby to the general public. It 
is noteworthy, though, that outputs are also what reaches most members of 
other parts of the scientific community. That is, though two parties both belong 
to the general scientific community, the one party rarely has deep insight into 
all the gory details of the activities of the other party. This issue  will prove to 6
be significant later on in this treatment.
So, the products of scientific activities are vehicles of representation and 
the specified ways of applying these as presented in publications. The other 
important kind of result of the activities of science, which could be considered 
a scientific commodity if you like, consist of predictions, recommendations, 
and interpretations supposed to constitute guides for action in the sciences as 
well as in broader society. Those outputs are derived from the representation-
al activities and from analyses of the vehicles of representation involved. I 
suggest that it is fruitful to consider the outputs of scientific efforts as most 
often specifiable in terms of hypothetical conditionals or, for instance in cases 
where historical matters are analysed, in terms of counterfactual condition-
als.  This issue will not be treated thoroughly in this thesis though, since the 7
exact nature of scientific outputs is not central to the topics investigated.
Does everybody represent?
Whether or not it is reasonable to choose representation as the focal point for 
the present analysis depends on whether representation is central, not just in 
some sciences, but in a relevantly similar sense in all scientific activities that 
might be involved in interdisciplinary activities. In this case, that means 
including scientific approaches traditionally categorised as belonging to the 
humanities and the health sciences as well as the natural and social sciences. 
Since attempts to introduce aspects of methodology from the natural sciences 
in, e.g., the humanities are abundant, a level of abstraction is required at 
which the relevant aspects of all potentially involved disciplines can be incor-
porated.
My position is that such an understanding of scientific representation is 
attainable without straining generally accepted ways of conceptualising scien-
ce beyond coherence. Indeed, many philosophers engaged in the debate on 
scientific representation would presumably agree, even though they rarely, if 
ever, discuss scientific representation in, say, the humanities.
In his seminal work on scientific representation, Bas van Fraassen states 
the following:
 Which has, indeed, been addressed empirically within science studies (e.g. Collins 1981; 6
1985)
 The idea of construing outputs of science in terms of conditionals is inspired by ideas 7
presented by Peter Godfrey-Smith in a series of lectures at The University of Sydney in 2015.
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Scientific representation is not exhausted by a study of the role of theory or 
theoretical models. To complete our understanding of scientific representation 
we must equally approach measurement, its instrumental character and its 
role. I will argue that measuring, just as well as theorizing, is representing. 
(Van Fraassen 2008, p. 2)
For the present purposes I stretch the concept of “representation” a bit further. 
As is common in philosophy of science, van Fraassen focuses on the most 
prestigious natural sciences.  However, the categorisations belonging to dis-8
ciplines in, for instance, the humanities can at an appropriate level of genera-
lisation reasonably be considered to be equivalent to the measurements of 
the quantitative sciences. The concepts of, for instance, literature theory are 
presumably less stringent and less well coordinated than the measurements 
of thermodynamics. But nevertheless, literature theorists use the concepts of 
literature theory to indicate that the conceptualised target has certain charac-
teristics and plays a certain role in a larger theoretical scheme. Thereby, lite-
rary concepts fulfil the most basic requirement of van Fraassen:
There is no representation except in the sense that some things are used, 
made, or taken, to represent some things as thus or so. (Van Fraassen 2008, 
p. 23) 
This is exactly what literature theorists do: They use some things to represent 
some other things (e.g. certain concepts used to represent characters in a 
novel (or vice versa)) as thus or so. Bas van Fraassen states, that if he were 
to propose a theory of scientific representation (which he stresses that he has 
no intention of doing), the above quote would be its Hauptsatz.
This »soft« attitude towards delineating scientific representation is in line 
with Mauricio Suarez, who states:
I propose that we adopt from the start a deflationary or minimalist attitude and 
strategy towards the concept of scientific representation, in analogy to 
deflationary or minimalist conceptions of truth, or contextualist analyses of 
knowledge. Adopting this attitude […] entails abandoning the aim of a 
substantive theory to seek universal necessary and sufficient conditions that 
are met in each and every concrete real instance of scientific representation. 
Representation is not the kind of notion that requires, or admits, such 
conditions. We can at best aim to describe its most general features. (Suarez 
2004, p. 770 f.) 
Van Fraassen and Suarez are right not to seek exact definitions of represen-
tation. And further, their quite inclusive accounts of representation  admits the 9
 Arguably, physics, chemistry, and biology are the places to make your mark if you want to »be 8
someone« in contemporary analytical philosophy of science
 Actually, quite a bit more inclusive than either of them considers explicitly, I believe.9
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treatment of a very broad class of scientific activities. On this background, I 
agree with van Fraassen that we can reasonably consider measurement to be 
representation, and I further add that so is categorisation. If that is accepted, I 
believe we can reasonably answer affirmatively to the question of whether 
representation is central in a relevantly similar sense in all scientific activities 
that might be involved in interdisciplinary activities.
This would be in stark opposition to a widely held position in which repre-
sentation involves modelling, and ‘model’ is conceived as short for ‘mathe-
matical model’ and therefore exclusively connected to the quantitative scien-
ces. I agree on this issue with Thomson-Jones’ (2012)  argument in favour of 10
a propositional view of modelling. According to Thomson-Jones most (if not 
all) mathematical models are somehow embedded in sets of propositions. 
These sets of propositions may for instance indicate how the mathematical 
structures of the model relate to its target system(s). On the other hand, 
examples of non-mathematical modelling consist solely of sets of proposi-
tions. The propositional view on modelling is especially useful in relation to an 
analysis of interdisciplinarity (such as the present one) in which one needs a 
way of conceptualising the vehicles by which »things are represented« that 
encompasses various divergent scientific approaches. 
Thus, for present purposes I think it is reasonable to accept Thomson-
Jones’ claims that vehicles of representation are embedded in networks of 
propositions and that some instances of modelling do not involve mathema-
tics at all. I will also claim, however, that for a meta-representation to be 
adequate, a finer level of detail is needed compared to what Thomson-Jones 
offers. Consequently, once the somewhat controversial move from “modelling” 
to “propositional modelling” is accepted (for the sake of argument at least), the 
next step is to attempt to spell out what these underlying propositional 
structures consist of.
The intermediate layer
On a naïve construal, vehicles might be believed to serve more or less as 
definitions which in themselves pick out which phenomena they are about. 
That is, the vehicle of representation could be construed as having the indexi-
cal function of pointing out its target build in somehow. This, however, cannot 
be the full story, since vehicles of representation are quite often transferred 
from one use to another. As one example, which I will return to below, Michael 
Weisberg has discussed how a mathematical model originally conceived to 
represent the dynamical relations between predators and prey in the Adriatic 
Ocean has (somewhat ironically) been used in economic theory to describe 
relations between different kind of agents in the market (Weisberg 2013a). 
Despite the irony, it seems quite farfetched to claim that this second use was 
somehow already pointed out by the model in its original formulation. Rather, 
 … which I will discuss in some detail in chapter 5 below.10
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there must be something else mediating the relation between vehicle of repre-
sentation and target in any representational activity.
On the other hand, a specific vehicle of representation certainly picks out a 
set of possible states. In other words, a vehicle puts constraints on which re-
sults, given certain inputs, we will expect from the targeted phenomena. 
Otherwise, of course, the representation would not tell us much. Vehicles do, 
in this way, perform a very central conceptually limiting task. The set of pos-
sible states which the vehicle of representation can display, frames our under-
standing of the target system. One’s choice of vehicle does, therefore, make 
some very important differences.
Tools, algorithms, and basic assumptions 
The vehicle of representation is relatively easy to identify, but, unfortunately, it 
is only the tip of the iceberg when considering representation. The vehicle of 
representation is part of, admittedly a very central part of, what I refer to as 
the ‘approach’, which, as already stated, is going to be one of the most central 
terms in the discussions of this thesis. But before we can get a hold on how I 
construe approaches, we need to discuss the topic of what I call the inter-
mediate layer between vehicle and target.
Following van Fraassen, there is no representation unless something is 
used  to represent something else. But what does ‘use’ mean? To analyse 11
representational activities we need to get a hold of what use is in the present 
context. The question of »how a vehicle is used« can, I believe, fruitfully be 
replaced by the question of »how the vehicle is connected to its target«. For 
the purpose of the analyses of this thesis, I construe the connection between 
vehicle and target as constituted by an intermediate layer consisting of 
combinations of more or less explicit, more or less taken for granted, assump-
tions and (conceptual) tools of various kinds.
My take is the following: Supporting the representational activities is first of 
all a group of fundamental assumptions (which I take to constitute at least a 
significant part of the propositions which Thomson-Jones discusses). Second, 
the representational activities are supported by a group of tools, which do not 
represent anything themselves, but which serve various other purposes which 
are central for establishing the connection between vehicle and target. One 
such function is to translate raw inputs into data (in terms of concepts or 
figures) which can be processed further by means of other tools, until the link 
to the vehicle of representation is established. Some of the tools involved are 
literal tools (e.g. various kinds of more or less complex instruments), others 
are mathematical tools like statistical methods. Further, I suggest that another 
subgroup of the tools involved can be fruitfully construed in terms of 
something like propositional algorithms, i.e. as (more or less explicitly stated) 
 The attentive reader will remember that van Fraassen’s requirement is that something is  11
»used, made, or taken« to represent something else. I will focus on use in the following, since 
I take it that “use” can for the present purposes reasonably be considered a generic concept 
under which “made” and “taken” can be subsumed.
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sets of rules for carrying out certain conceptual operations (an example will 
follow soon below). Involved in linking vehicles to targets is also a number of 
sub-representations, including what is often referred to as ‘data models’. Data 
models are ordered groups of data represented in ways appropriate for a 
certain purpose, which can be analysed in order to derive inputs to feed other 
elements in the representational chain. The results of processes of measure-
ment and categorisation also count as sub-representations.
While vehicles and other sub-representations are, obviously, used for 
representation, algorithms, tools, and assumptions contributing to link vehicle 
and target may not represent anything. They are means for linking target and 
vehicle, but they are not necessarily intended to represent any real connec-
tions between the two.
The claim that some of the tools in the intermediate layer could be 
characterised as propositional algorithms needs further underpinning. For 
example, in any representational activity one needs some way of pointing out 
the phenomena in focus. One way of doing this, though by no means the only 
way, is to use one of a number of possible types of definition. A type of 
definition is, I believe, a good example of a propositional algorithm doing 
important supporting work in representational activities. Different types of 
definitions have different conceptual structures, which again can be 
characterised as differently structured sets of rules for deciding whether 
something falls under a concept or not. In my use of the term, each specific 
set of rules for carrying out a conceptual operation would be a specific 
propositional algorithm. The algorithms of different types of definition will be 
spelled out below (in chapter 6).
As an example of a propositional algorithm for picking out objects of 
interest without using definitions, one might consider a setting in which the 
categorising system of a conceptually well-functioning individual is sufficiently 
accurate to point out phenomena of interest. An example of a psychological 
study of the effect on elderly people’s well-being from owning a dog as 
compared to owning a cat or a canary will be discussed in the section below. 
In such a setting an exact definition of “dog” would not be required. Instead 
the propositional algorithm might be something like: let a person with a normal 
understanding of the words ‘dog’, ‘cat’, and ‘canary’ determine whether the 
elderly person in question owns one or the other (or perhaps, of course, no 
pet at all).
Both types of algorithms (definitional and non-definitional) discussed above 
generate sub-representations in terms of concepts which can be further 
processed by other tools.
Other candidates for the status of propositional algorithm might be: 
Different ways of idealising, different ways of abstracting, different ways of 
measuring, different ways of observing, different ways of categorising, 
different ways of coordinating basic concepts, different ways of gathering 
data, different ways of quantifying data, different ways of using statistics 
(including the choice between specific statistical approaches), different ways 
of analysing topics or data, different ways of creating graphs and diagrams, 
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different ways of interpreting graphs and diagrams, different ways of setting 
up experiments (think of standards such as randomised double-blinded 
studies), different ways of intervening or not, or different ways of creating 
taxonomies.
An example
Since the above few paragraphs may come across as quite abstract, let me 
offer the following constructed scenario by way of example. 
Let us say that a social psychologist wants to study effects of owning 
different kinds of pets on the well being of single, elderly persons. Let us say 
that the psychologist operates with the following equation as a vehicle to 
represent the assumed »pet-effect«:
FIGURE 1: THE PET-EFFECT.
In this equation, a is the activity-coefficient of the type of pet, and wp is the 
weight of the pet measured in kilograms and wo is the weight of the owner. 
Further, g is a measure for the grumpiness of the elderly person, whereas c is 
a measure of how cute the pet is. 
Now, something is needed to mediate the connection between this 
equation and the reality of pet-ownership and well-being. Among these would 
be:
Various tools (such as): 
• Stipulative definition of what ‘elderly’ means in the context as a means to 
pointing out a relevant sample.
• Normal functioning human category system to determine whether they 
own a pet, and which kind of pet it is.
• A scale to measure the weight of the pets and people.
• A set of operationally defined categories to measure the grumpiness of the 
elderly person.
• Multiple choice questionnaires to measure the individual elderly persons 
experience of well-being. 
• Mathematical tools helpful for quantifying the raw (qualitative) data.
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Various assumptions (such as):
• Assumptions about the activity levels of different kinds of pet.12
• Technical assumptions such as that α ≤ .05 is a reasonable threshold for 
statistical significance.
• That well-being is something you can measure and quantify in a meaning-
ful way.
By means of these (and others) it is possible to link the vehicle (the above 
equation) with the phenomena of interest. This activity, when interpreted, 
might result in an output along lines such as:
By analysing our model of the pet-effect, we conclude that living with a 
medium sized reasonably active pet that requires some physical interaction 
has a positive effect on your well-being by forcing you to do low-intensity 
exercise. The conclusion is (in the form of a hypothetical conditional): »If you 
are an elderly person and you want to improve your well-being, you should 
get a cute, medium sized dog.«
Should our friend the psychologist decide to get involved in interdisciplinarity 
for some reason, opportunities are plenty. He might be inspired by studies in 
biology to control what is going on in a stricter way. He might add assump-
tions that dogs in these kinds of studies should be bred to have similar levels 
of activity and temper. He might decide to isolate his specimens in a labora-
tory. He might decide to collaborate with neurologists to develop a deeper 
understanding of grumpiness by fMRI-scanning his subjects or even decide to 
use specially bred elderly people to study the effect of grumpiness in a more 
controlled setting. He might import statistical tools or ingenious ways of 
analysing quantitative and qualitative data. Or he might import some existing 
equation, the mathematical structure of which fits his target better.
All such interdisciplinary activities should result in changes in how the 
phenomena of interest are represented. One should be able to discern these 
changes by looking at details such as those sketched out above, i.e. at chang-
es in vehicle of representation or among the elements constituting the inter-
mediate layer.
Why engage in this kind of madness? 
The attempts to spell out details about which tools and assumptions are used 
in a given approach is motivated by the following assumption:
The analysis of interdisciplinarity in terms of combinations of representa-
tional approaches involves in its most basic form the transferral of vehicles of 
representation from some setting to some other setting. This means importing 
 A dog you will have to take for a walk (= significant activity demand). A cat you will have to 12
poke with your walking stick when it is about to urinate on the carpet again (= medium activity 
demand). A canary you will only have to feed occasionally, and flush in the toilet when it dies 
(= low activity demand).
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existing vehicles of representation and applying them to a different target or, 
perhaps, the hybridisation of vehicles already in use and (parts of) imported 
vehicles. Thinking of interdisciplinarity in terms of combinations of models or 
vehicles of representation is far from adequate, though. The vehicles of 
representation are the proudly presented figureheads by which the pheno-
mena of interest are represented. But, as already stated, vehicles of represen-
tation do not inherently represent anything in themselves. Therefore they 
need to be embedded in larger networks of supporting elements to perform 
their representational magic. All aspects of the network supporting the 
representation are candidates for being transferred between scientific 
approaches as well as the vehicles themselves. Unfortunately, these networks 
are not necessarily explicitly stated in publications since a lot of the involved 
assumptions and tools are parts of the (tacit) background knowledge of 
people specialised in a given field of study.
Disciplines, thus, might be integrated in much more subtle ways than the 
transferral of vehicles. If we are to do interdisciplinarity justice, we need to dig 
deeper into how representation is accomplished in the pre- and post-
integrated states of affairs. And, indeed, it is required to spell out the difficulti-
es involved when combining elements from different disciplines. 
The last remark in the previous paragraph refers to one significant 
complication not yet mentioned. In the philosophy of scientific representation it 
is frequently argued that representation is not neutral and that different 
perspectives on the same target may be incompatible. Put in another way, 
representation involves distortion. And whether or not the inherent distortions 
are tolerable is dependent on context. No tools, assumptions, or vehicles 
come certified for general use. In the present context we therefore need to 
discuss the difficulties with combining non-neutral, incompatible perspectives. 
There are good reasons to assume that individually distorted elements picked 
from two distorted perspectives do not necessarily add up to something less 
distorted.
Adopting the framework sketched out above will lead us to a quite non-
standard conception of interdisciplinarity. In the rest of this thesis I will provide 
much further detail as well as concrete examples which will hopefully 
convince the reader of the usefulness of approach based analysis of inter-
disciplarity.
A bit of terminological explication
Before we venture into on the main part of this thesis, it will be beneficial to 
settle some terminological issues. We here need terms for referring to classes 
of entities some of which are not commonly distinguished in the literature and 
therefore have no commonly accepted names. A number of these have been 
introduced above, but it is beneficial with some further explication of the most 
important ones.
Perhaps the easiest route to grasping the first of these categories goes 
through an analogy with Hempel's and Oppenheim’s classic discussion of the 
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dichotomy of ‘explanans’ and ‘explanandum’. In the context of a discussion of 
scientific representation, one might be prompted to talk of repraesentans (= 
»that which is used to represent«) and repraesentandum (= »that which is 
represented«).  In the existing literature on scientific representation, the ex-13
pression ‘target system’, or simply ‘target’, seems well suited for picking out 
what is being represented. This is good fortune since it would be nice to avoid 
such heavy terms as ‘repraesentans’ and ‘repraesentandum’. Importantly, a 
target system is not (always) simply a part of the world but often a specific 
idealised or abstracted construct of a given phenomenon, set of phenomena, 
or, for that matter, fictive objects. There are no principled limitations as to what 
it is possible to represent.  Nevertheless, the conclusion is that ’target’ or 14
‘target system’ fits neatly into the analysis below.
On the other hand, there is a void in the literature regarding a term for the 
class that would be picked out by “repraesentans”. As will be discussed in 
more detail below, models and modelling have attracted most of the attention 
since Ronald Giere set the stage for the contemporary philosophical 
discussions of scientific representation in (1988). However, as recent 
discussions have pointed out, far from all scientific representations are 
realised by means of models (Weisberg 2007b; Weisberg 2013a). Modelling 
is understood as the practice where analyses, interventions or experiments 
are carried out, so to speak, by proxy. That is, in modelling the analytical 
efforts deliberately involves the use of an explicitly constructed model. 
Activities referred to as abstract direct representation, in contrast, are 
characterised by using theoretical constructs to represent some target or 
target system directly without involving modelling activities. The work of 
Darwin and Mendeleev are oft-mentioned canonical examples of science 
allegedly proceeding by abstract direct representation, in that they refer 
directly to real world phenomena and their characteristics. Further, many other 
kinds of things (such as pictures or verbal descriptions) are used for 
representational purposes in science, apparently without being instances of 
modelling (at least not in any remotely obvious sense). 
Due to this heterogeneity, it is useful to have a generic term for »all things 
which are used to represent a target system«. In this thesis ‘vehicle of 
representation’ (or simply ‘vehicle’ for convenience) is used to refer to the 
»thing« that takes up the central place as that which is being used to 
represent something else in a scientific context.
As just stated, in the philosophical literature on representation models are 
by far the most studied type of vehicle by which other things are represented 
 As is well known, the original formulation runs as follows: »By the explanandum, we 13
understand the sentence describing the phenomenon to be explained (not that phenomenon 
itself); by the explanans, the class of those sentences which are adduced to account for the 
phenomenon.« (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948, p. 136 f.)
 Once we get to my discussion of the elaborated duplex version of Giere’s representational 14
relation below (in chapter 7), I will assume that the W in Giere’s formalisation refers to target 
systems rather than real world aspects.
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(Cartwright 1983; Giere 1988; Giere 1999a; Giere 2006b; Godfrey-Smith 
2009; Van Fraassen 1980; Van Fraassen 2008; Weisberg 2013a). However, 
being the central term in an extensive literature also means that the exact 
sense of the word is quite controversial (Godfrey-Smith 2006, p. 725). And 
stipulating yet another (in this case very broad) sense of the term is bound to 
cause controversy (if not outright anger) as well as confusion. I will use the 
word ‘model’ frequently throughout the thesis. But this use will be restricted to 
cases in which modelling (in a narrow sense) is an obvious part of the 
representational activities. Most of the time the generic expression ‘vehicle of 
representation’ (or ‘vehicle’) is more fitting.
So, a vehicle of representation may be a mathematical model, a computa-
tional model, propositional model, a concrete model, a theory, a linguistic 
expression, a concept, a painting, a piece of music, an open cheese sand-
wich,  or whatever. Contrary to what one might initially think, vehicles of 15
representation used in a given act of scientific representation are much easier 
to pinpoint than target systems. A vehicle is most often given a prominent 
place in the publications of those making use of it. Indeed, one way to 
determine what is the vehicle of representation in a given approach is to look 
for what is proudly presented as the condensed »essence« resulting from the 
efforts on which a given scientific publication is based. In contrast, it often 
requires significant effort to explicate the target system.
To borrow an example from Ronald Giere (1988, p. 70 ff.):
FIGURE 2: THE SIMPLE PENDULUM.
is an equation (a mathematical model) commonly used in physics textbooks to 
represent a certain aspect of the movements of a pendulum. The equation fits 
the experimental results of Newton and Galileo, which showed that the period 
(P) of a pendulum is proportional to the square root of its length (l) divided by 
the gravitational constant (g), and that the period is independent of the mass 
of the bob (which is, as a consequence, not represented).
In this case it could hardly be more simple: The above equation is the 
vehicle of representation in the mentioned act of representation.
Targets 
The target, however, is less straight forward to identify. While vehicles often 
come in the form of mathematical equations, graphs, or verbal descriptions 
easily put to print, target systems are much more diverse. A target system 
might be a physical object, a group of physical objects, or a (stipulated) kind 
of physical objects. It might also be an emergent object, a fictional object, a 
 This will, I promise, eventually make sense.15
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social object or relation, a process, or, for that matter, a more or less universal 
scientific practise. But to complicate things further, in acts of representation it 
is quite rare simply to represent some object per se. Mostly, it is the case that 
some aspects of the target is represented while others are (more or less deli-
berately and more or less explicitly) ignored.
The target in the case of the equation of the simple pendulum is not any old 
pendulum in motion. In this case we are lucky, since it is most often clearly ex-
plicated in physics textbooks that the above equation represents an idealised 
pendulum. Indeed, it is often made explicit which idealisations are required in 
order to single out the kind of target the equation fits. In the case of the 
equation of the simple pendulum, the target is explicitly abstract, indeed, ex-
plicit to a highly commendable degree. In other cases, of course, the target 
may either be (closer to) a real world system, or abstract without the involved 
idealisations being explicitly stated.
Approaches 
As mentioned above, a central part of my treatment in the following will be an 
attack on the use of distinctions based on disciplines. I argue, perhaps at first 
glance paradoxically, that in order to understand interdisciplinarity, we will 
have to discard the notion of “discipline” and study approaches instead. 
Disciplines are highly complex phenomena and an entire chapter of this thesis 
is devoted to capturing their nature. Indeed, as the discussion of disciplines 
will reveal, disciplines are far too complex phenomena to serve not just as 
basis for the epistemic assessment of interdisciplinary cases, but also for 
interdisciplinary collaborations.
Therefore I will focus on the alternative concept  “approaches”.
As already stated, I define “approach” as the specific way of using a 
specific vehicle to represent some target. In a given publication, it is relatively 
straightforward to see who is representing, what is used as a vehicle of 
representation, what is represented, and why. Further it is easy to get a 
decent idea about what is supposed to be the consequences of the approach, 
i.e. what the outputs are.
To return to the stylised example presented above, in a psychology paper 
the number of participants, the statistical methods used, the questions asked 
and so on and so forth will (at least ideally) be spelled out. If experiments are 
carried out, the specific experimental setup will be described. Some aspects 
will not be explicitly presented, though. Some assumptions and use of tools 
will be taken for granted. Lots of details will not be included, such as 
biographical details of the participants in the experiment. Some of these omit-
ted details might matter if closer analyses are carried out, of course. The 
approach includes everything that is presupposed by those doing the repre-
sentation, including implicit assumptions and other very general and often 
unquestioned principles (such as parsimony assumptions and similar).
Obviously, some approaches are very complex. But compared to disciplin-
es, they are much easier to handle analytically. Inspired by Giere’s suggestion 
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that we should consider theories to be clusters (of clusters of clusters) of 
models (Giere 1988, p. 82), I suggest to consider disciplines as bundles (of 
bundles) of approaches.
I intend my use of ‘approach’ to be in some ways similar to everyday 
(scientific) parlance, in which it would not be surprising to encounter expres-
sions such as »what is your preferred approach?«, »what was their approach 
for tackling that issue?«, or perhaps »this doesn’t seem to work—let’s try 
another approach!« Indeed, what I wish to capture are the changes that 
constitute transformation from one approach to another, since this is how I 
believe interdisciplinarity should eventually be considered: as transformation 
from one approach to another. Every approach requires the same kinds of 
appraisal in order for its epistemic virtues to be assessed.
“Distance” and “proximity” 
Independent of which people are involved in the scientific activities and their 
respective affiliations, different approaches may be more or less overlapping. 
“Distance” and “proximity”  are two concepts (denoting opposite limits of a 16
continuum) meant to capture the degree of overlap between two approaches. 
Some approaches belonging to disciplines which are categorised very differ-
ently in conventional and administrative taxonomies of science would, on an 
approach based account, be considered very proximate due to strong 
overlaps in the above sense as well as for sharing paradigmatic examples of 
good practice.
Integration between proximate disciplines are similar to what is sometimes 
referred to as narrow interdisciplinarity in the Interdisciplinarity Studies 
literature, while integration between distant disciplines are referred to as 
broad or wide interdisciplinarity (Klein 1990, p. 18). I believe, that there is 
ample room for further elaboration of proximity or distance. Especially, my 
analysis will reveal interesting consequences, or pitfalls if you like, related to 
trying to integrate distant approaches.
On the one hand talk of interdisciplinarity between proximate approaches 
could in many ways seem quite unimpressive from a naïve epistemic point of 
view. The combination of two, or more, very similar approaches may intuitively 
seem unlikely to lead to revolutionary new insights. On the other hand, there 
might be unsurmountable difficulties related to combining very distant ap-
proaches since such would have very little in common at the outset. Thus, the 
 I thank John Matthewsson and Peter Godfrey-Smith for independently pointing out the need for some 16
notion of “disciplinary distance” in discussions of this project during my stay at The University of Sydney 
in 2015. 
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required effort for solving the puzzle of whether such a combination could (or 
has) lead to fruitful results might not even be worth the effort.17
Summing up
The overall motivations for this thesis are the following issues: If 
interdisciplinarity has any epistemic effect worth noticing, at least a significant 
part of this effect must occur as a detectable effect at the level of scientific 
approach, that is, at the level of vehicles of representation or ways of using a 
vehicle of representation to represent a certain target for representational 
purposes. The analysis of such effects will include explication of the basic 
assumptions, tools,  propositional algorithms, and data models at work in the 
pre- and post-integrated representational activities.
In this thesis, interdisciplinarity will be understood as minimally requiring 
the integration of two approaches. Integration is understood as the combi-
nation of elements picked from different approaches. In many cases of inter-
disciplinarity, one might expect that elements are picked from several more or 
less closely related approaches. Distance between approaches is understood 
in the soft sense of a measure of the extent to which two approaches share 
elements—some of which might be more important than others, of course.
Should one encounter an alleged interdisciplinary collaboration in which no 
differences can be detected at the levels of approach, it ought to make one 
somewhat suspicious. If nothing has changed in terms of vehicles, targets, 
and relations between them, while differences in output still occurs, it would 
indicate that my presently presented framework fails to capture the most 
central elements of interdisciplinary integration.
What has been presented in this introductory chapter so far is the basis 
upon which I will develop a framework for analysing the epistemic aspects of 
interdisciplinarity—the so-called approach based analysis. The development 
will proceed in the following steps:
Chapter 2—Disciplines and approaches
In this chapter I provide an in-depth analysis of the concept of “scientific 
discipline” and disciplinary difference.
As already stated, a fundamental point of attack in this thesis are conven-
tional disciplinary distinctions. This chapter provides reasons to assume that a 
conventional scientific taxonomy is not a good basis for analysing epistemic 
aspects of interdisciplinary science.
On this background it is argued that the concept of “approaches” is a more 
fruitful alternative.
 I disagree, then, with a lot of the existing treatments of interdisciplinarity in which it is assumed that 17
disciplines have a »virtual monopoly of expertise on their subject matter« (Weingart 2010, p. 9). In a lot 
of cases such a generalisation would not pass an empirical test. This superficial view, I claim, is an 
artefact of uncritically basing ones understanding of interdisciplinary integration on conventional 
disciplinary taxonomies.
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Three different levels for analysing interdisciplinarity are discussed: 1) 
Patricia Kitcher’s very scholarly, historical approach, 2) Michael Weisberg’s 
model-based approach (which, strictly, is not an attempt at analysing inter-
disciplinarity but nevertheless ends up discussing some of the central issues), 
and 3) my own more detailed approach based analysis.
I will further discuss different modes of disciplinary integration, from the 
polymath-mode (where a single person integrates several approaches 
internally) to entirely social modes (where the integration is, so to speak, 
external to the individuals involved). This discussion draws on discussions 
from science studies to explicate potential difficulties such as the lack of core 
sets as well as the lack of peers to review publications. Even though some 
might criticise the discipline based peer review system for many reasons, it 
certainly does have a number of points in its favour. Some of these positive 
aspects of peer review might be ineffective when addressing interdisciplinary 
approaches, though.
Chapter 3—Interdisciplinarity Studies and interdisciplinarity
I will provide a number of examples of interdisciplinary science and go 
through some relevant aspects of the present state of the discipline of 
Interdisciplinarity Studies.
I will provide my best account of why interdisciplinarity is such a topical 
subject in academia today, and why I consider the existing literature on the 
topic to be lacking in certain central respects.
I will also discuss the basic question of why we need interdisciplinarity at 
all? What are the attractions (the ontological and methodological assump-
tions) that drive people towards interdisciplinary collaborations?
Chapter 4—Is philosophy relevant to the study of interdisciplinarity?
This chapter will be quite short. My answer to the above question will be 
“Yes!”
It is worth discussing, however, the quite prevalent and influential argu-
ments against the relevance of philosophy to scientific activities (in general).
Chapter 5—Representation
The rest of the thesis will argue in favour of construing interdisciplinarity and 
interdisciplinary activities by means of concepts and theories drawn from the 
philosophy of scientific representation. To develop this argument, it is required 
to introduce this literature in some detail.
I will go through discussions of the nature of models, not because I believe 
“model” is the perfect concept to place at centre stage in this discussion, but 
because the discussion of models throws valuable light on how best to 
construe interdisciplinarity qua representational activity.
Ronald Giere’s framework for analysing representational activities is 
presented. The virtues of this approach are highlighted as well as the senses 
in which it is lacking in order to serve our present purpose.
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Chapter 6—Pluralisms, perspectives, and potential problems
In this chapter, issues related to scientific pluralism are discussed. This 
includes Giere’s perspectivism and his one-world-(working-)hypothesis.
Primitively put, scientific pluralism denotes the conviction that there are 
numerous ways to perform scientific activities and, importantly, these are not 
readily interchangeable between contexts.
Any way of representing reality involves distortions. And these distortions 
cannot easily be removed, if at all. Several in-depth examples of unavoidable 
distortions are presented. In many cases such distortions are invisible to the 
untrained eye, which is a serious epistemic problem in interdisciplinarity, since 
interdisciplinary activities by definition involve lots of less than well-trained 
eyes.
At this point the concepts of “tools”, “assumptions”, and “propositional 
algorithms” will prove their worth. I go into the nitty gritty of some examples of 
importing tools and propositional algorithms and the pitfalls involved in such 
operations.
Chapter 7—Scientific Crossbreeding
In this chapter the Giere Duplex is introduced in detail as a framework for 
analysing interdisciplinary integration.
With the Giere duplex in place, we are in a good position for analysing 
integration between scientific approaches. This analysis has the potential to 
systematise the considerations about modes and difficulties of integration 
discussed in chapter 2.
Analysis based on the Giere Duplex leads to a fuller understanding of the 
notions of “approach” and “distance”. It also leads to some recommendations 
that run directly counter to established assumptions about interdisciplinarity.
Chapter 8—Case study: Phenomenology imported with EASE
In this chapter, the developed framework is applied in a case study of a 
specific interdisciplinary project within schizophrenia research: Namely a parti-
cular approach of the EASE project developed by a research group lead by 
Josef Parnas at a Psychiatric Research Facility in Copenhagen.
I go through the background of the project, i.e. the contemporary status of 
schizophrenia research, psychiatry , and psychopathology.
Parent approaches are singled out (to the extent possible), the integrated 
vehicle is identified as well as the most important elements of the intermediate 
layer. The approach based analysis of this interdisciplinary project will result in 
interesting conclusions about the epistemic merits of this particular 
interdisciplinary approach.
Chapter 9—Conclusion
In chapter 9, I sum up the entire thesis and discuss the consequences of 
viewing interdisciplinarity in the suggested way. I briefly discuss some 
possible ways to develop and further support the suggested framework as 
well as questions which would be good to address in future research. 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2 — Disciplines and approaches
ABSTRACT. In this chapter, the most common ways of distinguish-
ing between branches of science are criticised for focusing to nar-
rowly on single dimensions of a highly complex phenomenon. 
Some usually neglected aspects are pointed out which ought to be 
included in a more adequate account of disciplinarity. The com-
plexity of disciplines, however, renders an adequate concept hereof 
more or less useless as the foundation for analyses of specific 
cases of interdisciplinarity. “Discipline” and related concepts are 
compared to the alternative “approach”, which, it is argued, will 
serve us better as the basic unit of analyses of scientific cross-
breeding. The thought that disciplines should be considered as 
bundles (of bundles) of approaches is revisited and some con-
sequences hereof are drawn out.
This chapter provides an analysis of what the »things« called disciplines are. 
This will primarily involve discussing different concepts denoted by the term 
‘discipline’ in various contexts. There are a lot of interesting aspects of the 
»nature« of disciplines, many of which are highly relevant for discussions of 
interdisciplinarity. The presented perspective on these issues will frame the 
analyses in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. Most importantly, the 
discussion of disciplinarity in this chapter will provide the background for why 
analysing cases of interdisciplinarity in terms of approaches is considered 
preferable.
Disciplines are far more complex phenomena than ordinary use of the word 
‘discipline’ admits. One consequence of this is, that if one wants to include 
epistemic aspects in one’s considerations of interdisciplinarity, one cannot 
simply rely on ‘discipline’ in the common usage of the word. Lexical definitions 
often do not capture the complexity of the phenomena in target. Such 
discordances are prevalent sources for confusion and disagreement. In the 
case of ‘discipline’, discordances (and related confusion) are certainly present 
and influential.
The topic of scientific disciplinarity is sufficiently rich and interesting to 
provide material for an entire doctoral thesis in itself. Obviously, in this context 
the treatment of these questions will have to be restricted to the most relevant 
aspects. This means that this chapter will not provide detailed accounts of the 
history of discipline formation or organisational analyses of how academic 
institutions have developed into their present form. Thus, the discussions in 
this chapter will by no means constitute an exhaustive account of 
disciplinarity.
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The following discussion will quickly reach the conclusion that the concept 
“discipline”, in any of the shapes analysed, is a poor foundation for analysing 
epistemic aspects of poly-disciplinary activities. At first, then, it might seem 
somewhat paradoxical that I will devote an entire chapter to this analysis, and 
further continue to use the terms ‘discipline’ and ’interdisciplinarity’ throughout 
the thesis. Not least since I will argue that phenomena commonly referred to 
as interdisciplinary are more fruitfully discussed if analyses are based on the 
integration of approaches in my sense of the term.
But since ‘interdisciplinarity’ is the term by which the phenomena of interest 
are usually denoted, it will be too awkward to discuss changes to our 
understanding of interdisciplinarity without using the commonly accepted 
term. And further, though I reject “discipline” as the basis for analysing specific 
cases of interdisciplinarity, I do not claim that the concept is generally useless 
or superfluous. It certainly makes good sense to speak of disciplines in many 
contexts. And, indeed, a nuanced understanding of disciplines is required, in 
order to understand many of the issues related to approach based analysis of 
interdisciplinarity. Acknowledging the terminological messiness, however, I will 
take care consistently to use ‘approach’, ‘discipline’, and ‘interdisciplinarity’ in 
ways that should reduce confusion to a minimum.
Since disciplines are considered to be bundles (of bundles) of approaches, 
and since the approaches constituting a given bundle  will often be quite 18
proximate, one might often find elements or traits that are common to the 
approaches of entire bundles or even disciplines. For instance, there are 
certain empirical standards which are common to many approaches in 
somatic medicine, e.g. double blinded tests which serve to reduce bias and 
estimate placebo- or nocebo-effects.
Often a series of publications within a research programme reflect a 
theoretical evolution in which slightly altering series of approaches are tried 
out and modified. In other cases new publications serve to cast light on 
underdeveloped or misunderstood aspects which critics may have pointed 
out. In this way, scientific efforts will implicitly be aimed at developing a 
coherent bundle of approaches.
Further, in order to do a scientific project at all, you need a scientific base. 
Most often, interdisciplinarity is practised from within some discipline and 
certain fundamental requirements of this discipline will have to be accepted. 
As will be discussed below (chapter 8), if you are aiming to publish your 
findings in psychiatric journals you cannot simply discard official diagnostic 
procedures. As the discussion will show there is a large difference between 
importing elements of philosophy into psychiatry and vice versa.
In most cases, a lot of background assumptions will not be explicitly 
challenged during integration. And if unchallenged, they are likely to remain in 
the default position of the base discipline. All in all, the concept of “discipline” 
is far from superfluous even when approaches are considered the basic unit 
 One bundle of approaches can be considered to be equivalent to a research project or 18
programme.
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of integration. Indeed, it will often be quite informative to know the disciplinary 
relationships of an approach in focus.
Nevertheless, since the main purpose of this thesis is to develop a method 
for singling out the epistemic effects and dynamics of interdisciplinarity. To do 
so, a fine-grained procedure for distinguishing between distinct scientific 
activities is required—among other things, in order to be able to determine 
what is combined in cases of interdisciplinary integration. For this purpose, I 
argue that my concept of “approach” is superior to “discipline”.
Obviously, the parent approaches must be non-identical in order for it to 
make sense to consider their integration as interdisciplinary. Thus, we need 
means for deciding whether the combined approaches are sufficiently 
different in relevant respects for their integration to count as truly 
interdisciplinary. As will be clear from the treatment below, there is another 
important question relating to difference between parent approaches. This is 
»how different should approaches be in order to reach the optimal level of 
fruitfulness?« This naturally leads to the further question of whether it is 
possible to say something in general about such issues at all.
Also with respect to these issues, the concept “approach” is superior to 
“discipline”. As the following discussion will show, disciplines are highly 
complex phenomena; complex to the extent that knowing that something 
belongs to a certain discipline is not very informative regarding epistemic 
matters.
In the following section, I will spell out in some detail why the ordinary use 
of ‘discipline’ is uninformative as well as the consequences hereof for the 
study of interdisciplinarity.
What are these things called ‘disciplines’?
It is easy to point out difficulties to which any account of disciplines ought to 
provide some kind of response. Think of questions such as whether philoso-
phy is one discipline in spite of its strong inherent heterogeneity? Or whether 
statistics is a discipline distinct from the rest of mathematics? Whether all 
disciplines of the humanities share common characteristics which set them 
apart relative to disciplines belonging to the natural or social sciences? A 
general issue is at which level of abstraction distinctions between different 
disciplines are to be made.
Despite the central importance of one’s position regarding issues such as 
these, it is not uncommon to discuss interdisciplinarity without conveying 
one’s position regarding basic distinctions. Indeed, in most treatments of inter-
disciplinarity, it is left unclear what exactly is denoted by the term ‘discipline’. 
Neither is it made clear which method is used for distinguishing between dis-
ciplines, or why this particular method is preferred.
There are, indeed, many potential ways of creating taxonomies of scientific 
activities, and there is a substantial body of literature dealing with issues such 
as what might be the natural (or most useful) way of distinguishing between 
different branches of science (e.g. Bechtel 1986; Darden & Maull 1977; Kellert 
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2009; Kockelmans 1979a; Sherif 1979). The easiest way forward would be to 
focus on the organisational structure of scientific institutions, i.e. to map how 
universities are divided into faculties, institutes, departments, units, centres, 
educations, and so on and so forth. The taxonomy that results from applying 
this »standard method« most often provides the background for analyses of 
whether some interaction is interdisciplinary or not.
It should only take brief reflections for suspicions to emerge that organi-
sational disciplinary boundaries do not necessarily track epistemically relevant 
differences. It appears that there is nothing to prevent researchers from em-
ploying quite similar methods and approaches in spite of being affiliated to 
different faculties. Consequently, there is an important distinction to be made 
between the organisational disciplinary divisions on the one hand, and the 
divisions that would result from analyses of differences in actual scientific 
approach on the other. The conclusion is, once again, that for an epistemic 
analysis, one needs a more fine-grained way of distinguishing between scien-
tific activities than the standard method.
Problems are not restricted to cases in which activities considered 
interdisciplinary are in fact not truly so due to insufficient pre-interaction differ-
ences. As Bechtel has stated, if one relies on the most common set of cate-
gories, not only is one at risk of considering something to be interdisciplinary 
in a productive way, when it is not, indeed,
[…] there may in fact be a great del of activity that crosses disciplinary 
boundaries which do not fit the preconception academic and science 
administrators hold when they bemoan the lack of interdisciplinary activity or 
of actual scientists when they caution against greater interdisciplinarity. 
(Bechtel 1986, p. 4)
I will return to the topic below in this chapter, but for now let me once again 
emphasise that it is not only important to determine some threshold of 
sufficient pre-interaction difference, which is indeed a daunting task in itself. 
There is also the task of figuring out whether some levels of difference or 
distance between approaches are more likely to lead to good results than 
others. The following discussion of the nature of disciplines will provide us 
with elements of a framework for distinguishing relevant activities and differ-
ences. This framework has the potential to lead to more accurate and fruitful 
analyses.
Distinctive discussions of “discipline”
As the following will show, the nature of disciplines is a topic that has received 
quite a lot of philosophical attention. When confronted with the numerous 
attempts at developing more exact versions of this concept, one might wonder 
why I want to add another. I shall attempt to provide a reasonable answer to 
that question below, after going through some of the existing literature on how 
best to think of disciplines.
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The term ‘discipline’ is often used as if it were a technical term with a 
clearly explicated sense with which everybody is familiar. On the contrary, 
however, the word is apparently retrieved more or less directly from ordinary 
parlance (Kockelmans 1979b, p. 16 f.).  It ought not come as a surprise, that a 
vague everyday term does not work very well as the basic unit for exact 
analyses of scientific collaborations. Though it is rarely explicitly discussed, 
this practice has lead to a fair amount of confusion. Only rarely do scholars 
explicitly state that they use ‘discipline’ in a non-exact sense. The following 
quotation is an exemplary exemption:
In this volume I talk about disciplines in a broader sense in which they are 
knowledge-producing enterprises with some shared problems, with some 
overlapping cognitive tools, and with some shared social structure. Thus, I 
call philosophy and sociology “disciplines,” although there is certainly no set 
of shared techniques that all practitioners of these fields share. Consider a 
“Continental” philosopher such as Edward Casey (1997) and an analytic 
philosopher of science such as John Earman (1989) discussing space, for 
example. They have little in common in terms of style of argumentation or 
overlapping references. (Kellert 2009, p. 29; references in the original text)
Problems of disciplinarity 
At first glance, the distribution of disciplines at universities may seem to be 
organised as a classic taxonomy in which disciplines are grouped together in 
faculties according to fundamental similarities and divided into more 
specialised sub-disciplines. Thus, for instance, physics, chemistry, and biolo-
gy belong to faculties of natural sciences, while literature studies, philosophy, 
and linguistics belong to faculties of the humanities. Examples of sub-
disciplines of physics are quantum mechanics, astronomy, and thermo-
dynamics, while philosophy can be subdivided into, for instance, philosophy of 
language, philosophy of science, ethics, and so on. 
As stated above, upon closer examination it appears that the organisational 
disciplinary boundaries do not track epistemically relevant differences be-
tween scientific approaches (even though they are not completely indepen-
dent hereof either).
For example, at the University of Copenhagen, psychology is placed at the 
Faculty of Social Sciences along with sociology, economics, and political 
science. At the University of Southern Denmark, on the other hand, psycho-
logy is placed at the Faculty of Health Sciences along with medicine, public 
health, and audiologopaedics. First, of course, it is clear that at least one of 
these universities is not carving academia at its joints. Second, and more 
interesting, it seems that at least some parts of psychology, for instance empi-
rical and theoretical work on the psychology of concepts, are quite closely 
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related  to certain parts of linguistics (especially cognitive semantics) and 19
philosophy of language. Linguistic and philosophy belong to the Faculties of 
the Humanities at both institutions. From a strictly administrative perspective, 
thus, collaborations between cognitive semantics and empirical psychology of 
concepts would be considered interdisciplinary (indeed of the most prestigious 
cross-faculty kind) at both of these universities. This in spite of the fact that 
one would be hard pressed to point out significant differences between the 
pre-integration approaches of the involved researchers, and equally hard 
pressed to point out how the integration of these very similar approaches 
might result in novel approaches.
As another example with a different structure, consider mathematics. 
Arithmetic and geometry are core parts of any basic curriculum in mathema-
tics. Many problems in geometry are elegantly solved through applications of 
arithmetic on geometrical issues and vice versa. Indeed, these two elemen-
tary parts of mathematics are so interconnected that few would probably think 
of combinations of arithmetic and geometry as interdisciplinary at all. This 
impression is strengthened by the observation that groups of people with 
geometrical and arithmetical expertise tend to overlap significantly.
But indeed, arithmetic and geometry are radically different enterprises tar-
geting completely distinct objects.  That impressive results could be achieved 20
through the combination of these distinct branches of mathematics was far 
from obvious to anyone prior to revolutionary work by, among others, 
Descartes (actually, this continues to be far from obvious to many even today) 
(Hacking 2014, p. 7). There are other examples of fruitful boundary crossing 
internal to mathematics such as algebraic geometry, algebraic topology, and 
analytic number theory. All of these have developed into primary fields of in-
quiry in their own right. A further, though quite different, example of boundary 
crossing in mathematics is that of probability and statistics. These have only 
quite recently come to be parts of mathematics at all, even though by current 
standards there is no disagreement about where they belong (Galison 2008, 
p. 115; Gigerenzer et al. 1989). Examples such as these cross-fertilisations 
between different parts of mathematics  speak strongly in favour of hybrid 21
scientific activities. But they speak equally strongly against analysing these 
activities on the basis of conventional disciplinary distinctions.
Yet a different challenge to the standard understanding of disciplines is the 
issue of internal incoherence. It is not only philosophy which is plagued by 
considerable internal heterogeneity. Think of elements of economy such as a 
 For instance, in terms of topics of interest, central aspects of methodology, paradigmatic 19
examples of good practice, as well as theoretical background assumptions (Fauconnier & 
Turner 2002; Lakoff 1987; Margolis & Laurence 1999; Murphy 2002).
 Just think of how Kant considered arithmetic to be the synthetic a priori truths of time, while 20
he considered geometry to be the synthetic a priori truths of space [4:283]
 —which is »a constant source of both delight and achievement among 21
mathematicians« (Hacking 2014, p. 9).
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priori mathematical modelling, more or less anecdotal descriptions of the 
history of economic institutions, and highly idealised representations of human 
beings as strictly rational agents. Do these elements constitute a coherent 
whole? Or take psychology: What is the connection between intelligence 
tests, detailed subjective biographies, anonymous lab-tests, factor analysis, 
and the traumas of childhood? There do not appear to be any common topics 
or general methodologies involved here (Campbell 1969, p. 332)? Neverthe-
less, psychology and economics are considered to be disciplines by all 
traditional standards.
Matters are even less clear with an area such as political science. In politi-
cal science, work is based on a very heterogenous multidisciplinary base 
drawing upon e.g. philosophy, mathematics, history, statistics, sociology, and 
more (Aldrich 2014, p. 6). One might think of political science as a disciplinary 
chimera, which could eventually sediment and develop the characteristics of a 
truly integrated discipline in its own right (whatever these characteristics are). 
From an epistemic point of view, though, it does seem reasonable to question 
whether political science has yet developed into a self-contained discipline. 
And consequently, one might wonder whether a collaboration between politi-
cal scientists and, say, philosophers should count as interdisciplinary.
On the other hand, though, political science has all the infrastructure need-
ed to be taken seriously as a stand alone discipline from an administrative 
point of view. It has university departments, dedicated journals, peer review 
structure, PhD-programs, tenure opportunities and so on and so forth. The 
question remains whether this is sufficient for it to be a discipline in its own 
right?
Philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science have developed 
various alternative concepts intended to more fruitfully or adequately capture 
the basic distinctions between scientific branches. Examples abound: discipli-
nes in various versions, fields, paradigms, research programs, domains, 
specialties, areas, research groups, and research networks (Bechtel 1986; 
Darden & Maull 1977; Kuhn 1962; Lakatos & Musgrave 1970; Shapere 1974; 
Shapere 1984; Toulmin 1972). Even though few of these were originally deve-
loped for the purpose of analysing interdisciplinarity, they draw attention to 
many issues relevant for the discussion hereof. The following discussion will 
provide the background for offering the alternative concept “approaches”.
Three dimensions (plus some) of disciplinarity
William Bechtel has suggested that different accounts of how to discriminate 
between disciplines can themselves be characterised by the emphasis they 
put on three different dimensions: 1) the phenomena they target (i.e. their 
objects of study); 2) the cognitive tools they use (e.g. the theories, concepts 
and models they employ); and 3) social structure (e.g. institutional affiliations, 
peer review organisation, journals) (Bechtel 1986, p. 8).
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As the following will demonstrate, Bechtel’s framework certainly draws out 
important aspects of the differences between distinct understandings of the 
central characteristics of disciplines. 
But before we embark on this discussion, the following is worth mentioning: 
One might reasonably think of Lakatos’ “research programmes” and Kuhn’s 
“paradigms” and “disciplinary matrices” as some of the most influential ex-
amples of epistemically relevant distinctions between scientific activities. But 
these concepts are macro-concepts (Hull 1982) and are thus quite far from 
the level of detail which is required for the present purpose. Therefore these 
otherwise influential concepts are not included in the following discussion.
Social aspects only 
One option is to base characterisations of disciplines solely on a single of 
Bechtel’s dimensions. For instance, Nissani (1997) has characterised discip-
lines as »any comparatively self-contained and isolated domain of human ex-
perience which possesses its own community of experts« (p. 203). On 
Nissani’s account of disciplines, social structure is the only aspect considered. 
Stephen Turner has provided another example based strictly on the social 
dimension, though he put more stress on educational background. Turner 
stated that »[d]isciplines are kinds of collectivities that include a large propor-
tion of people holding degrees with the same differentiating specialization 
name […]« (2000, p. 47). Turner emphasised a number of other (social) 
aspects which are required for something to be a full-fledged discipline, e.g. 
that the people involved are organised in degree granting units, that these 
people are employed in these units on the grounds of having obtained such a 
degree themselves, and that there are other groups who identify themselves 
with the same discipline name. Turner prided himself for having come up with 
a definition with a remarkable fit to actual disciplines. This is, however, not 
much of an achievement. When a definition states little more than that all 
phenomena called ‘x’ belong to the category y, it is not surprising if y ends up 
having a good fit with how the term ‘x’ is normally used.
Examples discussed above in this chapter have demonstrated that 
focusing on social aspects of disciplines do not provide a sufficient level of 
detail for an epistemic analysis of interdisciplinarity. So let us immediately 
devote our attention to more auspicious alternatives.
Objects only 
Dudley Shapere’s sophisticated notion of scientific domains is a good 
example of an attempt to distinguish between disciplines solely along the 
dimension of objects of study. There is, indeed, also in this case quite a good 
fit between the notion of domain and our normal use of the term ‘discipline’. 
The generic discipline biology, for example, corresponds to the study of the 
very broad domain »living things«, whereas the sub-discipline cardiology 
corresponds to the domain »the human heart«.
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In Shapere’s terminology, a domain is constituted by a set of items, i.e. 
parts that are deliberately selected by the scientist to constitute the object of 
study. Shapere defined “domain” as the set of items studied in an 
investigation. Part of studying a domain is to look for relations between items, 
which indicate that the selected items are fruitfully grouped together (Shapere 
1984, p. 279 ff.). Shapere’s notion of “domain” is useful in this context, since it 
brings out important aspects of how to provide a specification of what consti-
tutes the target in a given scientific (representational) activity.
But even though Shapere’s account is highly developed and might seem as 
a tempting way of characterising disciplines, attempts at distinguishing 
between disciplines simply on the basis of objects of study will not work either. 
Few would maintain that Einstein and Newton do not belong to a common 
discipline, even though their most central objects of study are clearly non-
identical. In the words of Peter Galison:
Though the objects studied change, of course, there is something roughly 
commensurate about the nature of physics in 1930, 1950, and 1970. The 
discipline grew and new specialties arose, but one recognizes across these years 
much continuity in the teaching of physics (start with mechanics, proceed to 
electricity and magnetism, advance to “modern” physics of the atom …). The 
division into theoretical, mathematical, and experimental physics carries across 
the mid-twentieth century rather well. True, the boundary between physics and 
chemistry changes; but (whatever critics said as they raised their anti-Einsteinian 
voices) no one argued that special relativity was really a piece of chemistry or a 
fragment of biology—not in 1905, not in 1955, not even in 2005. (Galison 2008, p. 
115 f.)
Though Shapere’s account is highly sophisticated, it does not capture disciplinarity 
adequately.
Objects and tools combined 
Joseph Kockelmans has provided an example of how to consider disciplines 
as combinations of the dimensions of objects of study and cognitive tools 
while excluding considerations of social structure. He defines “discipline” as 
[a] branch of learning or field of study characterized by a body of 
intersubjectively acceptable knowledge, pertaining to a well-defined realm of 
entities, systematically established on the basis of generally accepted prin-
ciples with the help of methodological rules or procedures; e.g. mathematics, 
chemistry, history. (Kockelmans 1979b, p. 127)
Another example based on the same two dimensions is the discussion of 
interfield theories by Lindley Darden and Nancy Maull (1977), which is a rare 
example of a philosophical account targeting interdisciplinary collaborations 
directly. In their interesting discussions of theoretical integration within biology, 
Darden and Maull also focused strictly on objects of study and cognitive tools 
while, again, excluding social aspects. As they stated: »We are interested in 
 47
conceptual, not sociological or institutional, change« (Darden & Maull 1977, p. 
44). Instead of “discipline” they employed the concept “field”, which they 
defined as:  
[…] an area of science consisting of the following elements: a central 
problem, a domain consisting of items taken to be facts related to that 
problem, general explanatory factors and goals providing expectations as to 
how the problem is to be solved, techniques and methods, and, sometimes, 
but not always, concepts, laws and theories which are related to the problem 
and which attempt to realize the explanatory goals. A special vocabulary is 
often associated with the characteristic elements of a field. (Darden & Maull 
1977, p. 44)
A field, in Darden's and Maull’s sense, is similar to what one might call a 
specialised sub-discipline. If biology is a discipline, genetics or cytology would 
be fields. An interfield theory, then, is a theory (or model) that combines 
knowledge from two distinct fields in one way or the other. 
Darden and Maull listed a number of ways in which interfield theories might 
improve scientific understanding of some phenomena. As one example they 
mentioned how one field may focus on the function of a given phenomena 
while another field may focus on its structure. For instance, anatomy is an 
example of a field, which is distinct from, yet very closely related to physio-
logy. In spite of significant overlaps, anatomy can be distinguished by its study 
of the structure of the parts which constitute living things, while physiology 
studies the function of these parts. There is no doubt that in-depth knowledge 
of the structure of a phenomenon may enrich one’s understanding of its 
function (and vice versa). As another example, one field may be able to speci-
fy the physical location of an entity or process which has been postulated 
within another field. For instance, in the early chromosome theory of Mendeli-
an heredity, genes were postulated to be somewhere in or on the chromo-
somes. The field of cytology was able to specify that the genes are indeed 
inside the chromosomes. Thus, collaboration between genetics and cytology 
helped develop the understanding of this specific part-whole relation (Darden 
& Maull 1977, p. 49).
Though Darden and Maull’s discussion of fields is quite reminiscent of ap-
proach based analysis, there are substantial differences. One difference worth 
emphasising is that Darden and Maull focus strictly on issues related to 
integration internal to biology. Indeed, the integration of fields such as 
genetics and cytology, involves what I would consider the integration of very 
proximate approaches. But an adequate framework for capturing present day 
interdisciplinary activities needs a broader scope. Further, whereas the con-
cept “approach” denotes a particular way of representing, the concept “field” is 
less specific. It lies somewhere between a bundle of approaches and a 
discipline.
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The characterisations proposed by Darden & Maull and by Kockelmans are 
certainly superior to those based exclusively on social aspects. Nevertheless, 
an even closer fit can be gained, as the following will show.
All included? 
In his Human Understanding (1972) Stephen Toulmin argues in favour of an 
account of disciplines which include all three of Bechtel’s dimensions. But, 
significantly, Toulmin added two dimensions (p. 145 ff.). The fourth dimension, 
which Toulmin placed centrally, relates to the problems which the research of 
a given discipline is aimed at resolving.  The fifth dimension is time.22
As Toulmin pointed out, all aspects of disciplinarity targeted in an analysis 
along the first four dimensions are transitory. The set of people who constitute 
the members of the discipline and the social structures that bind groups 
together, certainly vary through time. So do the conceptual and theoretical 
elements (and, for that matter, the instruments used). As emphasised in the 
Galison quotation just above, even the objects of study sometimes change 
dramatically in only a few years. And as Toulmin noted, the same is true of the 
problems addressed. Indeed, on Toulmin's account, changes to the problems 
addressed is a natural consequence of scientific progress, since he defined 
scientific problems as explanatory ideals minus current capacities (Toulmin 
1972, p. 152).
The five dimensional analysis lead Toulmin to include atomic physics and 
law in the category of disciplines, whereas he interestingly excluded philo-
sophy (Ibid., p. 145).
Where does this leave us? 
Bechtel’s three dimensions serve us well for distinguishing between different 
ways of categorising science. Indeed, all of Bechtel’s dimensions plus 
Toulmin’s two additional ones will have to be included in an adequate charac-
terisation of the basic phenomena of disciplinarity. However, characterising 
disciplines in this way does not provide us with a very good basis for 
analysing specific interdisciplinary integrations. I will discuss my preferred 
alternative in the next section. But first a couple of other remarks are in place:
All these discussions of the nature of disciplines and how to distinguish 
between them are certainly interesting. But despite their obvious relevance for 
the purpose, their conclusions and considerations do not seem to have had 
much impact on evaluations of research proposals. In such evaluations 
collaborations are to a very large extent discussed on the basis of institutional 
affiliations and other social aspects. Little regard is payed to relevant 
differences or similarities in actual scientific approach. 
For one example, one might consult the Guidance for evaluators of Horizon 
2020 proposals. Horizon 2020 is a 70 billion € research initiative by the 
 As explicitly stated in the quotation above, Darden and Maul do indeed include problems in 22
their characteristic of fields, as well.
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European Union (EC 2014). In the guide, it is made clear that »fostering multi-
actor engagement«, mixing nationalities, and achieving a higher than average 
female-to-male ratio among participants are important criteria in the evalua-
tion of research proposals. In specific calls, it is specified more narrowly which 
kinds of scholars are expected to participate. In very general terms, it is 
expressed that interdisciplinarity is expected to contribute to the quality and 
excellence of research proposals. Now, there are many good things to say 
about mixing nationalities and securing a reasonable male-to-female-ratio. But 
these criteria certainly do not target epistemic aspects of interdisciplinary 
activities directly. Apart from very general requirements (objectives must be 
clear and pertinent; concepts must be sound and novel; the proposed 
methodology must be credible), no other criteria for evaluating the epistemic 
aspects of proposals are provided.
Part of the problem here, I suspect, is an over-reliance on the inadequate 
distinctions one can make by means of the notion of “discipline”. As displayed 
in the above survey, those who have taken the time to consider the issue in 
detail have not reached agreement. This predicament is not changed to the 
better, of course, when people entirely fail to even address the central issues 
of disciplinarity. One problem is, I believe, that even some of the most subtle 
discussions of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity are carried out using the 
term ‘discipline’ as its basis. A more exact or optimal sense of ‘discipline’ may 
be explicated to some extent, but if the term is retained, administrators and 
policymakers will tend to rely on their lay understanding of disciplinarity when 
performing their administrative and political arts (even if they do consult the 
specific literature on the subject). This is a possible consequence, if the langu-
age used in specialised literature does not clearly indicate that what is being 
discussed is something that requires extraordinary interpretative efforts. If 
alternative terminology is used, readers are forced to notice, at least to some 
extent, that everyday concepts are considered inadequate for the discussion 
at hand. 
One of the most central conclusions of this thesis will be that subtle 
nuances are liable to be lost when elements are transferred between con-
texts. One might say that concepts, tools, algorithms, vehicles, and, indeed, 
approaches themselves are often idealised when imported into new settings. I 
will return to this issue in various places below. This effect is strengthened if 
the terms used in specialised senses are identical to ones used in everyday 
senses and no one takes upon him or her the responsibility of making sure 
that confusion is kept at a minimum.
The attentive reader may at this point be tempted to ask: »But ‘approach’ 
seems to be a term retrieved from everyday parlance as well. Is using 
‘approach’ not simply repeating the mistake?« I think not. First, since the 
everyday sense of approach is much closer to the sense in which I make use 
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of it in the present context,  compared to the difference between the every-23
day sense of ‘discipline’ and the adequate concept of disciplinarity. Second, 
the tension involved in claiming that we need to base our analyses of 
interdisciplinarity on “approach” rather than “discipline” attracts enough atten-
tion, I believe, for the reader to give these issues second thought.
It is further worth noticing the temporal distribution of the different charac-
terisations of “discipline” discussed above. The examples emphasising the 
epistemic aspects of disciplinarity (i.e. theoretical constructs, targets and 
methods) are all from the 1960s or 1970s, whereas the discussions focusing 
primarily on social aspects are from the mid 1980s or later. Presumably, this 
distribution reflects the impact of the sociological studies of science, which 
gained their maximum momentum in the slipstream of The Strong Programme 
in the late 1970s  (Barnes 1974; Barnes 1977; Bloor 1976).
The bottom line of the discussion of disciplines is, that if the epistemic 
aspects of scientific hybridisations are to be adequately captured, there is a 
need for quite a lot more detailed and specific distinctions than what the stan-
dard administrative, organisational disciplinary boundaries have to offer. An 
adequate representation of scientific hybridisations will require a way of zoom-
ing in to achieve closer alignment with epistemic differences at a given time. 
Enter the concept “approach”.
Approaches
As a consequence of the considerations about disciplines presented above, I 
suggest thinking about interdisciplinarity in terms of integration of approaches 
rather than integration of disciplines.
To repeat, approaches are specific ways of using a specific vehicle to 
represent some target. Importantly, approaches are fixed, invariant entities. 
They do not evolve or change through time. If you represent differently, you 
use a different approach.
In any integration there must be something specific that is transferred, 
combined, or integrated. Given the complexity of disciplines, it would be very 
surprising to see someone actually attempting to combine, say, the disciplines 
of literature studies and neurology in their entirety. However, it is not that un-
usual to read statements that a given research project is based on inter-
disciplinary collaboration between disciplines at this quite unspecific level of 
abstraction.
Bechtel’s and Toulmin’s frameworks will be useful as we strive for further 
clarification:
First, the social dimension of disciplines seems to be only indirectly rele-
vant to analysis of the epistemic aspects of interdisciplinarity. Indirectly in the 
 According to www.oxforddictionaries.com, an approach is »a way of dealing with a situation 23
or problem«. In the present context, of course, focus is on representational approaches, and 
the situation or problem is how to scientifically represent some phenomena. You can decide 
to adopt an entirely different approach or to slightly alter your present approach. Pretty 
straightforward, in my opinion.
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sense that we might, perhaps, derive something about what is likely to be 
involved in an act of integration by focusing on the educational background 
and affiliations of the people involved. However, there are ways to target the 
most central epistemic aspects more directly. An approach based account 
abstracts from the social dimension. It assumes that it does not matter who 
uses A to represent B. However, it matters which A they use and how they use 
it.
Second, if we are to characterise a discipline such as physics, we certainly 
need to take temporality into account. But the temporal extension of 
disciplines adds a level of indeterminacy which renders the knowledge that 
certain disciplines are involved more or less useless in itself. Instead, we need 
a concept for exactly those temporal cross-sections of the involved 
disciplines, which serve as the specific input into the interdisciplinary integra-
tion in a given case. I suggest that we use “approach” to refer to specific 
temporal cross-sections of disciplines.
Third, one might use the same approach to study different phenomena.  24
Thus, at least in some ways, it makes sense to exclude targets from the 
approach—though targets are not to be completely excluded from analyses of 
interdisciplinarity, of course.
Fourth, one might use the same approach for different purposes. Thus, it 
makes sense to exclude purposes from the approach—though purposes are 
not to be completely excluded from analyses of interdisciplinarity either, of 
course.
We are left, then, with vehicles of representation and the tools, algorithms, 
propositions which are used to constitute the link between vehicle and target. 
People, targets and purposes are not part of the approach. Therefore it makes 
sense to say that an approach is better suited for target A, than for target B. 
Or, for that matter, that an approach is better suited for purpose A, than for 
purpose B.
One might think of approaches as the core which is reapplied to the same 
type of phenomena in attempts at replication. In such cases attempts at repli-
cation are based on the details included in the published description of the 
original study. It is completely natural to say, for instance, that when a slightly 
different approach was used, everything worked as originally expected. Or, 
that the reason a second group of scientists failed to replicate a given study 
was that they failed to use the exact same approach.
Studies have examined the extent to which details required for replication 
are conveyed in psychology papers. Interestingly, this is often not the case 
(Carp 2012). It is likely that similar problems will haunt many disciplines 
potentially involved in interdisciplinarity, and this will make evaluations based 
on approaches more difficult. Some of the propositional knowledge that could 
be made explicit is not included in the text, perhaps because it is part of the 
taken for granted background assumptions of the people constituting the 
 There are some difficulties related to applying the exact same approach to different targets, 24
though. These issues will be addressed in ch. 7.
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approach’s home discipline. Other aspects may be less easily communicated 
because they involve skill-like, non-propositional knowledge.
Skills have been treated by scholars in science studies as a central 
element which is not easily conveyed in publications.  The lack of required 25
skills, or lack of attention to the fact that skills are required, are considered to 
be part of the answer to why some replications fail (Collins 1985).
‘Skill’ is often used to refer to abilities not based on propositional 
knowledge. Importantly, if a task requires skills, it means that being told how 
to do something is not sufficient for being able to actually do it. For instance, 
no one without a considerable set of musical and motor skills can perform 
Purple Haze by Jimi Hendrix on a cello, regardless of whichever elaborate 
verbal instructions they get. Skills can be acquired, of course (and even 
sometimes through verbal instruction). Indeed, Collins and Evans considers 
skills as »something real or fixed that can be transferred from one person to 
another, or can fail to be transferred« (Collins & Evans 2002, p. 241). Surely, 
in many cases a skill can be broken down into less mysterious sub-parts, like 
insight into idealisations, familiarity with a coordinated web of relevant 
concepts, but also motor abilities acquired through practice and so on.
The analogy between attempts at replication and interdisciplinarity is not 
perfect, of course. For instance, replication is only relevant in certain types of 
empirical sciences. The approach notion, in contrast, is intended to capture 
core aspects of representational activities across all disciplines. What the 
analogy with replication does suggest, is that an exhaustive analysis of inter-
disciplinarity in terms of fully explicated pre- and post-interactional approach-
es is probably impossible. Nevertheless, the descriptions in terms of ap-
proaches come as close to what is actually going on, to the extent that this 
can be derived from publications. The fully explicated approach based 
analysis, in which all relevant details are revealed, may then serve as a regu-
lative ideal for analyses and evaluations of interdisciplinary activities.
As should be clear, the concept “approach” is not intended to replace the 
concept “discipline”. Disciplines (as well as fields, research programmes, and 
paradigms), will involve a wealth of approaches. Especially when the temporal 
dimension is taken into account, disciplines will include an abundance of 
divergent approaches. It may be relevant to some analyses of interdisciplinari-
ty to figure out which approaches are bundled together in specific research 
projects and programmes.
Though approach based analysis constitutes a novel way of carving up 
scientific activities, the concept is intended to have a somewhat familiar feel to 
it. The intention has been to strike a balance between familiarity and novelty 
which makes the concept easy to get used to in the context, even though it 
draws out interesting aspects of interdisciplinary activities, which deserve 
more attention than they usually get.
 Indeed, grasping the concept “skill” may require some sort of meta-skill. In the words of 25
Collins and Evans: “[S]kills [are] notoriously hard to explain—as qualitative sociologists know 
to their cost” (2002, p. 258).
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The discussion of representation in the chapters below will enrich the 
concept of approaches considerably. For now, it will be helpful to revisit the 
comparison between the concepts “approach” and “field”.
Approaches vs. fields 
As quoted above, Darden and Maull makes it clear that they are exclusively 
interested in conceptual and epistemic issues related to the combinations of 
different fields. In this way their goals are quite similar to mine. On the other 
hand, their discussions of interfield theories focus strictly on combinations of 
very proximate approaches. As they state: »Interfield theories are likely to be 
generated when two fields share an interest in explaining different aspects of 
the same phenomenon and when background knowledge already exists 
relating the two fields« (1977, p. 43; my emphasis).
As will be discussed in several places below, interdisciplinarity is by no 
means restricted to collaborations between proximate approaches. When 
physics is combined with psychiatric diagnosis, or when neuroimaging 
techniques are combined with literature studies, little existing background 
knowledge relate the involved approaches prior to their integration.
Indeed, the interfield theories Darden and Maull discuss constitute quite a 
contrast to the sweeping, unqualified claims of interdisciplinarity involving 
combinations of very distant approaches. The cases discussed by Darden 
and Maull are highly successful. But surely, it would be a mistake to argue 
that interdisciplinarity in general is likely to lead to wonderful results on the 
basis of a few examples of successful integration of very proximate approach-
es.
Distance vs. proximity revisited 
I suggest »measuring« distance between approaches by comparing the 
assumptions and tools (in a broad sense) used to connect vehicles and 
targets. The more background assumptions and tools are shared between two 
approaches, the more proximate they are. Assumptions include things like 
paradigm cases of good practice, standards of when something is considered 
sufficiently demonstrated, fundamental stances regarding questions of 
realism/constructivism, and so on.
To determine the distance between parent approaches it is, thus, not 
sufficient to focus on vehicle of representation and target. Two approaches 
may be quite proximate even when they represent distinct targets by means 
of distinct vehicles. On the other hand, two approaches may also be quite 
distant even though they represent the same (or a similar) target by means of 
the same (or a similar) vehicle.
Construed in this way, the example discussed above of the psychology of 
concepts and cognitive semantics would involve very proximate approaches. 
Interestingly, in the discussion above, the collaboration between psychology 
of concepts and cognitive semantics was considered as »not really« 
interdisciplinary (in spite of the parent approaches belonging to different 
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faculties) due to the minor differences in their respective approaches. But 
since then, we have reached the conclusion that there might be great poten-
tial for developing fruitful interdisciplinarity in integrations of proximate 
approaches. So perhaps interdisciplinary collaborations between the psycho-
logy of concepts and cognitive semantics are back in business.
A further complication is that the distance between approaches is not only 
a question of whether the same assumptions and tools are used, but also of 
whether they are used in the same way. As the discussion of the introduction 
of operational definitions in psychopathology in chapter 6 will show, it can 
make a big difference how an element is put to use. Further, some elements 
of the intermediate layer may be more important than others. Small variation 
in one respect may result in two approaches being quite distant, whereas 
substantial dissimilarities in other respects may not make much of a relevant 
difference.
This discussion of distance between approaches is highly abstract. 
Chapters below will provide more concrete exemplification. What should be 
obvious, though, is that “distance” and “proximity” are not exact, quantifiable 
measures of the differences between approaches.
There are no a priori reasons to assume that the integration of two proxi-
mate approaches will lead to great scientific progress, just because the 
approaches are proximate. Neither are there reasons to assume that the 
integration of distant approaches will lead to poor results, simply because the 
approaches are distant. But there is likely to be more potential pitfalls to avoid 
in cases of integration across wide distances, and figuring out whether the 
result is a good one will require a much more substantial effort.
The more closely related two approaches are, on the other hand, the easier 
their integration can be expected to be. The ease of integration might also hint 
in the direction of the novelty of the integrated approach. Ease of integration is 
partly a consequence of straight up similarities between the combined ap-
proaches, which might indicate that the integrated approach differs to a 
smaller extent from the parent approaches. But ease of integration is also a 
result of the involved scientists being already familiar with background as-
sumptions, standard idealisations, and so on.
One might classify the examples discussed by Darden and Maull as micro-
interdisciplinarity in the sense that a quite small gap is bridged. This should 
not, however, be understood as indicating that their examples of proximate 
integration involves small scientific advances. The examples they analyse 
certainly constitute genuine and significant steps (if not leaps) forward. 
More on temporality 
To make it absolutely clear: As the discussion above shows, not only is there 
a temporal element to interdisciplinary collaborations, disciplines themselves 
are temporal entities. Disciplines and disciplinarity have evolved through 
history. Thus, even if one were able to nail down a set of necessary and 
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sufficient criteria for membership of a given discipline at a given point in time, 
a few years on, these criteria would most likely no longer fit well.
As seen above, David Hull pointed out quite a while ago (1982) that 
concepts such as disciplines, disciplinary matrices, research programs, or 
research traditions are all macro-concepts constituted by more basic 
concepts. To take Kuhn’s matrices as an example, the constituents would be 
symbolic generalisations, metaphysical views, models, values, and exemplars 
(Kuhn 1970, p. 183 ff.). These constituents are all historical entities or continu-
ants, i.e. entities that change through time. This opens the possibility of 
thinking of disciplines as evolving entities characterised by continuity through 
transformations rather than essences. In some cases the central continuity 
might be along the dimension of method, in other cases along the dimensions 
of social structure or topics of interest.
As discussed above temporality was a central theme in Toulmin’s discus-
sion of disciplines. And the following quotation: »If we examine some relatively 
sophisticated area of science at a particular stage of its development, we find 
that a certain body of information is, at that stage, taken to be an object for 
investigation« (Shapere 1984, p. 273; my emphasis) shows that Dudley 
Shapere was also well aware on the temporal nature of disciplines. 
Several of the most influential philosophers of science (at least since the 
early 1960s) have had a strong focus on issues related to transformation. 
Again, Kuhn (1962) is perhaps the best known example, but others are 
certainly worth noticing. Toulmin (1972) and Laudan (1977) both allow for 
more or less complete transformations within a discipline, as long as change 
is gradual. Lakatos (1970) allows for change in less central parts of the 
system, but requires the retention of some theoretical »hard core«.
One consequence of viewing disciplines in these ways is that there is 
nothing in principle to hinder two disciplines from evolving into using very 
similar methods for solving identical problems—even if they are organisation-
ally unrelated. Or for that matter, though they might share common ancestry, 
two disciplines may evolve into using completely distinct methods for solving 
distinct problems.
In light of the above, interdisciplinarity can be considered as sudden, more 
or less radical, transformations as compared to the slow, incremental 
developments of intra-disciplinary scientific evolution. According to Toulmin, 
gradual developments in explanatory aspirations and capacities are central to 
rational enterprises. But that would deem the explorative conceptual leaps of 
many interdisciplinary projects irrational.
It is central to my framework, that analysis of interdisciplinary integrations 
should be based on temporal cross-sections of the involved disciplines. Apart 
from a gain in specificity, this way forward also highlights that future develop-
ments of the parent disciplines are not automatically build into the generated 
hybrid. Put differently, the hybrid account will not automatically update in 
accordance with developments in one or more of its parent disciplines. This is 
a central point in Patricia Kitcher's analysis of the failures of psychoanalysis 
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(1992; 2007). Below, I will provide some further examples of how serious this 
problem can be.
Summing up
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that even though the concept 
“discipline” is certainly not without utility, something more specific is required 
for an epistemic analysis of interdisciplinary activities. An approach, on the 
other hand, is defined as a snapshot of a specific way of representing certain 
phenomena at a given point in the development of a discipline. It is thus a 
fixed, invariant phenomenon which does not change through time. That 
someone used a given approach at a given time does not change, because 
they use a different approach at some other time. While disciplines are con-
stantly evolving, approaches remain fixed.
For an exact analysis of interdisciplinary activities to be possible, we need 
to get a hold of what exactly is combined. Any interdisciplinary activity must 
result in some product (unless of course it is abandoned, for some reason, 
and does not result in any publications). This product will incorporate some 
approach to the representation of some target. All the elements used must be 
picked from somewhere unless they are freshly developed (e.g. in the 
relatively rare case where a completely original statistical tool or propositional 
algorithm or a hitherto unheard of basic assumption is put to use). It must 
therefore be possible to single out the specific approach from where a certain 
element is imported (it may of course be used in several places). In many 
situations the lineage may be indeterminable to some extent. But such lack of 
clarity is worth spelling out in its own right, since it is likely to require extra 
attention if one is to evaluate the adequacy of the hybrid approach.
Sometimes, of course, it might only be fragments of approaches which are 
combined. In such cases it might also be illuminating to consider the function 
of the combined fragments in the parent approaches, and compare this 
function to how they are put to use in the integrated approach.
The next chapter will focus on the treatment that interdisciplinarity has 
received in the existing literature on the topic.
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3 — Interdisciplinarity Studies
ABSTRACT. In this chapter, I go through what I consider to be the 
dominant trends in contemporary studies of interdisciplinarity. The 
biases and inadequacies reflected in these efforts are a central part 
of the motivation for this thesis. I provide an account of the basic 
characteristics of interdisciplinarity which, I believe, any analysis 
hereof must take into account. I further provide an account of the 
developments of the interest in interdisciplinarity, and how inter-
disciplinarity has come to be occupy such a dominant position in 
science and science policy today. All in all this chapter provides an 
overview of the phenomenon of interdisciplinarity and how it is 
usually treated academically.
This chapter will provide a somewhat selective survey of existing approaches 
to the study of interdisciplinarity as well as representative examples of 
interdisciplinary scientific activities. The account is intended to illustrate a very 
central part of the motivation for developing an alternative approach to the 
analysis of interdisciplinarity, namely that existing treatments are to a 
significant extent analytically biased. The bias consists most importantly in a 
strong emphasis on social aspects, which is pronounced in the Interdiscipli-
narity Studies literature. This emphasis has resulted in an unfortunate misre-
presentation of interdisciplinary science.
This chapter will also point out some of the major general trends in recent 
interdisciplinary activities as well as historical examples showing, first, that 
interdisciplinarity is no recent invention, and, second, that there are certainly 
good reasons for drawing inspiration from examples of successful integration. 
These successes cannot fully explain, though, why interdisciplinarity has 
evolved into such an attractive way of developing science.
The academic literature on interdisciplinarity is large and packed with 
thorough and interesting studies of various aspects of polydisciplinary  26
collaborations. Nevertheless, the treatment that the topic of polydisciplinarity 
has typically received within Interdisciplinarity Studies has contributed to the 
generation of a widespread and unfortunate tendency which, polemically put, 
considers interdisciplinarity »inherently good«. As a consequence, too often 
insufficient attention is paid to the special epistemic pitfalls involved in 
interdisciplinary practice.
 Following Shalinsky (1989) I use “polydisciplinary” (and the derivative “polydisciplinarity”) 26
as a generic concept subsuming all the different types of scientific collaboration discussed 
below. In the rest of the thesis, I will focus strictly on interdisciplinarity.
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Hopefully, this thesis may help to reduce this problem by directing attention 
to the issue that‚ in some cases at least, serious epistemic difficulties do arise 
in relation to integrating scientific approaches.
This chapter will not provide an exhaustive survey of Interdisciplinarity 
Studies, or, for that matter, provide necessary and sufficient criteria for 
counting as part of this movement. It will suffice for present purposes to 
account for the positions of some of the most prominent and influential names 
as presented in some of the most prototypical publications.  Neither shall I 27
ascribe the attitude I argue against, i.e. the analytical attitude that results from 
an overemphasis of social aspects of interdisciplinarity, to any particular 
person or group of persons within Interdisciplinarity Studies or elsewhere. It 
does not matter for the present concern whether anyone would openly adhere 
to this position. The important part is that central writings on the topic of inter-
disciplinarity showcase this bias. Indeed, I believe that most readers familiar 
with scientific practice in, especially, Europe and North America will recognise 
the general attitude I am targeting—not least within circles acquainted with 
science policy and funding related issues.
A small number of philosophers work on analysing aspects of inter-
disciplinarity, some of them somewhat along the lines of the account develop-
ed in this thesis.  However, those efforts do not result in a general framework 28
for analysing interdisciplinarity. Rather, they focus on detailed analyses of 
specific instances of interdisciplinary collaboration. Much of this work is of 
splendid quality, though, and some of it will be discussed in the present 
chapter, in order to draw and build on those efforts in the following ones.
The positive account offered in the following chapters is by far the most 
interesting part of this thesis. The partly critical, partly historical account in this 
chapter may be less interesting in itself. But it serves the important purpose of 
pointing out the cavity which the subsequent positive account is intended to 
fill. On this background, most people interested in the topic of interdisciplinari-
ty will probably sympathise with the position that epistemic aspects of pluri-
disciplinary activities have so far received less attention than they deserve.
 Among the latter I count works such as The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity 27
(Frodeman et al. 2010), Interdisciplinarity : history, theory, and practice (Klein 1990) 
Interdisciplinarity and Higher Education (Kockelmans 1979a). Among the former I count (in no 
particular order) people such as Robert Frodeman (Director of the Center for the Study of 
Interdisciplinarity at University of North Texas), Julie Thompson Klein (Former president of the 
Association for Integrative Studies), Erich Jantsch, Carolyn and Muzafer Sherif, Peter 
Weingart (Former director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Research), William H. Newell 
(professor of interdisciplinary studies at Miami University as well as executive director of the 
Association for Integrative Studies), and others. The reader might of course disagree that 
these are representative for Interdisciplinarity Studies or that it is reasonable at all to 
postulate the existence of this group of academics.
 See for instance (Darden & Maull 1977; Mitchell 2002; Mitchell 2003; Morgan & Morrison 28
1999)
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What is interdisciplinarity?
There seems to be widespread agreement that there are no commonly 
accepted definitions of terms such as ‘crossdisciplinarity’, ‘pluridisciplinarity’, 
‘multidisciplinarity’, ‘interdisciplinarity’, or ‘transdisciplinarity’. All of those terms 
are considered to denote variations of polydisciplinary activities—that is, 
activities which draw on and combine in some way elements from at least two 
distinct disciplinary contexts.  Apart from ‘polydisciplinarity’, all those terms 29
were parts of the influential taxonomy developed by Erich Jantsch (Jantsch 
1970; Klein 2010). Despite disagreements on the exact sense of the term 
‘interdisciplinarity’, Eric Jantsch is generally credited for having invested the 
term with its present meaning.
Fortunately, for the present discussion there is no need to stipulate exact 
definitions of any of these notions, let alone attempt to resolve the widespread 
disagreements regarding their exact meaning. For present purposes, the 
approximate outlines of the meanings of the terms provided in the next few 
paragraphs will suffice.
Quite a lot of effort has been put into developing taxonomies of different 
types of scientific collaboration to get to the heart of what interdisciplinarity is. 
One very fundamental issue, on which there seems to be agreement, is that 
interdisciplinarity is characterised by integration in one form or another. 
Indeed, this is often considered the litmus test of interdisciplinarity as 
compared to, most significantly, multidisciplinarity (Klein 2010; Lattuca 2001, 
p. 78, 109).
‘Multidisciplinarity’ is widely used in reference to situations in which two or 
more scientific disciplines are »placed side by side« (perhaps in an effort 
aimed at solving a common problem), but in a way that does not result in the 
development of hybrid or novel approaches.
Julie Thompson Klein considers multidisciplinarity to be
[…] an approach that juxtaposes disciplines. Juxtaposition fosters wider 
knowledge, information, and methods. Yet, disciplines remain separate, 
disciplinary elements retain their original identity, and the existing structure of 
knowledge is not questioned. This tendency is evident in conferences, 
publications, and research projects that present different views of the same 
topic or problem in serial order. Similarly, many so-called ‘interdisciplinary’ 
curricula are actually a multidisciplinary assemblage of disciplinary courses. 
[…] In [such cases] […] integration and interaction are lacking. (Klein 2010, p. 
17)
 Notice that in the following I will often use the phrase »interdisciplinary activities« instead of 29
the, perhaps, more straightforward »interdisciplinary collaborations«. This is a deliberate 
choice, since the integration of distinct disciplines does not necessarily involve more than one 
person, and hence may not involve any collaboration.
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Some polydisciplinary activities are, thus, interdisciplinary by name only. And 
the difference between these and the truly interdisciplinary ones, is the lack of 
integration and interaction in the former.
In Jantsch’s original taxonomy ‘transdisciplinarity’ was used to refer to the 
all-encompassing »coordination of all disciplines and interdisciplines in the 
education/innovation system on the basis of a generalised axiomatics« 
developed for social purposes (Jantsch 1970, p. 411). Most of the various 
contemporary uses of the term are less ambitious and only require that 
collaborations somehow transcend academia. Transcendence can either be 
achieved by developing an overarching scientific synthesis or by involving 
sectors external to science such as the private sector or simply non-academic 
members of some relevant community (Klein 2010, p. 24 f.).
‘Crossdisciplinarity’ and ‘pluridisciplinarity’ are less frequently used terms. 
The latter was originally thought by Jantsch to indicate a version of 
multidisciplinarity in which the involved disciplines were less isolated from 
each other. This would somehow facilitate the building of relationships 
between the involved disciplines. ‘Crossdisciplinarity’, on the other hand, 
denoted situations in which aspects of one discipline are somehow imposed 
upon other disciplines in a more or less imperialistic manner  (Jantsch 1970, 30
p. 411). In other contexts, though, ‘crossdisciplinarity’ is used as a generic 
term for all types of collaboration involving several disciplines including the 
above mentioned ones (e.g. Bechtel 1986, p. 22) similar to the meaning of 
polydisciplinarity stipulated above.
Knowledge generation and integration
The most important aspect of the above account of subtypes of poly-
disciplinarity is that integration and interaction are considered to be the central 
characteristics that sets interdisciplinary activities apart from the other sub-
types. On many occasions, Klein has clearly stated that this is her conviction. 
As a few examples:
When integration and interaction becomes proactive, the line between 
multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity is crossed. (Klein 1990, p. 18)
And:
[T]he only true interdisciplinarity is integrated interdisciplinarity, which [can be 
described as] collaborations in which the concepts and insights of one 
discipline contribute to the problems and theories of another (Klein 1990, p. 
20).
 This is reminiscent of some recent discussions in philosophy warning against certain 30
dangers of interdisciplinary collaboration. Most noteworthy, John Dupré has initiated a small 
field focused on so-called scientific imperialism, which is thought to involve forcing ones 
framework onto a domain of which one has little expertise (Clarke & Walsh 2009; Dupré 1995; 
Dupré 2001; Mäki 2013).
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Also central, however, is that the integration leads to the generation of (new / 
integrated / mutual) knowledge:
Mutual knowledge emerges as novel insights are generated, disciplinary 
relationships redefined, and integrative frameworks built. (Klein 2008, p. 119)
So knowledge and knowledge generation, however one likes to think of it, is 
certainly considered to be central to interdisciplinarity. Indeed, the last 
sentence in the foreword of The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity is the 
following:
[…] we hope that this handbook can contribute to critical assessment of a 
vibrant new dimension of knowledge production. (Frodeman et al. 2010, p. 
iv)
Notice how »knowledge production«, the emergence of »mutual knowledge«, 
the generation of »novel insights«, and that »concepts and insights of one 
discipline contribute to the problems and theories of another« are considered 
to be essentially different from the fostering of »wider knowledge, information, 
and methods« in multidisciplinary activities. Interdisciplinarity results in new 
knowledge, somehow—not just deeper, more inclusive, or more wide-
reaching knowledge. Unfortunately, the processes involved in generating 
»new knowledge« as opposed to »wider knowledge« are not discussed in any 
detail. Consequently, insufficient attention is payed to the specific epistemic 
processes related to interdisciplinary activities.
In the existing literature on interdisciplinarity it is sometimes questioned 
whether the production of new knowledge is necessarily a good thing. In the 
introduction to The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity it is even stated that 
»[…] it is evident that knowledge can sometimes do more harm than 
good« (Frodeman et al. 2010, p. xxix). It is then concluded that the remedy 
against producing too much knowledge is to gain knowledge, which enables 
one to decide whether knowledge in a given situation is pertinent or not (p. 
xxx). How one can know the value of knowing something before gaining the 
knowledge which one is evaluating remains somewhat mysterious, though.
This thesis constitutes an attempt at raising the level of attention to the 
dynamics of interdisciplinarity in the sense of integrative polydisciplinarity. 
Focus will be especially on how to analyse integration, and what the analysis 
of integration might tell us about interdisciplinarity and representation in 
general. Showing that integration of approaches can involve substantial 
though unapparent epistemic difficulties will constitute a strong argument in 
favour of careful conduct in simple as well as in more complex cases.
Even though focus is strictly on interdisciplinarity, let me note that I do 
indeed find discussions of other versions of polydisciplinarity interesting—
especially the (potential) activities picked out by the concept “transdisciplin-
arity” (in both senses discussed above). It seems reasonable, however, to at-
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tempt to get a hold on what is going on in the »simpler« interdisciplinary set-
tings before attempting to comprehend the even more complicated dynamics 
of transdisciplinarity. It is my conviction, though, that the discussions of inter-
disciplinarity of this thesis can be extended to capture transdisciplinary colla-
borations as well. But we need to get the basic dynamics of the simpler 
(though by no means simple) cases worked out first.
Interdisciplinarity is not new 
That drawing inspiration from other scientists is a central part of developing 
new and improved scientific approaches may seem almost too obvious to 
discuss. But in this context, it is at least worth mentioning that drawing 
inspiration from more than one distinct scientific approach and attempting to 
develop integrated approaches hereof has been a central part of science for a 
very long time.
As Stephen H. Kellert writes in his Borrowing Knowledge (2009):
Economist Herbert Simon pointed out in 1959 that “the social sciences have 
been accustomed to look for models in the most spectacular of the natural 
sciences,” and he went on to say “there is no harm in that, provided that it is 
not done in a spirit of slavish imitation” […]. Knowledge has always traveled 
between disciplines, from Darwin’s use of geological facts to the role of 
radioactive dating in archaeology to contemporary discussions of historical 
“forces” and social “inertia” […]. The insights of linear Newtonian physics 
have sometimes proven useful for conceptualizing human social change. (p. 
13)
One might be tempted to point out that Kellert’s use of ‘always’ appears 
somewhat excessive, if the period he refers to only goes as far back as the 
works of Charles Darwin.  Quibbles aside, however, it is not difficult to find 31
earlier examples of borrowed knowledge. A good example is David Hume’s A 
Treatise of Human Nature (1738) with the telling subtitle Being An Attempt to 
Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. In its 
introduction, Hume described the idea of »the application of experimental 
philosophy to moral subjects« and how »some late philosophers in England, 
[…] have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have 
[thereby] engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the 
public« (Hume 1738, p. 26).
Hume’s treatise is a clear example of an attempt at integrating distinct 
areas of inquiry, i.e. the study of moral subjects with experimental philo-
 I assume that the applications of Newtonian physics on human social change which Kellert refers to 31
are more recent than Darwin.
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sophy.  And not only is the idea of integrating distinct areas not new, neither, 32
apparently, is its potential to attract public interest. In order to make explicit its 
novelty, Hume continued: 
[…] [T]o me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally 
unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to 
form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and 
exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which 
result from its different circumstances and situations. And though we must 
endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up 
our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest 
and fewest causes, it is still certain we cannot go beyond experience […]. 
(Hume 1738, p. 27 f.)
If interdisciplinarity is thought of in terms of developing and improving science 
by having »the concepts and insights of one discipline contribute to the 
problems and theories of another«, Hume’s treatise certainly qualifies.
In (2014) Simone Mammola traced attempts at, or at least belief in the 
potential benefits from, integration between medicine and philosophy as far 
back as Aristotle’s discussions hereof in the collection of texts referred to as 
Parva Naturalia. Then, at least, it appears reasonable to talk of ‘always’ with 
respect to the topic of science.33
As a final, more recent, example, think of The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn (1962); the well known opening lines of which 
read:
History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could 
produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are 
now possessed. (Kuhn 1962)
It is common knowledge that Kuhn did in fact bring about decisive transforma-
tions within philosophy of science, as well as in the general understanding of 
science, by developing a historically informed approach to the study of 
science. Kuhn is especially interesting in that his work is one of the main 
inspirations for the social turn in philosophy of science as well as a paradigm 
example of quite successful disciplinary integration. Certainly, Kuhn could be 
claimed to have developed »new knowledge«, or perhaps a new way of 
knowing something about science.
 ‘Moral philosophy’ is not restricted to ethical matters, but is more properly understood as 32
»the science of human nature«. On the other hand, ‘experimental philosophy’ is another 
expression for ‘natural philosophy’, or, in present day terms, ‘natural science’. Thus, Hume 
aimed to apply the »scientific method« to the study of human nature.
 Some might protest against viewing Aristotle as a wannabe interdisciplinarian. Indeed, it 33
would not be unreasonable, it seems, to take the exact opposite position: That Aristotle was 
perhaps the most influential early figure in the movement towards scientific specialisation.
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The above examples are only a handful out of the many interesting histori-
cal attempts at integrating (elements from) distinct disciplines. Though far 
from exhaustive, the above account suffices to show that interdisciplinarity is 
no recent invention.
What is indeed a more recent invention is the tendency to consider 
interdisciplinarity as the heart of scientific innovation—as something that is 
more or less necessary for driving scientific innovation forward. In the next 
part of this chapter, I will focus on diagnosing these recent and dominant 
trends in western science.
More recent developments: The turn-turn
Within the framework of contemporary discussions of science, it is a central 
characteristic of many of our most paradigmatic examples of scientific genius 
that his or her work resulted in a paradigm shift. As a result, the influence of 
Kuhn may have motivated many scientists to look for ways of bringing about 
paradigm shifts themselves, or, more modestly, a »turn« in the way we view 
some subject. One might say that since Kuhn there has been a »turn-turn« in 
approaches to developing science.
Kuhn himself set an example with his historical turn in philosophy of scien-
ce, which, as mentioned, in turn inspired the social turn in popular approaches 
to studying science. More recently we have witnessed the cognitive turn 
affecting all kinds of disciplines, much like the evolutionary turn and the 
neurological turn. Nowadays, disciplines twist and turn so frequently that the 
achievements of one turn hardly have time to sediment before the next wave 
of revolutionary rotation sets in.
Interdisciplinarity is essentially a way of turning things upside down. It is not 
easy to measure exactly the influence of Erich Jantsch and Interdisciplinarity 
Studies on the development of the present widespread interest in interdiscipli-
narity. But it is not unfair to claim that interdisciplinarity has developed into 
being, if not a goal in itself, then to a large extent a prerequisite for scientific 
projects to be considered innovative and well-formed.
In recent decades, a tendency has developed of drawing inspiration from 
especially successful or high-profiled scientific branches. Especially aspects 
from neurology and evolutionary theory have been imported into more or less 
all other kinds of settings—from art studies and musicology to psychopatho-
logy and the behavioural sciences.
There are different ways to close in on the multitude of attempts at creating 
interdisciplinary hybrids in contemporary science. The search for grand scale 
turns is one strategy. Another is to focus on a single discipline and look for 
which kinds of other disciplinary influences have been imported, in order to 
develop novel approaches. As one example of this perspective, one can find 
many recently developed approaches to the analysis of literature which are 
explicitly interdisciplinary.
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Literature studies 
Think of examples such as Cognitive literature studies in which cognitive 
neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of mind (among other 
things) are applied to the study of literature and other aspects of culture 
traditionally belonging to the humanities (e.g. Aldama 2010; Crane 2000; 
Crane & Richardson 1999; Zunshine 2015). Or think of Darwinian art studies 
in which literature and art is situated in the context of evolution and natural 
selection. Literature and art (and aesthetically related abilities in general) can 
thus be interpreted as adaptive in one way or the other. This can lead to new 
interpretations of works of art themselves, or of the role of art for human survi-
val and selective processes.
Brian Boyd has argued that the ability to create stories is adaptive since it 
provides humans with a »free space« for developing innovative ideas and 
spreading the idea of innovation in the first place:
Stories, whether true or false, appeal to our interest in others, but fiction can 
especially appeal by inventing events with an intensity and surprise that fact 
rarely permits. Fictions foster cooperation by engaging and attuning our social 
and moral emotions and values, and creativity by enticing us to think beyond 
the immediate in the way our minds are most naturally disposed—in terms of 
social actions. (Boyd 2009, p. 382 f.; emphasis in the original)
According to Boyd, stories further help humans develop communal social 
identity, which he also considers adaptive.
As related examples, in (1997) Steven Pinker argued that humans have 
evolved the abilities to appreciate and produce literary narratives since these 
may provide data relevant for adaptive issues. Several other authors argue 
that aesthetic responsiveness is adaptive since it helps organise impressions 
of reality by means of emotionally and aesthetically modulated cognitive 
models (Carroll 2004; Dissanayake 2000; Dutton 2009). All of these 
approaches are focused on the benefits of the discussed abilities with respect 
to survival.
Choosing a different emphasis, Geoffrey Miller has argued that sexual 
selection is the driving force behind the development of abilities such as 
humour, wit, musicality, and the ability to produce lyrical and exciting prose. 
People with these kinds of talents are more sexually attractive,  it is argued, 34
and therefore these trades have been selected for. In line with Darwin (1871) 
and Fisher (1930) among others, Miller distinguishes sharply between natural 
selection (which is related to trades that increases overall fitness, e.g. with 
 Or at least were more sexually attractive in the specific EEA (i.e.: Environment of 34
Evolutionary Adaptation) of the species in question. Roughly, the EEA is the environment to 
which a species is adapted. The intuition is that for specific traits to have evolved, they must 
have served a special beneficial function in a certain environment. Verbal creativity and wit 
may be worthless in your local discotheque (where clearly defined muscle-groups and well-
placed tattoos seem to make the biggest positive difference these days) and still have served 
their possessor well in the EEA.
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respect to escaping predators or finding food) and sexual selection which 
increases chances of producing more offspring by intensifying sexual 
attractiveness. Miller, thus, likens aesthetic ability to the paradigm example of 
a sexually selected feature: The tail of the peacock. The peacock’s tail may 
impress licentious peahens, while it actually seems to diminish fitness in 
terms of the ability to hide or escape from, say, hungry tigers.
Psychoanalytic literature studies 
Take another example from the study of literature: Drawing on, e.g., Sigmund 
Freud, Jacques Lacan, Slavoj Žižek, and others, psychoanalytic literary 
criticism is focused on the role of consciousnesses and the unconscious in 
literature. Objects for analysis include the author, the reader, and the (fictive) 
characters of the text.
In such analyses, literary works are interpreted as expressions of, e.g., 
repressed emotional and psychological conflicts. A central assumption is that, 
for instance, the actions of characters in a novel somehow display the trauma-
tic events of the authors childhood, sexual experiences, and family life as well 
as neuroses and fixations from which he or she may suffer. All of this is only 
expressed indirectly and metaphorically in the text. Analytical techniques 
inspired by central Freudian concepts such as “symbolism”, “condensation”, 
and “displacement” are therefore applied to unveil the real content (which is 
not identical to the authors’ intention with the text).
Psychoanalysis is an interesting example, since it is, to say the least, a 
disputed framework within its parent discipline of psychiatry. And the theoreti-
cal background, on which many of the central assumptions of psychoanalysis 
rest, have been thoroughly, and more or less unanimously, rejected. For 
instance, beliefs in recapitulationism or Lamarckian inheritance have been out 
of academical favour for quite a while. But both of these elements are 
indispensable for Freud’s reasoning (Kitcher 1992; 2007; Rasmussen 1991). I 
do not mean to pass judgment on psychoanalysis, but it is an interesting 
question to what extent the considerable difficulties facing the original 
approach are taken into account in relation to the use of psychoanalysis in 
literature studies? The further, and no less interesting, question is whether it is 
reasonable or fruitful to base an approach in, say, literature studies on a 
parent approach which is a manifest failure?35
In my opinion, one should not expect general conclusions regarding issues 
such as these. Let us call this ‘insight b’: We should not assume that some 
element will not work well in a new context, simply because it did not work 
well in its context of origin.36
 As a general reflection—I am still not attempting to pass judgment on psychoanalysis.35
 Insight a will follow shortly.36
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A different approach 
These were only a few, though notable, examples. Of course there are many 
others equally worthy of discussion. However let us turn things upside down 
and look at the source disciplines from which inspirations are drawn. Doing so 
will reveal a different, but no less interesting, pattern of contemporary inter-
disciplinarity. There are a number of trendy sources for providing input to 
other disciplines. The most notable are, perhaps, the already mentioned dis-
ciplines of evolutionary theory, neurology, and cognitive science.37
Some of these sources have been widely applied outside of aesthetics. 
Take cognitive science as a first example. All kinds of disciplines come in a 
cognitive variety. Some of these, such as cognitive linguistics  and cognitive 
psychology, have certainly been tremendously successful and have had wide 
applications outside of science such as in language teaching in pre-schools 
and kindergartens as well as in therapeutic approaches within clinical psycho-
logy.38
One central element, which has contributed to the success of therapeutic 
cognitive psychology, has been a focus on proceeding in the so-called 
»evidence based« manner, with a focus on quantifying and documenting ones 
efforts and results. Since other approaches to psychotherapy (psychodynamic 
therapy, for instance) have been less good at documenting their results, cog-
nitive therapy have come to appear as much more successful on this basis 
alone (Shedler 2010; Wampold et al. 2011).
The evolutionary turn 
Evolutionary theory has also been applied to a tremendous diversity of topics 
in recent decades. A few examples from literature and art studies were 
discussed above. There is an abundance of interesting applications of evolu-
tionary theory to countless other disciplines, though. Among the many examp-
les are evolutionary anthropology, evolutionary ecology, evolutionary neuro-
science, evolutionary psychology, and, indeed, evolutionary epistemology 
(one version of which might be more precisely termed ‘evolutionary philo-
sophy of science’).
In psychopathology, all kinds of applications of evolutionary theory have 
been constructed, among other things in attempts at explaining why the 
abundance of crippling mental disorders have not been selected against. In 
some cases mental disorders are considered as something that have been 
adaptive in some EEA but have ceased to be beneficial in modern societies.
Over the past 10,000 years, roughly since the invention of agriculture, 
humans have so transformed their way of life that for the majority of the 
  Even though I do not think there exists a cognitive discipline as such. ‘Cognitive’ may be a 37
free-floating additive—free for anybody to use.
 For massively influential examples see (Lakoff 1987; Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Murphy 2002; 38
Rosch 1973)
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world's six billion people, conditions today are now vastly different to those in 
the EEA. Could this transformation be the root cause of several psychiatric 
disorders? This view, sometimes called the 'out of Eden' hypothesis, 
'genome lag' or the mismatch hypothesis, has attracted numerous adherents. 
(Cartwright 2007, p. 299 f.)
Some of the most plausible candidates for something that might have been 
adaptive in the EEA, but is less advantageous today, are the specific phobias, 
such as fear of snakes or spiders. In a large part of the civilised world, 
especially in urban areas, fearing snakes and spiders is a waste of energy, 
but things might have looked differently in the EEA of homo sapiens.  Many 39
other out-of-eden-style explanations for mental disorders are considerably 
less plausible, though.
One such example focuses on schizophrenia, which is interpreted as 
having had a group-splitting function in the EEA. A lot of evidence indicate that 
schizophrenia has a strong genetic component. Other evidence point out that 
schizophrenia is no recent phenomenon. There is approximately a 1% risk of 
schizophrenia across all cultures, even ones which were isolated long ago 
(such as Australian aboriginals which split off about 60.000 years ago). This 
indicates that schizophrenia was genetically well-established before then.
But since schizophrenia is a very debilitating condition, why has it not been 
selected against? Compared to the average person, people suffering from 
schizophrenia produce less offspring and die relatively young even if they do 
not commit suicide (which they quite often do). In almost any respect schizo-
phrenia immediately comes across as a severe disadvantage to the individual.
John S. Price and Anthony Stevens (e.g. 1999) have suggested that in the 
EEA there were drawbacks related to groups increasing beyond a certain 
size. For instance, it might be difficult to gather enough food locally to feed a 
very large group. To avoid devastating social tensions, it would then be adap-
tive if some group-splitting function set in when groups reached critical sizes. 
Since the prevalence of schizophrenia is 1%, the likelihood of one member 
suffering from schizophrenia would be high when group size approached one 
hundred. If schizophrenia served a group splitting function, two groups of 
more optimal sizes would result.
Stevens and Price argue that the individuals showing symptoms of schizo-
phrenia might somehow have attracted followers who were discontent with 
their present situation in the (too) large group. They base this in part on an 
assumption that well-known charismatic leaders (such as Adolf Hitler) might 
have suffered from schizophrenia. 
In support of their hypothesis, Price and Stevens add that
 It is wise, though, to check quickly beneath the toilet seat before using the facilities in 39
places such as Sydney (at least in my experience). Nevertheless, it is somewhat paradoxical 
that compared to snakes or spiders it is apparently far more dangerous to encounter a horse, 
a cow, or a kangaroo in contemporary Australia. But still these animals rarely inspire phobias.
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[…] the schizophrenic individual is behaving like a prophet lacking followers. 
The prophet is alienated from normal social intercourse because of his 
deviant beliefs, and in the absence of followers, his preaching of his mission 
having failed, he might be expected to withdraw from society and to refrain 
from social intercourse. (Price & Stevens 1999, p. 201)
This is tremendously speculative. Where are the references to empirical 
studies of how prophets usually act when deprived of followers, for instance? 
One might also worry about the propensity for feeling fearful or disgusted that 
many people exhibit when faced with apparent insanity. We need some 
explanation for why we should not expect this reaction to have occurred in the 
alleged EEA. Taking such reactions into account makes it seem more likely 
that individuals suffering from schizophrenia would be expelled or even killed, 
than that they would end up as charismatic leaders of newly formed groups.
Indeed, it is not uncommon to encounter tensions between the reality of 
people suffering from some condition and the function evolutionary theorists 
assume they might have fulfilled in the EEA. As Dominic Murphy has pointed 
out, in many cases of evolutionary theories of mental disorders there is a 
“failure […] of psychological form not matching alleged biological function”. 
(2005, p. 761). In plain terms: Very few people suffering from schizophrenia 
are plausible candidates for charismatic leadership.
Evolutionary theory at its best neatly explains why some characteristic 
providing some beneficial function has been selected for. It is less good at 
explaining why some dysfunction have not been selected against. Schizo-
phrenia as a species-dysfunction that affects 1% of individuals may simply not 
have a strong enough effect for a selection against the dysfunction to occur. 
Here we get a glimpse of another central challenge related to interdisciplinary 
integration, which I will discuss in more detail in the following chapters. The 
challenge is that of making sure that an imported element is indeed fit for 
carrying out the function it is assigned in the integrated approach. For now, I 
will merely point in the general direction of this issue, and note that it will play 
a significant part in my analyses below.
This, then, is insight a: We should not assume that some element will work 
well in a new context, simply because it worked well in its original context. 
Recall insight b: We should not assume that some element will not work well 
in a new context, simply because it did not work well in its original context.
Some approach may well be a failure in its original application, and prove 
to be fruitful in different contexts. On the other hand, some approach might 
have been successful in its original application, and fail completely in a 
different context. Evaluation must, consequently, always be carried out on a 
case by case basis. One should be careful not to ascribe more or less validity 
to some theoretical element or approach than it actually deserves.
The neurological turn 
As mentioned above there is an evolutionary sub-discipline of neuroscience. 
But neuroscience itself is a very popular source for inputs into interdisciplinary 
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integration. Think of neurolinguistics, neuropsychiatry, 
neuropsychology, educational neuroscience, neuroan-
thropology, neurocriminology, neuroeconomics, neuro-
epistemology, neuroesthetics, neuroethics, neurolaw, 
neuromanagement, neuromarketing, neuropheno-
menology, neurophilosophy, neuropolitics, neuro-
psychoanalysis, neurosociology, neurotheology, and 
so on and so forth.
There is no doubt that the central nervous system is relevant in many ways 
to almost any activity in which humans (or other animals equipped with a 
central nervous system) are involved. This does not mean, of course, that 
neuroscience is relevant to any human related subject. Neither does it mean 
that neuroscientific approaches (or the elements that constitute them) are 
equipped with universal fitness. 
The popularity of importing elements from, for instance, neuroscience 
makes one wonder if this is not an instance of a general tendency which Alan 
Chalmers has diagnosed like this: 
A COUPLE OF BRAINS
Many in the so-called social or human sciences subscribe to a line of 
argument that runs roughly as follows. “The undoubted success of physics 
over the last three hundred years, it is assumed, is to be attributed to the 
application of a special method, ‘the scientific method’. Therefore, if the social 
and human sciences are to emulate the success of physics then that is to be 
achieved by first understanding and formulating this method and then 
applying it to the social and human sciences.” (Chalmers 1999, p. xx)
Chalmers is right to some extent, though it is important to be aware that »the 
scientific method« is not limited to methodology applied in physics these days. 
Certainly, neuroscience and evolutionary biology are also popular sources for 
certified scientificity. Importantly, Chalmers continues:
Two fundamental questions are raised by this line of argument, namely, “what 
is this scientific method that is alleged to be the key to the success of 
physics?” and “is it legitimate to transfer that method from physics and apply 
it elsewhere?”. (ibid.)
The reason why the latter question is too often 
insufficiently addressed is partly that we lack a method 
for detailed evaluation of specific cases of transferral. 
Chalmers’ first query is, at least in its most obvious 
interpretation, a trick question. There is no single 
scientific method. Rather, there is a plurality of scientific 
methods, and whether an individual method is good, to 
a large extent depends on context. It is dependent on 
the purpose for which it used, the inputs it is fed, the 
role it is assigned, and so forth.
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Empirical studies of the »seductive allure« of neuroscience has some 
interesting implications relevant to transferral of methodology from high rank 
sciences. Apparently, non-experts are highly susceptible to being unduly 
impressed by neuroscientific information—even when this is irrelevant to a 
provided explanation (Weisberg 2008; Weisberg et al. 2008). In a related 
study, McCabe and Castel (2008) found that their subjects were much more 
likely to find scientific claims and reasoning plausible, if the results were 
accompanied by an image of a brain as compared to other types of scientific 
illustrations.
Though interesting and neatly devised, these studies have one significant 
weakness for our present concerns in that they do not address to what extent 
experts from other disciplines than neuroscience count as non-experts when 
presented with neuroscientific information (or brain images). Weisberg et al. 
compare neuroscience experts with students of neuroscience and lay men. In 
the McCabe and Castel study it is merely reported that the participants are 
undergraduate students. We are not told their subjects of study.
In science studies, Harry Collins has targeted similar issues. Ever the poet, 
he has coined the phrase »distance lends enchantment« (Collins 1985, p. 17; 
Collins & Evans 2002, p. 246). The idea has been developed further by the 
Edinburgh sociologist Donald MacKenzie, who reached the conclusion that 
scientists are often less skeptical regarding the outputs of neighbouring 
disciplines as compared to outputs of their own discipline (Collins & Evans 
2002, p. 287; MacKenzie 1998).
Though these considerations may come across as somewhat speculative, 
it does not seem unreasonable to assume that scientists themselves are to 
some extent impressable by results from high rank disciplines. One could 
imagine a continuum from experts in neuroscience through closely related 
sciences, with scholars focused strictly on qualitative research at the other 
extreme. The relation is complex, though. One cannot assume that, e.g., 
people engaged in purely qualitative research are as likely to be allured by 
neuroscience as lay people, not least since actively engaging in idiographic, 
interpretive research may correlate with a skeptical attitude towards quantita-
tive methods. This would fit well with MacKenzie’s account of what he calls 
»the certainty trough« (see figure 3), according to which people far removed 
from the central core of scientist tend to think of the results as even more un-
certain than the scientists themselves (MacKenzie 1998).
There are indirect effects to consider as well, which might draw researchers 
towards integration with neuroscience. One such indirect effect is that 
scientists are likely to experience that people take their work more seriously 
when they add brain images to their publications and a “neuro”-prefix to their 
disciplinary label. Due to the pleasant nature of being admired by peers and 
the general public, such effects may, perhaps subconsciously, motivate 
scholars and scientists for engaging in opportunistic interdisciplinarity.
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FIGURE 3: THE CERTAINTY TROUGH.
What is the point? 
Presenting the above examples is primarily meant to highlight some of the 
more dominant trends in interdisciplinarity—especially in recent decades. All 
of the presented turns, including the turn-turn, are symptoms of a changed 
general approach to driving science and innovation forward. The construction 
of new disciplines informed by, e.g., cognitive, evolutionary, and neurological 
approaches is a phenomenon that has co-developed with the academic inter-
est in interdisciplinarity since Jantsch.
It would be unfair, though, if I were to leave the impression that subliminal 
cognitive biases were the primary motivations for interdisciplinarity. This is 
certainly not the case. In the next section, other reasons for interdisciplinarity 
will be discussed, none of which portray interdisciplinary scientists as seduced 
by anything at all.
More reasonable reasons for interdisciplinarity
A number of non-epistemic advantages are commonly associated with inter-
disciplinarity. One influential view sees interdisciplinarity as raising the ac-
countability of science  by developing »novel forms of quality control which 
undermine disciplinary forms of evaluation« (Barry et al. 2008; Strathern 
2004). To »undermine disciplinary forms of evaluation« constitutes a direct 
attack on the exclusive authority of established disciplines to determine intra-
disciplinary matters. Sometimes this is considered a democratisation of scien-
ce.
In another perspective, interdisciplinarity is viewed as a way to make 
science more readily applicable for innovation, which paves the way for fur-
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ther integrating science into the knowledge society (Nowotny 2005; Strathern 
2006). 
[…] [A]t its best, interdisciplinarity represents an innovation in knowledge 
production—making knowledge more relevant, balancing incommensurable 
claims and perspectives, and raising questions concerning the nature and 
viability of expertise. (Frodeman et al. 2010, p. xxix)
This could be considered as a way of subordinating science to the pragmatic 
needs of society.
At this point, it will be helpful to look at what the interdisciplinarity move-
ment reacts against. The opposite of interdisciplinarity is often considered to 
be specialisation. And indeed in many cases, interdisciplinarity is thought to 
be a remedy against the negative consequences of specialisation understood 
as the continuing process of dividing science up into ever narrower and more 
isolated (sub-)disciplines.
According to Peter Weingart, generally science was much more inter-
disciplinary prior to the establishment of contemporary disciplinary divisions.
The increasingly esoteric nature of knowledge production [throughout the 
eighteenth century] led to a growing distance from practical concerns and 
increased resistance to commercial and practical applications that had 
previously legitimized the utility of the sciences. (Weingart 2010, p. 6)
In Interdisciplinarity Studies quite a lot of effort has been put into the critique 
of established disciplines and the related methods and assumptions. One 
example is when Frodeman states that endorsements of »[…] [s]pecialization 
and expertise are built upon two assumptions—that it is possible to get down 
to the bottom of things, and that it is possible to study parts of the world in 
isolation from the world at large« (Frodeman et al. 2010, p. xxxiv).
Frodeman does not explicate what he means by getting »down to the 
bottom of things« and therefore it is uncertain whether this is a necessary part 
of the motivation for specialised science. On the other hand, I claim that it is 
indeed possible to study parts of the world in isolation from other more or less 
related aspects. The question is rather to what extent this results in more or 
less adequate science. 
From a pragmatic point of view, it certainly appears that many instances of 
specialisation have been and continue to be beneficial to the world at large. 
Think for instance of highly specialised fields such as condensed matter phy-
sics, with its many influential applications in medicine and user technology.  40
Quite a large number of the findings on which developments in these areas 
are based have been achieved only through attempts at isolating causal 
connections in specialised settings in order to develop manipulative abilities. 
 Superconductivity, quantum computing, laser-technology, and magnetic resonance imaging 40
are a few examples of technology in which condensed matter physics is applied.
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All in all, it does not seem right to claim that there has been a decrease in e.g. 
medical and technological developments based on applicable scientific dis-
coveries since the eighteenth century. Clearly, then, specialisation has not 
had a completely devastating effect on the relevance of science to the general 
public.
On the other hand, of course, it is difficult to say whether we would have 
been even better off had science not been divided into specialised sub-discip-
lines. And there is no doubt that there is a trade off between simplicity and 
cognitive economy on the one hand, and representational fidelity and rich 
contextualisation on the other.
The bottom line is, however: It is far from evident that we would be better 
off epistemically if we gave up on specialisation and isolation. There certainly 
are no legitimate reasons for a general warning against specialisation.
Specialisation vs. integration 
Given the reluctant attitude towards specialisation, one obvious reason for 
interdisciplinarity might be the aspiration to restore the scientific wholeness 
we have allegedly lost. Unfortunately, there might be serious obstacles to 
achieving this ideal, at least on an individual basis. There are ample reasons 
to doubt that it is possible today to develop a level of expertise that allows one 
to make genuine scientific contributions in several disciplines. Not to deduct in 
any way from past geniuses such as Galileo, da Vinci, or Leibniz, but the 
contemporary scientific world is far more complex than the one which these 
polymaths inhabited. Regardless of ones cognitive capacities one is certainly 
excused for not acquiring scientific omnicompetence today.
A less ambitious aspiration could be the development of what Donald T. 
Campbell has termed »the fish-scale model of omniscience«. Campbell is 
highly critical of individual attempts to develop expertise in two or more discip-
lines. He calls this the »leonardesque aspiration«. Campbell takes as his 
starting point that the specialisation of the disciplines somehow leaves gaps 
which are not addressed. By means of a series of diagrams he argues that 
when a number of closely related disciplines are organised in departmental 
structures, the most central of these (i.e. the disciplines that have most over-
laps with the largest number of the other disciplines thus subsumed) will 
inevitably end up dominating the department. This will in turn hurt the connec-
tions with neighbouring departments, since the less central disciplines are 
those most likely to share common ground with non-central members of other 
departments. The result, according to Campbell, is gaps between depart-
ments in which topics are not addressed unless interdepartmental cooperation 
is carried out (Campbell 1969).
Campbell’s own remedy for dealing with interdepartmental gaps is the fish-
scale model. On this model academic institutions should be organised in a 
wealth of specialised units in such a way that all units just slightly overlap with 
neighbouring units in a fish-scale pattern. Presumably, this should prevent 
gaps from developing
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One might wonder, though, how actually to interpret Campbell’s notions of 
gaps and overlaps.  First, it seems that scientific activities are far too complex 
phenomena to be represented simply in terms of two-dimensional diagrams. 
Talk of gaps is obviously metaphorical, but what are the real phenomena this 
metaphor targets? And even if we find these real gaps, how likely is it that 
gaps are simply left unaddressed for long? It seems like it is often considered 
a central achievement for scientists to define or uncover a new problem area 
to discuss or analyse, to expand by applying existing theory to issues hitherto 
left untouched, or, indeed, to develop brand new theories or models to 
address issues somehow related to ones central area of expertise. One might 
argue that whenever a stone is discovered to be unturned, lots of ambitious 
scholars and scientists can be expected to be on the brink of throwing them-
selves at it (to turn it over) (Bechtel 1986, p. 27).
A better reason for interdisciplinarity could be to directly attack what 
Campbell calls the ethnocentrism of disciplines. Campbell defines ethno-
centrism as »the symptoms of tribalism or nationalism or ingroup partisanship 
in the internal and external relations of university departments, national 
scientific organizations, and academic disciplines« (Campbell 1969, p. 328). 
Campbell suggests that fighting ethnocentrism of disciplines is a significant 
step towards the development of fish-scale coordination. As Gold and Gold 
states:
The training and socialisation that the student in a discipline undergoes lead 
to an identification with the disciplinary community that comes prior to, and is 
generally regarded as more persistent than, identification with a specific 
employer or particular task. In combination with normative differences these 
feelings of identification and loyalty to the disciplinary community can, and 
often do, develop to the point of professional chauvinism […] (Gold & Gold 
1983, p. 94)
There is certainly some truth to such claims, and consequently good reasons 
to consider to which extent mechanisms such as those for peer review, getting 
tenure or promotion, deciding on curricula, or general requirements for obtain-
ing a degree, actually serve epistemic goals. If one wants to get a job at some 
point in a certain academic discipline, there is certainly a canon one is requir-
ed to acquaint oneself with. Through the study of these central topics of the 
standard literature of the discipline, students are likely to develop some form 
of loyalty and trust towards other (senior) members of the discipline.  Special 41
skills and values are internalised as part of ongoing activities, skills which 
might not be valued in other departments. Competition for resources between 
departments probably also at times add to a somewhat hostile interdepart-
mental atmosphere.
 In one department they celebrate important and influential heroes, which the »idiots« of 41
some other departments might never even have heard of.
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If, on the other hand, we look in some detail at the small philosophical 
department to which I am affiliated, a quite different picture emerges. In this 
philosophy department the people employed cover a vast range of interests 
aside from the strictly philosophical topics of their central interests. In the 
department, employees are quite accomplished in such divergent fields as 
musicology, literature theory, religious studies, psychology, psychopathology, 
mathematics, law studies, evolutionary theory, educational studies and more. 
One might wonder whether this is not the general tendency one would 
encounter if one were to check the extra-disciplinary interests and competen-
cies of the scientific staff in other departments? This might constitute a fish-
scale model of expertise on an individual, rather than on a departmental level. 
This does not mean that all employees at the department suffer from leonar-
desque aspirations. But it means that the department overlaps to a significant 
extent with many other areas of study, and even though there are central 
topics which are held to have primary importance by all (or most) depart-
mental members, there is a considerable heterogeneity in secondary 
interests.
Three modes of integration
Campbell’s notion of the ‘leonardesque aspirations’ opens the possibility of 
expanding a bit further on what one could call different modes of integration.
Let us briefly discuss three different modes. The following is not intended 
as a deep discussion of these issues. But it will be useful for discussions 
below to have these distinct modes sketched out.
The polymath mode 
When addressing the issue in terms of modes, we could rephrase Campbell’s 
‘leonardesque aspiration’ as ‘the polymath mode’. This would be the mode in 
which interdisciplinary integration is carried out in the cognitive system of a 
single individual, so to speak. One might think of this as the mode in which 
one person fully specialised in a certain discipline acquires expertise in one 
(or more) additional discipline(s) in order to integrate the theory or methodo-
logy from these approaches.
While one might be skeptical about developing full expertise (whatever that 
might mean) in two or more disciplines (let alone in all disciplines), it is 
certainly possible for an individual to develop expertise to some extent in 
several disciplines. It is clear, though, that this is a very demanding approach. 
As everybody involved in research is aware, keeping up to date with state of 
the art in just a single discipline requires significant effort. Thus, keeping up to 
date with two or more not closely related disciplines would be a tremendously 
demanding task indeed. The question is, then, whether the extent to which the 
poly-expertise developed is sufficient for handling potential problems with suf-
ficient care.
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The social mode 
The most obvious alternative to the polymath mode would be a social mode, 
in which people specialised in different discipline collaborate to combine their 
competencies. Representatives of different disciplines each contribute their 
special expertise to the common development of hybrid solutions.
This is probably the way in which most interdisciplinary activities are carried 
out. This mode has its own challenges. Somebody will have to take upon 
themselves the role of mediators between the involved frameworks, and these 
persons will need some sort of interactional expertise in Harry Collins’ terms: 
In such circumstances the party without the interactional expertise in respect 
of the other party should be represented by someone with enough 
interactional expertise to make sure the combination is done with integrity. 
(Collins & Evans 2002, p. 256; italics in original)
This more or less means that someone involved will have to be sufficiently 
»polymath-like« to carry out the function of mediator between the involved 
disciplines. Possessing interactional expertise must require some level of 
insight into the interacting disciplines. But the level of disciplinary expertise 
required may not be the same as that required for being a full expert in the 
individual disciplines.
The educational mode 
In (socially) successful cases of interdisciplinarity, it will at some point seem 
natural to establish institutions at which future practitioners of the inter-
discipline are educated. This, educational mode, makes it possible to cherry-
pick the knowledge elements and competencies which people engaged in the 
relevant activities are required to have. It also makes possible the training of 
students specifically to develop the required types of interactional expertise.
All of the above 
In some cases the above modes may be combined. For instance, a research-
er who strives to become a certain kind of interdisciplinary polymath may 
establish a centre for the study of a given subject in his or hers preferred 
perspective. At this centre, researchers from the involved disciplines may be 
employed or affiliated on the leaders initiative. If a sufficient degree of success 
is achieved, this might eventually lead to the establishment of institutionalised 
education.
Science without a core set?
One central worry worth mentioning at this point relates to the notion of a 
scientific core. Cores can be analysed along different dimensions based on 
what aspects of disciplinarity one favours. 
Lakatos famously insisted that some theoretical and methodological hard 
core must be retained through changes, for some class of activities con-
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tinuously to belong to a given discipline (or, rather, research programme) 
(Lakatos 1978). Harry Collins, on the other hand, operates with a concept of 
“the core set” (a more sociologically orientated core), which refers to the 
central group of scientists who are actively engaged in settling scientific 
disputes (Collins 1981; Collins 1988).
If we combine these notions into a hybrid, let us call it ‘the hard core set’, 
we can use this to point to a group of people with sufficient insight into the 
central theoretical elements to contribute actively to settling disputes in a 
given set of scientific activities. In some interdisciplinary settings, especially if 
revolutionary new approaches result from integrating distant parent approach-
es, one might expect that no single person possesses the competencies 
required for membership of the hard core set. Possessing interactional 
expertise is not sufficient to make one a hard core set member, since people 
with interactional expertise are not necessarily disciplinary experts.
In the detailed discussion of the introduction of operational definitions into 
psychopathology below (in chapter 6), one of the most evident problems 
revealed is the lack of a hard core set. The people involved had little insight 
into the crucial differences between the state of the art or the conceptual foun-
dations of the parent disciplines. In that case, then, when developing the ope-
rationalised psychopathology, a hybrid approach was created without an 
accompanying hybrid hard core set. The creators of the hybrid approach did 
not possess sufficiently overlapping expertise to be members of a hybrid hard 
core set. The consequence was that even though the creators were warned 
(by Carl Hempel) about a good deal of the most critical pitfalls related to the 
use of operational definitions, the warnings were not taken duly into account 
in the resulting construct.
Degenerating hard core sets 
We are not only concerned with whether our theoretical findings will be 
broadly accepted by our peers, but also with whether they will live on, so to 
speak. This is a respect in which interdisciplinary developments are in a much 
less comfortable position than, say, core developments within established 
disciplines. If you write a groundbreaking paper or book on a central topic in 
philosophy, you have thousands of dedicated philosophers already employed 
in philosophy departments all over the world who are, to some extent, eager 
to pick up (or on) your ideas and may incorporate them into their teaching and 
so on. If, on the other hand, your groundbreaking discoveries are within an 
interdisciplinary field with no established departments, like, say, neuro-inuito-
logy, the potential for having your insights established as central among 
students by enthusiastic colleagues is much smaller.
Especially in the polymath mode, there is another significant risk, namely 
that the hard earned interdisciplinary expertise will evaporate with the retire-
ment (or death) of the central figure(s). Even with a strong hard core set, there 
is a significant risk that the next generation of researchers will be less well 
equipped to partake in core activities or carry on the work. If well-formed 
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educational settings have been established, on the other hand, it might be the 
case that second generation researchers are in some ways even better 
equipped to continue the work than were the initiators of the specific 
interdisciplinary activity. It is a reasonable worry, though, that an XY-PhD 
might have less insight into deep X-issues than an X-PhD. This might 
eventually be problematic for third or fourth generation XY-PhDs when not 
even their supervisors possess deep X-insight. 
Here we might have an interesting interdisciplinary auxiliary to Lakatos’ 
notion of negative research programmes. There is a risk that interdisciplinary 
research programmes will undergo a degeneration due to a decline in the 
level of academic proficiency of its core members.
Another important aspect relates to peer review: If you are participating in 
the core aspects of a specific X-debate in a specialised X-journal it is very 
difficult to get away with making unsupported claims about central issues. The 
peer review institution is likely to block your paper from publication, since what 
counts as a peer will be an X-expert. However, given the nature of the peer 
review institution, it is much easier to get away with making less well 
supported claims when publishing on X (or perhaps XY) in a Y-journal, the 
core debates of which are distant from the core elements of X. The reviewers 
in the Y-journal will be experts on Y-topics and thus know as little or less about 
X as the author knows about Y. It is tempting to pick peers from the hard core 
set of the specific interdisciplinary activity. But this is not a perfect solution, 
especially not if the hard core set itself is non-existing or degenerating.
Summing up
The most important observation regarding the above examples of different 
motivations for interdisciplinarity is that none of the texts in which these 
examples are discussed incorporate detailed considerations about epistemic 
issues related to how disciplines are integrated, what gaps are, what it means 
to overlap, or how to handle the threat of degeneration. The focus is almost 
exclusively on departmental structures, socialisation, affiliation, and organisa-
tion. The last-mentioned issues all fit naturally into a sociologically informed 
account of interdisciplinarity. The first-mentioned questions are most naturally 
addressed within a philosophy of science framework. Unfortunately, philo-
sophy of science is not frequently integrated into discussions within Inter-
disciplinarity Studies.
It is not up for discussion that scientific inquiry is partly a social phenome-
non. Undeniably science is carried out by communities of collaborating re-
searchers. Thus, it is obvious that an exhaustive account of science must take 
account of its related social aspects (Kitcher 2001; Longino 2006a). However, 
in Interdisciplinarity Studies, as in science studies in general,  arguably there 42
is a marked tendency to overemphasise the importance of social aspects of 
 Interdisciplinarity studies is closely related to science studies. Indeed, one might think of 42
Interdisciplinarity Studies as a highly specialised branch of science studies.
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science. Work carried out in these frameworks have certainly generated a 
wealth of interesting insights and eyeopening case studies. But focus is 
predominantly on how participants become »socialised« into disciplines as 
well as on the power struggles between members of disciplines, between 
disciplines, and between science and external stakeholders (Weingart 2010, 
p. 8 ff.).
As Giere wrote (commenting on Latour): »One can understand the desire 
of sociologist for a theory of science and technology that is totally sociological. 
But the subject simply will not allow it« (Giere 1999a, p. 63). In the next 
chapter, I will discuss some reasons for and against the position that philo-
sophy has something relevant to offer for analyses of interdisciplinarity.
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4 — The relevance of philosophy
ABSTRACT. In this chapter, I will present opinions for and against 
the relevance of philosophy of science to the study of interdisciplin-
arity. To some the relevance of philosophy may seem so obvious 
that it is hardly worth discussing. Others are of different opinions, 
though. I will present some arguments of the latter group and some 
philosophical examples which, I believe, speak strongly in favour of 
the former position.
This chapter will discuss the relevance of philosophical reflections to the study 
of interdisciplinarity. To some it may seem obvious that philosophy of science 
is relevant to discussions of interdisciplinary research. After all, it is the overall 
goal of philosophy of science to describe scientific activities and prescribe 
remedies for change to the better. The extent to which the efforts of philo-
sophers have been successful can of course be disputed.
In (1980) Science Studies icon Trevor Pinch wrote:
In-depth studies of the development of particular pieces of scientific 
knowledge form the hallmark of recent work in the sociology of science. 
Broadly informed by a relativist approach, the authors of such case studies 
have attempted to explain scientific development in a fully sociological 
manner. That is, the main explanatory weight is given to the social world 
rather than to the natural world. (p. 77; my emphasis)
Later in the text, Pinch states his conviction that
[the fact that this sociological] description is in close resonance with how the 
participants themselves viewed the situation […] gives us some 
encouragement that the account offered here is at least not as divorced from 
real scientific activity as that offered by philosophers. (p. 84; my emphasis)
The conviction that philosophy is out of touch with scientific reality was a 
central part of the motivation for the Strong Programme in the Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge since the very beginning. Inspiration from especially 
Thomas Kuhn  (Barnes 1977, p. 23; 1982; Kuhn 1962) developed into a 43
quite dismissive attitude towards philosophy of science (Laudan 1984). 
Succinctly put, certain sociologists aimed to seize power over what should 
 Though a number of other philosophers(!), e.g. Wittgenstein, Feyerabend, Quine, and 43
Hanson, also made their influence count (Brown 1984, p. 12)
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count as authoritative descriptions of science (Bloor 1976). This meant that 
philosophers had to step aside.
Similarly, in the genre known as »laboratory studies« people such as Bruno 
Latour, Steven Woolgar, and Karin Knorr-Cetina have argued that their micro-
sociological approaches made plain the irrelevance of more traditional 
philosophical analysis focused on science as a rational enterprise generating 
knowledge and truth (Knorr-Cetina 1981; 1999; Latour & Woolgar 1986).  44
Philosophers of science were considered fundamentally misguided due to 
their propensity for a priori speculation.45
Essentially the same view on philosophy of science lives on in 
Interdisciplinarity Studies. In the Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity 
philosophy of science is specifically criticised for being insensitive to many 
central aspects of interdisciplinarity. Quoting historian Bruce Kuklick (2001), 
academic philosophy is claimed to have been characterised by »great 
technical acumen wedded to societal irrelevance« since the middle of the 
twentieth century (Frodeman et al. 2010, p. xxxi). And further it is claimed that:
[…] the philosophy of science has been ‘pure’ for decades, built on the 
assumption that the epistemological aspects of scientific research can be 
separated from the social, ethical, political, economic, and religious causes 
and consequences of science. (p. xxxii)
One can certainly understand the impression that large parts of twentieth 
century philosophy of science have somehow been isolated from scientific 
reality. Nevertheless, it is most wise not to succumb to the temptation of 
universal generalisation. If all goes well, this thesis should demonstrate that 
philosophy of science does bring something of relevance to analyses of 
interdisciplinarity. And it is worth mentioning, that several of the central ideas 
this thesis is built upon were originally put forward in the early 1960s (e.g. 
Hesse 1963; Nagel 1961; Suppes 1960; 1962). Even Kuhn himself expressed 
regret that he had not placed some inclusive concept of “model” centrally in 
his framework of disciplinary matrices (Kuhn 1970, p. 184). These and many 
other examples demonstrate that it is not fair to portray philosophy of science 
since the middle of the twentieth century as »pure« (in a derogatory sense) 
and irrelevant.
Indeed, it is probably more fair to claim that over the last four decades most 
approaches to analysing interdisciplinarity have bent their subject somewhat 
out of shape. Abstracting from all but social aspects is no more a healthy 
move than abstracting from all but logical structures. This has been a 
 To be fair, in the afterword of the second edition of Laboratory Life Latour and Woolgar do 44
admit that some parts of philosophy may not be entirely irrelevant after all (1986, p. 279 ff.).
 Straw man or not, among other interesting effects the topic stimulated a quite entertaining 45
exchange of verbal blows between David Bloor and Larry Laudan. (see Brown 1984)
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standard point of criticism of the sociology of knowledge, which is no less 
pertinent to the specialised study of interdisciplinarity.
More sensitive to potential problems in existing methodology, Julie 
Thompson Klein has pointed towards some difficulties involved in the 
production of new knowledge, when »[i]ndividual standards must be calibrated 
and tensions among different approaches carefully managed in balancing acts 
that require negotiation and compromise« (Klein 2008, p. 116). In line with the 
Cartwright quotation  in the opening of chapter 1 above, Klein states that: 46
»Evaluation […] remains one of the least-understood aspects [of inter-
disciplinarity]« (ibid.).
One obstacle to understanding the aspect of evaluation better, is that 
attention is focused on issues which fit naturally into a sociologically orientat-
ed framework. For instance, when presenting the results of the American 
Political Science Association’s task force on interdisciplinarity, John Aldrich 
writes: »The attraction of interdisciplinarity often seems to be more than mere-
ly combining the insights or methods or data and their analysis, which is what 
the definition of interdisciplinarity requires« (2014, p. 15). Before moving on to 
discussions of more interesting elements, it seems required to reach an 
understanding of what integration itself (merely) is. However, the discussion of 
integration is philosophical and cannot be carried out solely in sociological 
terms.
Thus, to repeat myself, it is certainly worth emphasising the importance of 
social matters. But ignoring the complex epistemic issues related to interdis-
ciplinarity is not reasonable. Philosophical analysis is not only relevant, it is re-
quired for an adequate analysis of interdisciplinarity. In the following, I will dis-
cuss some examples of very relevant philosophical approaches to interdiscip-
linarity. These examples, some of which will be elaborated in subsequent 
chapters, may serve as a base for the development of a more general frame-
work for the epistemic evaluation of interdisciplinary efforts.
Relevant philosophical approaches to 
interdisciplinarity
There are, indeed, some parts of philosophical literature which focus on 
interdisciplinarity in one way or the other. This includes interesting discussions 
of communication between scientists from different fields (Galison 1997; 
Holbrook 2013), discussions about implications from social epistemology for 
understanding interdisciplinary collaborations (Andersen & Wagenknecht 
2013), discussions about whether philosophy is a necessary part of well-
executed interdisciplinary collaborations or, indeed, whether philosophy itself 
is by nature interdisciplinary (Frodeman 2013; Fuller 2010; Hoffmann et al. 
2013). These are definitely all interesting topics worthy of attention, even if 
 »[W]e have no articulated methodologies for [evaluating] interdisciplinary work, not even 46
anything so vague and general as the filtered-down versions of good scientific method we are 
taught at school.« (Cartwright 1999, p. 18)
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they do not contribute much to the development of a framework suited for the 
epistemic evaluation of interdisciplinarity.
Kitcher’s historical perspective 
Taking a more critical standpoint, Patricia Kitcher has developed a very 
detailed analysis of the failure of Freud’s project of developing an all-encom-
passing science of mind. Kitcher's eminent scholarly work certainly pins down 
important epistemic implications and sets a very high standard for investiga-
tions in this field. Kitcher's work on Freud is based on an extended historical 
case study, and thereby sets a great example for the utility of retrospective 
analyses of interdisciplinary research programmes.
Indeed, the strength of Kitcher’s analysis depends partly on the ease with 
which one can retrospectively judge the parent approaches involved. A sub-
stantial number of the theories which Freud drew upon in his psychoanalysis 
have fallen seriously from grace since then. Actually, some of those theories 
were already considered fundamentally flawed by experts working in the res-
pective fields at the time when they were adopted by Freud as inputs into his 
own construct.
As briefly mentioned above (chapter 3), it seems clear that if one builds 
ones theoretical construct with, for instance, Lamarckian inheritance as a 
corner stone, it significantly deducts from one’s credibility once Lamarck’s 
ideas are more or less unanimously rejected.  It is important not to confuse 47
this with insight a and insight b discussed above. Those insights refer to the 
utility of tools and approaches in different contexts whereas the question re-
garding Lamarckian inheritance is about using something false as a basic 
premise in an argument.
Kitcher's concerns are closely related to what has been called »the threat 
of dilettantism«, which is often expressed among less enthusiastic followers of 
interdisciplinarity:
A […] concern about interdisciplinarity, the danger of dilettantism, is raised by 
Nissani (1997, 212) and Bauer (1990, 113), among others. After all, there is a 
reason why serious fields of inquiry are called “disciplines”—their practice 
requires time, dedication, and indeed discipline. The demands of rigorous and 
specialized scholarship make it exceedingly difficult to engage responsibly 
with more than one discipline. Dabblers may easily be misled by superficial 
resemblances when they are not acquainted with the technical details 
wherein so much of the real effort lies. (Kellert 2009, p. 35; references in 
original)
 Even if one were to accept the quite controversial claim that epigenetics somehow 47
rehabilitates Lamarck, this does not seem to help Freud. The nature of the acquired traits his 
theory presupposed as inheritable are more similar to the development of the long necks of 
giraffes than to gene expressions increasing the likelihood of obesity in offspring (Penny 
2015).
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Kellert is right to state that »[b]ad scholarship is the problem« but is less 
obviously correct when he adds that »interdisciplinarity itself carries no special 
risk« (2009, p. 35). Basing your efforts on work from unfamiliar disciplines is 
treacherous for a variety of reasons discussed throughout this thesis. You 
probably do not have sufficient insight into the various discussions of pros and 
cons when working with a given theory. You are not intimately familiar with the 
idealisations made. Further, there is the issue of keeping track of the progress 
of the parent disciplines, and updating your hybrid approaches in accordance 
with these new developments.
In addition to the difficulties related to acquiring sufficient mastery of a 
second discipline already discussed, there is a further significant risk that the 
already acquired mastery of ones home-approach may lead one to 
overestimate one’s understanding of what is going on in a second discipline.
Indeed, this phenomenon of referred expertise has been targeted in 
science studies:
At the very outset […] we noted that in the 1950s scientists were often 
attributed with authority to speak on subjects outside their narrow area of 
specialization. [Science studies] has shown how dangerous it is to take this 
kind of referred expertise at face value, since the pronouncements of the 
wider scientific community are nearly always based on simplified and 
retrospectively constructed accounts of the scientific process. Quite simply, 
scientists’ supposed referred expertise about fields of science distant from 
their own is nearly always based on mythologies about science, rather than 
on science itself (Collins & Evans 2002, p. 259 f.)
The strength of the threat of referred expertise depends to some extent on the 
mode in which the interdisciplinary activities are carried out. But the notions of 
referred expertise and disciplinary distance add nuance to Kitcher’s warnings 
against building one’s interdisciplinary castle on a foundation of ill-understood 
theory. These notions further emphasise the relevance of discussing the dif-
ference between transferring elements (mathematical or otherwise) between 
proximate approaches and more distant approaches by indicating that there 
are likely to be different grades of problems related to transferability. 
Weisberg’s vehicle perspective 
As another especially interesting example, Michael Weisberg discusses a 
number of cases in which models are transferred between approaches. 
Weisberg has developed a framework for discussing such transferrals in great 
detail. Especially Weisberg’s discussions of his concepts of “construal”, 
“assignment”, “scope”, and “fidelity” highlight central and important aspects of 
the transferral of models between approaches. Weisberg’s framework thus 
captures central parts of the analysis of model use. I shall discuss these 
aspects of Weisberg’s account in more detail in chapters 5 and 7 below.
As Weisberg notes about the transferral of models between approaches:
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In some instances of modeling, construction is carried out from scratch. For 
example, when Volterra first constructed the mathematical structure for the 
Lotka–Volterra model, he had no previous biological models from which to 
work. However, in many cases, structures are developed from other 
structures, or may be completely coopted from another use. Any subsequent 
researchers using the Lotka–Volterra model are borrowing their mathematical 
structure from Volterra and from Lotka. (Weisberg 2013a, p. 75)
At least in some cases involving the borrowing of the Lotka-Volterra model, 
theoretical structures are obviously transferred between disciplines (e.g. 
Goodwin 1967). A number of central issues are less obvious, however. Is 
there anything inherently disciplinary about mathematical structures? Is it rele-
vant in anything but a historical sense that a given equation was first applied 
to a certain target? If not, are mathematical structures neutral? How do we 
compare the applications of a given equation to two different targets? Are 
such comparisons relevant at all?
Weisberg’s work is of eminent quality and his framework certainly empha-
sises important aspects of the epistemic mechanisms of interdisciplinarity. 
However, there are details and dynamics of interdisciplinarity which Weis-
berg’s as well as Kitcher’s approaches fail to capture. 
Weisberg and Kitcher both focus on examples in which the theoretical 
material which is imported is at the »surface« of the activities in question. That 
is, as just discussed, Weisberg analyses the transferral of vehicles of repres-
entation, whereas Kitcher's focus is on the transferral of scientific products or 
outputs. What is, thus, lacking in Weisberg’s account is attention to how other 
theoretical elements (tools, assumptions, algorithms) may be transferred 
during integration. And as Kitcher’s explicitly states, she does not engage in 
the sort of general, abstract analysis, which is the specific concern of this 
thesis (Kitcher 1992, p. 4; Kitcher 2007). Consequently, I believe there is room 
for considerable further development.
Pluralism and representation
Interestingly, a number of philosophers in the tradition of the philosophy of 
scientific representation have worked on issues which could be interpreted as 
providing very strong arguments in favour of interdisciplinarity as a general 
strategy for scientific progress. In this literature, it is one of the most basic 
assumptions, that the world (and most of the phenomena that the world is 
made up from) is so complex that it cannot be captured adequately by any 
single model (or other kind of vehicle of representation). Consequently, a 
multitude of different perspectives are required each capturing some aspect of 
the total complexity (Giere 1999a, p. 79).
This seems to provide all the reasons one needs for immediately adopting 
a general strategy of interdisciplinarity: If all phenomena require more than 
one perspective for a full analysis, then it is clear that we should combine 
perspectives and that interdisciplinarity is the way forward.
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To some extent, the central notions of this thesis may be said to descend 
directly from the literature on scientific pluralism which is closely related to the 
philosophy of scientific representation. Philosophers such as Kellert (2009), 
Longino (2006b), Cartwright (1999), and Giere (1999a; 2006a) have advocat-
ed ideas along the line that (often) »natural phenomena cannot be fully 
explained by a single theory or fully investigated using a single approach. As a 
consequence, multiple approaches are required for the explanation and 
investigation of such phenomena«  (Kellert et al. 2006, p. vii).
I am in many ways sympathetic to this pluralistic stance. There are reasons 
for caution, though:
A thoroughgoing disciplinary pluralism […] suggests that sometimes the 
perspectives [involved in interdisciplinarity] do not fit nicely together on the 
same plane: they overlap or conflict or cannot both be held at the same time, 
and yet both are needed to understand the phenomenon. (Kellert 2009, p. 38)
Some questions naturally arise following such statements: What does it mean 
for specific perspectives to be incompatible? And what are the epistemic 
consequences of attempting to integrate incompatible perspectives. To 
provide a framework in which these and related questions can be answered is 
the most significant contribution I see myself as offering with this thesis.
According to the literature on scientific pluralism  it is not just the case that 48
all phenomena require multi-perspectival explanations (in order to be fully 
explained, that is). It is another fundamental assumption that these different 
perspectives are (at least to some extent) incompatible, incommensurable, 
incongruent, or just not overlapping. Think of the following: Why is it such a 
rare experience to encounter discussions of interparadigmatic research? 
Probably because it is a basic (and well-known) assumption of widespread 
interpretations of the Kuhnian framework that such integrations are not feasib-
le. As I will discuss in detail below, similar problems are built into represen-
tation-based accounts of science. What the consequences are of trying to 
integrate incompatible perspectives is an issue that is far from clear. 
Importantly, this central philosophical issue has not been addressed in the 
literature on interdisciplinarity in spite of its obvious relevance. It is, inciden-
tally, a central aspect of what I intend to address in the following chapters of 
this thesis.
In many cases, different approaches do not combine neatly to form new, 
epistemically superior wholes. It may very well be the case, though, that 
incompatible perspectives constitute fruitful constraints on how the individual 
approaches might reasonably be used and interpreted. I will discuss the 
issues of representation, pluralism, and incompatible perspectives in detail in 
chapter 5 and 6.
The philosophy of scientific representation, then, provides both strong 
arguments in favour of interdisciplinary approaches and a list of serious 
 Which I deal with in detail in chapter 6.48
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difficulties which need to be taken into account. Similarly, there are many 
good reasons why the philosophical study of scientific pluralism should also to 
be integrated into the frameworks for studying interdisciplinarity. Not least 
since the problems addressed are absolutely central to whether inter-
disciplinarity is recommendable or not. Addressing interdisciplinarity on a 
pluralistic, representation based background provides ample reason for a 
careful and sober attitude towards interdisciplinary science.
Though some philosophers of science, such as Weisberg, have dealt with 
the issue of using models or theories in other settings than their original field 
of development, only a few have discussed this in the context of inter-
disciplinarity. And though most of these discussions are relevant to the discus-
sion of epistemic aspects of interdisciplinarity, no one has developed a frame-
work able to capture the diversity of collaborations in the present-day eclectic 
and almost promiscuous attitude towards scientific crossbreeding.
Perhaps Sandra Mitchell’s position called integrative pluralism is the 
position most closely related to the framework developed in this thesis. 
Mitchell’s work is based on detailed, representation-based analyses of narrow 
interdisciplinarity (in the terms of Interdisciplinary Studies). More specifically, 
she deals with the integration of various levels of explanation internal to 
biology (Mitchell 2002; 2003; Mitchell et al. 1997). These are fascinating and 
important discussions very relevant to the themes of this thesis. But due to 
their specificity, they do not capture general issues regarding interdisciplinary 
activities involving, for instance, the humanities and the social sciences. I shall 
return to Mitchell’s interesting work in my discussion of pluralisms in chapter 
6.
If we are to do these issues justice, a good place to start is to dig into how 
scientific representation in general is accomplished in specific approaches 
and on that basis spell out difficulties related to integrating these (perhaps 
incompatible) approaches. Once one realises that all approaches involve 
individual distortions, it appears that there are few reasons to assume that the 
integration of two distorted approaches adds up to something which is less 
distorted.
Summing up
This chapter has been a short one. The reason is, that it does not require 
much reflection to see that philosophy is actually relevant to discussions of 
interdisciplinarity, even though this has been passionately disputed.
Philosophical analyses of scientific representation and discussions within 
the framework of scientific pluralism are not just obviously relevant. They will 
also constitute the foundation of the approach I develop in the chapters below. 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5 — Representation
ABSTRACT. In this chapter, I put forward what I believe should ser-
ve as the philosophical foundation for a representation based ac-
count of interdisciplinarity. I focus especially on the work of Ronald 
Giere, Stephen Downes, Michael Weisberg, Bas van Fraassen, 
and Martin Thomson-Jones. Through discussing the positions of 
these philosophers, I arrive at an enriched version of Giere’s ac-
count of scientific representation. I end the chapter by summing up 
why I believe this constitutes a good foundation for an approach 
based framework.
In the above chapters some difficulties motivating the present attempt to 
develop an approach for more detailed analyses of interdisciplinarity were 
presented. Further, a conceptual framework for capturing the most relevant 
aspects of the complex phenomena targeted in this thesis were outlined. In 
this chapter, I present the philosophical foundation which adds the level of 
nuance necessary for detailed analyses of specific interdisciplinary cases. 
Succinctly put, the goal in this chapter is to arrive at a deflationary semantic 
account of scientific practice which is sociologically and historically informed 
and sufficiently pragmatic for capturing representational activities across the 
scientific board.
The central line of thought in this thesis is that a fruitful approach to 
analysing interdisciplinary activities can be developed by adapting tools from 
the philosophy of scientific representation. To determine the extent to which 
this suggestion is reasonable, clear specifications of the relevant version of 
the philosophy of scientific representation are required, as well as how it is to 
be adapted. In this chapter the main focus is on providing a response to the 
former half of this challenge. The main presentation of the suggested adapta-
tions will constitute the core content of chapter 7 below. Having stated this, 
though, it is probably clear that these two tasks cannot be completely 
separated.
To a large extent, the following account is based on Ronald Giere’s view on 
scientific representation. In this chapter I describe the relevant aspects of 
Giere’s viewpoint from the early and very influential version in his Explaining 
Science (1988) up until the more fully developed versions (most notably 
1999a; 2004; 2006b; 2009; 2010; 2011). Further, I describe why I consider 
this to be a good starting point for an analysis of interdisciplinarity as well as 
in which respects it is wanting. I go on to develop what I think are the neces-
sary augmentations for the present purposes.
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When discussing the background of approach based analysis which will be 
developed below, I will largely ignore some of the most influential positions in 
the philosophy of science in the twentieth century. If one were to look for 
detailed discussions of logical empiricism, Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, or 
social constructivism in the following, one would be disappointed. The variants 
of the semantic view on scientific theory, which will serve as the background 
for the following account, was established from around 1980 and onwards 
(with some notable precursors in the 1960s and 1970s). The early versions of 
the semantic view (most notably Van Fraassen 1980) were at the same time 
sufficiently similar in many ways to logical empiricism and sufficiently ignorant 
of, e.g., Kuhn’s historicism for it to make sense to start my account here  49
(Giere 1988, p. 46 ff.). Relevant insights from sociological and historical 
approaches to the study of science only started to impact anglo-american 
philosophy of scientific representation in the 1980s and onwards.
In the following, I will attempt to strike a balance between a deflationary 
semantic view and a pragmatic view on scientific theory. While doing so, I will 
not be searching for axiomatic foundations of interdisciplinarity. I will start by 
briefly discussing the move from the syntactical view to the semantic view on 
scientific theory embodied by discussions in the early 1980s. As additional 
background, I will discuss the move from strictly mathematical isomorphism to 
a socially enriched deflationary similarity-based account of modelling. Follow-
ing that, I will unfold a (pragmatic) use-based account of science including a 
specified propositional account of scientific representation.
Thus, the discussions of this chapter draw mostly on work by people 
associated with different contemporary or quite recent schools of thought 
within the philosophy of science. Among those schools are: the (so-called) 
semantic view on scientific theory, the (so-called) Stanford school, the (so-
called) pragmatic view on scientific theory, the (so-called) model-based view 
on scientific theory, and some representation based views on scientific 
theory.50
I am not claiming that a representational account exhausts all there is to 
say about interdisciplinarity (or science in general, obviously). But I do claim 
that the focus on representational activities reveals interesting, central as-
pects and difficulties of scientific practice in general—and will do so when 
applied to interdisciplinarity. Therefore, I believe that the philosophy of repre-
 I will include, though, a brief discussion of the consequences of a certain interpretation of 49
Kuhn’s concept of “paradigm“ below.
 Notable theorists associated with these closely related but nevertheless distinct lines of 50
thought are Bas van Fraassen (1980; 1989; 2008), Nancy Cartwright (1983; 1999), Ronald 
Giere (1988; 1999a; 1999b; 2004; 2006a; 2006b; 2010), Ian Hacking (1983; 1999; 2014), 
Michael Weisberg (2007b; 2012; 2013a), Mauricio Suarez (2003; 2004), Anjan Chakravartty 
(2010), Peter Godfrey-Smith (2003; 2009), Martin Thomson-Jones (2010; 2012), Sandra 
Mitchell (2003; 2009), and Peter Galison (1997; 2008). Earlier influential discussions in the 
1960s and -70s include work by Nelson Goodman (1976; 1978), Patrick Suppes (1960; 1962; 
1967), Frederick Suppe (1972; 1989), and Mary Hesse (1963; 1974).
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sentation is a good place to start, when aspiring to develop means for assess-
ment of the details and dynamics of interdisciplinarity.
That we have reached this part of the discussion means that we are about 
to get down to serious business. There’s no two ways about it: We will now 
need to get our hands dirty as part of these discussions, e.g. on topics such 
as how theories relate to their targets, whether science can reasonably be 
construed as unitary along a representational dimension, and what the 
consequences of this might be for analysing interdisciplinarity. These are, in-
deed, daunting tasks, so we better start right away before we lose our nerve.
The basics
As should be evident by now, the basic focus of this thesis is on activities of 
representation in analyses of interdisciplinarity. The thought that represen-
tation in one way or the other should be placed centrally in analyses of scienti-
fic activities in general has been a basic assumption in a quite heterogeneous 
set of philosophical approaches to science for quite a while. The stance that 
vehicles of representations (in my terms) should take centre stage is charac-
teristic of early proponents of the semantic view of scientific theory such as 
Patrick Suppes and Bas van Fraassen (both considered early proponents 
even though their major contributions are several decades apart) and more 
recent contributions by, for instance, Giere, Weisberg, Downes, Godfrey-
Smith, and Thomson-Jones (aka Jones). As briefly mentioned above, it is 
worth noting that, for instance, Ernst Nagel (1961), Mary Hesse (1963), and, 
indeed, Thomas Kuhn (1970) have expressed similar lines of thought, though 
they are less frequently discussed in the canonical literature on the topic.
The development of the semantic view is often considered a crucial step 
away from the syntactical view on theory associated with the logical empiri-
cists and kindred spirits. Indeed, the semantic view is often explained in con-
trast to the syntactical view, as in the following quotation:
The syntactic picture of a theory identifies it with a body of theorems, stated 
in one particular language chosen for the expression of that theory. This 
should be contrasted with the alternative of presenting a theory in the first 
instance by identifying a class of structures as its models. In this second, 
semantic, approach the language used to express the theory is neither basic 
nor unique; the same class of structures could well be described in radically 
different ways, each with its own limitations. The models occupy centre 
stage. (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 44)
For the purpose of analysing and comparing representational activities in a 
very broad-scoped construal of science, the view of modelling in early ver-
sions of the semantic view is far from adequate. The already mentioned repre-
sentatives of the early semantic view defended positions that implicitly demar-
cate science as being activities with a weighty mathematical core. This senti-
ment partly motivated Van Fraassen to state that »[…] the usages of models 
in meta-mathematics and in the sciences are not as far apart as has some-
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times been said« (1980, p. 44). Suppes made the even stronger assertion 
»[…] that the meaning of the concept of model is the same in mathematics 
and the empirical sciences« (Suppes 1960, p. 289). As has been frequently 
pointed out in the more recent literature, this is not a reasonable view of 
science in general. Many activities, which one might be inclined to label as 
»scientific«, involve no mathematics at all. Stephen Downes is one influential 
example of philosophers disagreeing with van Fraassen and Suppes on this 
issue:
There are many referents for the term “model" and it is my contention that 
there are far greater differences between models in mathematics and logic 
and models in science than holders of the semantic view have been prepared 
to admit. Both Suppes and Van Fraassen have played down the distinction 
between models in logic and in science. (Downes 1992, p. 144)
Indeed, the statements of van Fraassen and Suppes are quite peculiar given 
that both of these authors discussed a row of different model types in the 
paragraphs leading up to the above quotations. The models they each discus-
sed include physical models (i.e. a model aircraft), rational choice models in 
game theory, and the Bohr model of the atom, all of which seem easily 
distinguished from what is denoted by the term ‘model’ in metamathematics. 
In the discussions of modelling dominating contemporary philosophy, it is 
widely assumed that all these types of models (and others as well) must be 
encompassed by any adequate account of scientific representation (e.g. 
Godfrey-Smith 2009; Weisberg 2013a).
As developed in his The Scientific Image (1980), Van Fraassen’s Construc-
tive Empiricism is constructivist in the sense that scientific models are viewed 
as human constructs incorporating postulated elements and structures which 
cannot be deduced from observation. The account is empiricist in the sense 
that models are to be evaluated strictly on the adequacy between their 
empirical substructures and observable phenomena. What counts as observ-
able is a controversial issue, which I shall not grapple with here.  The point 51
is, that on Van Fraassen’s account, in validating a model one need not be 
concerned with what Giere calls the theoretical superstructures of models, i.e. 
the within the theory postulated non-observable relations between, and 
causes of, observable phenomena (Giere 1988, p. 49).
On van Fraassen’s account in (1980), then, a model is accepted if it is em-
pirically adequate, which means that its empirical substructures are isomor-
phic with the observable data, which van Fraassen also terms ‘appearances’ 
and defines as »The structures which can be described in experimental and 
measurement reports […]« (Van Fraassen 1980, p. 68 f.). Empirical adequacy 
is far from being a weak demand for theories, but it is a logically weaker de-
mand than the realist’s demand for truth, which would implicate that every 
detail of a model should replicate the relevant aspects of the world—including 
 Good places to start, if one is thus inclined, could be (Alspector-Kelly 2004; Hacking 1981). 51
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the theoretical superstructures (at least according to van Fraassen). The 
distinction between those two demands is equivalent with Michael Weisberg’s 
(2007b) distinction between “representational fidelity” (corresponding to em-
pirical adequacy) and “dynamical fidelity” (corresponding to the realist posi-
tion). Weisberg’s position will be further discussed below in this chapter.
The Scientific Image did not constitute a first or decisive strike against the 
dominance of Logical Empiricism, obviously. Quite a number of very influential 
discussions in the preceding twenty years had significantly reduced the 
authority of this attitude to philosophy of science, though on different grounds. 
The historicist and sociologically informed reasons to doubt the modus 
operandi of logical empiricists, however, had little impact on early versions of 
the semantic view as already stated. Perhaps this is part of the reasons why 
the contrast between the semantic and syntactic »pictures« of science is less 
sharp than one might initially think. In the words of Gabriele Contessa:
Philosophers of science are increasingly realizing that the differences 
between the syntactic and the semantic view are less significant than 
semanticists would have it and that, ultimately, neither is a suitable framework 
within which to think about scientific theories and models. The crucial divide in 
philosophy of science, I think, is not the one between advocates of the 
syntactic view and advocates of the semantic view, but the one between 
those who think that philosophy of science needs a formal framework or other 
and those who think otherwise. (2006, p. 376)
Of the two groups defined by Contessa, I belong to the group of people who 
think otherwise. Of course, one must acknowledge the importance of the very 
influential contributions by Suppes and van Fraassen. Nevertheless, for pre-
sent purposes the most significant contribution to philosophical represen-
tation-based thinking is Explaining Science (1988) by Ronald N. Giere.
Enter Ronald Giere
In 1988, Ronald Giere published Explaining Science – A Cognitive Approach. 
Giere’s account of science in this work is situated firmly within (or perhaps 
built upon) the semantic view on scientific theories by the fundamental as-
sumption that models as representational entities are the central aspects of 
scientific activity. Further, Giere’s focus on mathematical models, data 
models, and experimental models relates him closely to his predecessors 
within the semantic view. So do central questions such as »how do theories 
explain and confirm data (and vice versa)?« and »How do theories shape and 
restrain data (and vice versa)?«.
Nevertheless, Giere’s early version of the semantic view made significant 
departures from the track laid out by van Fraassen (and others). In (1988) 
Giere attempted to develop a sociologically and cognitively informed philo-
sophy of science, drawing inspiration and challenges from SSK, STS, and, 
e.g., the extended mind hypothesis. Giere’s »bridge-building« aspirations ex-
tend into his more recent work as well (e.g. 2006b, p. 3). In its more recent 
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developments, Giere’s construal of science has gained quite a significant 
pragmatic touch with a strong focus on how models are used.52
Constructive Realism 
In Giere’s view, the somewhat implausible claim of close resemblance 
between the meanings of ‘model’ in metamathematics and in the sciences 
was weakened to some extent. Rather than claiming that scientists’ use of 
‘model’ is the same as in metamathematics, he stated that it »overlaps nicely 
with the usage of [‘model’ by] logicians« (Giere 1988, p. 79).
Giere approved of van Fraassen’s constructive elements but disliked the 
accompanying anti-realism. That is why he at first dubbed his alternative 
version ‘constructive realism’ only later to change it into ‘perspectival realism’. 
What is interesting in this contest, however, is not the realism/anti-realism 
debate and the disagreements between Giere and van Fraassen along this 
dimension. What is most relevant is their differences regarding the notion of 
“model” and how to think about the relation between models and targets.
The central contributions of Explaining Science is, first, the idea that we 
should think of models »as abstract entities having all and only the properties 
ascribed to them« (Giere 1988, p. 78, italics in the original) in the scientific 
texts. Scientific texts, according to Giere’s account then, contain statements 
that describe models. Secondly, according to Giere’s account, there is a 
relation of definition between statements and model, and a relation of 
similarity between model and the targeted real world system. As Giere pointed 
out, however, in many cases models do not seem to bear close relations to 
any empirical systems and, consequently, it may require considerable effort to 
establish similarity relations (Downes 1992, p. 146; Giere 1988; 2008, p. 126).
There are substantial difficulties with Giere’s notion of “abstract entities”. It 
is quite difficult to figure out what ontological status these entities are sup-
posed to have. As Thomson-Jones has pointed out, on the one hand it seems 
like Giere understands abstract in the sense of »existing outside space and 
time«. However, it is not clear how something can have properties such as 
»being extended« and »periodicity« when existing outside space and time 
(Thomson-Jones 2010). Even though there might be solutions for this prob-
lem, they come at a considerable price. Paul Teller has suggested considering 
the abstract entities as objects containing uninstantiated properties (2001). 
But that solution simply pushes the burden of controversy on to issues re-
garding the ontological status of properties themselves. Peter Godfrey-Smith’s 
alternative suggestion is to think of models as »imagined concrete things« 
rather than abstract entities. As Godfrey-Smith acknowledges, however, this 
solution is still saturated with metaphysical puzzles (some of which are identi-
cal to those haunting Giere’s abstract entities) (Godfrey-Smith 2006, p. 734 
f.).
 Indeed, in some of van Fraassen’s most recent treatments of scientific representation (e.g. 52
Van Fraassen 2008) he seems to have developed in a more pragmatic direction as well
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For present purposes, however, we need not quarrel with these issues. The 
ontological status of models is not crucial to the present analysis, and we may 
safely proceed to exploit the overall structure of Giere’s account of scientific 
representation without worrying about ontological details. Since the central 
interest presently is to track transformations or changes between parent 
approaches and integrated approaches, we do not need to pass ontological 
judgments. I believe Godfrey-Smith is right when he claims that »the 
treatment of model systems as comprising imagined concrete things is the 
‘‘folk ontology’’ of at least many scientific modelers« (Godfrey-Smith 2006, p. 
735).  On the other hand, discussions of the ontological status of models is 53
probably rarely a part of discussions anywhere outside of philosophy of 
science. Indeed, I believe there is reason to doubt whether one’s position (if 
one has one) on these issues makes much of a difference to (scientific) 
practice anyway.
Giere illustrates his vision of the relation between statements, models, and 
reality like this (Giere 1988, p. 83):
FIGURE 4: SIMILARITY AND DEFINITION.
Extremely important for the utility of Giere’s approach in the present context is 
that the defining set of statements can be statements expressed in any 
language. Some models are certainly defined (in part) in the language of 
mathematics, other models are simply expressed in a natural language such 
as English. Giere does not discuss non-mathematical representation in the 
social sciences or the humanities, but there is nothing to prevent us from 
expanding the scope of the sets of statements to include statements one 
might find in these sciences.
Giere developed the notions of “interpretation” and “identification” as more 
useful alternatives to the correspondence rules of Logical Empiricism (Giere 
1988, p. 75). “Interpretation” in Giere’s universe means linking mathematical 
symbols to concepts, while “identification” refers to the act of linking these 
concepts to specific objects. Activities of interpretation and identification are 
 Godfrey-Smith credits Deena Skolnick Weisberg for this idea.53
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important places to look for changes as the consequence of interdisciplinarity, 
though we need to include non-mathematical symbols on the modelling side 
of these relations.
As I understand Giere, the notion of interpretation is somehow part of the 
act of definition, which serves to point out the abstract entity, i.e. the model in 
question. Establishing the similarity relation between abstract model and real 
system, then, presupposes identification of the concrete aspects of the real 
world which the claims of similarity involve.
The move from construing the relation between model and target in terms 
of the softer notion of “similarity”, rather than the stronger “isomorphism” (or 
other strong alternatives), has been very contested. Many find that “similarity” 
is unfit for the function it is assigned by Giere due to its vagueness. Others 
contest “similarity” on grounds of it implying a symmetrical relation (if the 
model is similar to the target, then the target is equally similar to the model), 
and this kind of symmetry is considered inappropriate in a scientific represen-
tational relation.
I will discuss these issues in a bit more detail below. But let me note for 
now that I am quite sympathetic to Giere’s use of “similarity”. “Similarity” 
seems able to capture a very broad range of relations from different scientific 
practices. As Downes argue, the concept of “isomorphism” is actually relaxed 
considerably when used to describe the relation between scientific models 
and empirical systems compared to its use in metamathematics (1992, p. 
145). One might argue that these different versions of “isomorphism” are 
actually simply more or less strict subtypes of similarity, with the metamathe-
matical version being the strictest.
Claims of similarity might often require explication, but that is, I believe, 
part of a healthy process of identification (in Giere’s terms) or construal (in the 
terms preferred by Weisberg (2013a) and Godfrey-Smith (2006)). Spelling out 
in which ways one considers a vehicle of representation to be similar to its 
target seems to be a central part of sound representational practice. And there 
is little doubt that similarity relations are candidates for being transformed as 
part of an interdisciplinary process.
Perspectival Realism 
An important part of the present analysis of interdisciplinarity based on 
representation is Giere’s concept of “perspective”. This concept has played a 
significant role in Giere’s most recent account of science, which he has 
named Perspectival Realism (not to confuse his later more developed position 
with his earlier Constructive Realism) (Giere 1999a; Giere 2006b). I will 
postpone the detailed discussion of the notion of “perspective” and its 
consequences for interdisciplinarity to the next chapter. Right now I will focus 
on another aspect of the discussion of representation in Giere’s later 
development of his account of science, i.e. his discussion of the need for a 
four-place representational relation.
Recall van Fraassen’s Hauptsatz quoted in chapter one: 
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There is no representation except in the sense that some things are used, 
made, or taken, to represent some things as thus or so. (2008, p. 23)
If we understand representation as an action, representation must always 
involve an agent: Someone uses A to represent B.
In the later versions of his account, Ronald Giere operates with a very 
similar agent- and action-based conception of scientific representation—
though he stresses the need for a fourth element: purposes (Giere 2004; 
Giere 2010). Giere suggests the following four-place-relation as containing the 
variables minimally required for an analysis of a scientific representational 
relation:
S uses X to represent W with the purpose P
This schema is to be understood in the following way: A scientist, or a group 
of scientists, (S) uses something (X) to represent an aspect of reality (W) for 
one or more specific purposes (P) (Giere 1999b; Giere 2004). Notice the 
close fit between Giere’s representational relation and Bechtel’s and Toulmin’s 
characterisations of disciplines as discussed in chapter 2 above.
The four place relation is very central to Perspectival Realism: It  shows 
that scientific representational activities are always to be understood relative 
to the involved subject(s), object(s), and purpose(s). On the one hand, as I will 
discuss in detail in chapter 6, representation always involve a view from 
somewhere. On the other hand, representational activities are always directed 
against an object, which, if it does not exactly determine the character of the 
activities of representation, at least often (and ideally) strongly affects it. More-
over, the purpose for constructing models in the first place has considerable 
influence on which perspectives are chosen and which results are accepted.
It is further important to be clear about what might take the place of the 
variable X. Giere’s position is this:
So here, finally, we have a candidate for the X in the general scheme for 
representation […]: Scientists use models to represent aspects of the world 
for various purposes. On this view, it is models that are the primary (though 
by no means the only) representational tools in the sciences. (Giere 2004, p. 
747)
So, X is a placeholder for models (among other things ). Giere’s later con-54
cept of “model” is not identical with the abstract entities of his younger days. 
For instance, in his (2006b) incarnation Giere considered models within the 
sciences to be forming a »quite heterogeneous class including physical 
models, scale models, analogue models, and mathematical models, to name 
 Giere also mentions words, equations, diagrams, graphs, photographs, and computer 54
generated images (Giere 2006b, p. 60).
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a few« (p. 62 f.). »Models as abstract entities« still have a role to play as a 
subset of the generic class of models (Giere 2008, p. 125). This is a move in 
the right direction. But there is still some way to go before we have an 
operational notion of “vehicle of representation” which will serve our present 
purposes. I will discuss in some detail just below how Giere’s later notion of 
“model” can be developed into a fully liberated and enriched X-variable, which 
is simply indicating the use of »something« as vehicle of representation.
But first, what about W? As many a philosopher of science Giere is mainly 
occupied with understanding the natural sciences. But it is worth emphasising 
once again that nothing prevents us from expanding our understanding of W 
to include all kinds of phenomena, as for instance the friendship of Watson 
and Holmes, the influence of meteorological circumstances on the choices of 
colour among impressionistic painters, as well as the movement of a 
pendulum or the function of a Higgs-field. Indeed, there is nothing in principle 
that should deter us from including the targets of any discipline we might wish 
in the class of potential targets for representation. It is important not to let the 
focus on natural science and representation of »real systems« misled us into 
thinking that we are only addressing (interdisciplinary) studies of »real« physi-
cal stuff.
As Downes has stated: »There are many models in science that clearly do 
not purport to represent empirical systems and yet are still important in 
scientific theorizing« (Downes 1992, p. 143). Similarly, Thomson-Jones has 
an interesting discussion of the representation of »missing systems« (2010). 
To develop a framework for capturing general dynamics of interdisciplinarity, it 
is vital not to exclude potential participants in interdisciplinary activities. On 
the other hand, there is little reason to fear being overly inclusive. If people 
want to study the emotional states of quarks or the childhood traumas of 
Batman, who can decide, a priori, that these studies are unscientific or cannot 
be studied better (or worse) in some interdisciplinary setting?
In the next section, I will suggest moving focus from models and towards 
modelling. In this process, the concept “model” will be developed further. 
“Model” is not the perfect concept to place at centre stage in the discussion of 
interdisciplinarity. But the following discussion of modelling throws valuable 
light on how best to construe interdisciplinarity qua representational activity. 
The expanded and enriched X
Part of the discussion within the semantic view has been focused on trying to 
capture the nature of theories. Giere has invested some energy in discussing 
how populations of some cluster (of clusters of clusters) of models translate 
into some specific theory (Giere 1988, p. 82). 
My preferred suggestion, then, is that we understand a theory as comprising 
two elements: (1) a population of models, and (2) various hypotheses linking 
those models with systems in the real world. Thus, what one finds in 
textbooks is not literally the theory itself, but statements defining the models 
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that are part of that theory. One also finds formulations of some of the 
hypotheses that are also part of the theory. (Giere 1988, p. 85)
Luckily, for present purposes we need not concern ourselves further with 
issues about the nature of theories. Unfortunately, though, we need to be 
quite a lot more specific about the links between vehicles of representation 
and targets, because elements of these links may be part of what is mixed up 
during an interdisciplinary process. Focusing on these links will help us de-
termine important aspects of the pre- and post-interaction state of affairs of an 
interdisciplinary integration. The next step, of course, is to determine whether 
or not the integration brings us in a more or less favourable epistemic positi-
on.
In the following sections, I will start out by briefly discussing Stephen 
Downes’ (1992) deflationary account of modelling and theorising. Next, I will 
discuss Martin Thomson-Jones’ suggestion for a propositional view of model-
ling. If we are to compare vehicles of representation used in all types of scien-
ce potentially involved in interdisciplinarity, we need a category of vehicles of 
representation with a very broad scope. Downes and Thomson-Jones both 
add valuable elements to the development of an inclusive account of model-
ling.55
Deflation 
Stephen Downes’ account of theorising as presented in (1992) takes the 
crucial step away from attempting to define what theories (or models) are to a 
focus on the activities of theorising and modelling. As he states: »[…] we 
cannot say what scientific theories are unless we appreciate the myriad ways 
they are used and developed in all of the sciences« (p. 142). As Downes 
mentions briefly, in spite of extensive philosophical discussions of the nature 
of scientific theory over the years, little effort has gone into establishing agree-
ment on the scope of theories or models. What are the minimum requirements 
for something to be a scientific theory or model? It seems like any boundary 
drawn is either obviously wrong (like on the received view) or simply arbitrary.
Currently, I have no ambitions of contributing to discussions of demarca-
tion. For present purposes, the best we can do is to bracket questions about 
the nature of theories and models and simply count any act of representation 
in any alleged scientific context as worthy of inclusion in our analysis of inter-
disciplinarity. Further, we should pay no regard to the nature of whatever is 
used as vehicle of representation in the context. The only requirement must 
be that it is possible from the descriptions provided by the participants in the 
scientific activity in question to figure out what is indeed used as vehicle of 
representation, and what it is used to represent. In many cases, one might 
end up concluding that how some vehicle is supposed to represent some 
phenomena is radically underdetermined, and that the act of representation is 
 As a word of warning, the derived concept of “model” is not going to overlap nicely with the 55
usage of ‘model’ among logicians.
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therefore impossible to evaluate. But this in itself will provide some hint of how 
to assess the scientific activity in question, I believe.
In the literature on model based accounts of science since 1980, it is quite 
clear that there is a tendency towards expanding the category of models. As 
Downes points out, Giere contributes considerably to a proliferation of various 
types of models, for instance when he discusses the modelling involved in the 
geological revolution (Giere 1988, p. 227 ff.). Griesemer adds physical models 
(such as Watson and Crick's cardboard and wire model of DNA) as well as 
what he calls »remnant models« (such as museum specimens of animals or 
plants) (1990). Michael Weisberg discusses examples such as the San 
Francisco Bay Model (the warehouse-size model simulating the consequen-
ces of building a dam in the San Francisco Bay), The Moniac (the analog 
simulation of the british economy by means of »fluidic logic«), as well as 
model organisms (such as lab rats) among others (2013a).
Downes ends up concluding very minimally that modelling, in one way or 
the other, is an important part of scientific activities. I think this deflationary 
view is reasonable. We might still, though, benefit from using Giere’s schema 
of representation when analysing what is going on in cases of interdisciplinar-
ity as I shall demonstrate below.
Downes expresses his opinion in the following way:
Although Giere claims that “theories are families of models", his view could 
be more adequately characterized as the deflationary: model construction is 
an important component of scientific theorizing. (Downes 1992, p. 150)
I will twist this a bit and state that representation is an important part of 
scientific activity and, further, that determining how vehicles are used is an 
important part of the analysis of representation. For an account of vehicles of 
representation and their use to be rich enough for present purposes, it is 
required that we look beyond the vehicles themselves to the processes of 
identification and interpretation or construal. We must look in more detail 
especially at how X’s are linked to W’s. Martin Thomson-Jones’ propositional 
view of modelling (2010; 2012) points in the right direction. He does not quite 
make it home, though, so we will have to move further ahead, once we have 
gone through his position in the next section.
To model (mathematically) or not to model (at all)
As already discussed at length, ‘model’ is the standard term for denoting »the 
things by which other things are represented« and also by far the most 
discussed type of vehicle of representation (Cartwright 1983; Giere 1999a; 
Giere 2006b; Van Fraassen 1980; Van Fraassen 2008; Weisberg 2007b). I 
believe that the generic expression ‘vehicle of representation’ is better suited 
for capturing representational practices, but nevertheless there is little doubt 
that the use of models and the practice of modelling is widespread in science. 
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This is especially evident if one adopts a liberal understanding of ‘model’ (as I 
have argued in favour of just above).
Giere’s focus on how Newton’s laws translate into model-based represen-
tation of real world systems provides us with some significant insights. But 
zooming in on classical physical modelling partly occludes that scientific 
representation is carried out by means of a multitude of vehicles, only some of 
which are mathematical (or non-linguistic abstract entities for that matter). It is 
especially worth noting that many vehicles in the natural and health sciences 
are far from abstract, and that many vehicles in the humanities appear to be 
of a very linguistic nature indeed. This however does not detract from Giere’s 
overall account. One can reasonably maintain his description of a set of state-
ments describing (perhaps even defining) the vehicle of representation.
But there are other relevant issues to discuss in this respect. Because how 
is it, exactly, that the X and the W is linked on Giere’s account of the repre-
sentational relation? We need to get a hold on what is involved in the identifi-
cation process if we are to compare different approaches in the pre- and post-
interaction states of affairs. Thomson-Jones’ (2012) argument in favour of a 
propositional view of modelling points out relevant aspects to consider. 
Thomson-Jones bases his discussion on a distinction between mathemati-
cal models and non-mathematical models. By ‘mathematical model’ he simply 
means a model which incorporates some mathematical tools. To Thomson-
Jones this does not imply that the model itself is a mathematical structure, 
though. So in this way Thomson-Jones’ notion of “mathematical model” is 
significantly weaker compared to some widespread understandings of what 
mathematical models are.
According to Thomson-Jones, most (perhaps all) mathematical models in-
clude sets of propositions that indicate, among other things, how the involved 
mathematical structures relate to their target system(s). Non-mathematical 
models, then, consist of sets of propositions (and perhaps diagrams or other 
illustrations). Thomson-Jones quotes Downes for en example of a non-mathe-
matical model:
[…] “[I]n most texts a schematized [eukaryotic] cell is presented that contains 
a nucleus, a cell membrane, mitochondria, a Golgi body, [the] endoplasmic 
reticulum, and so on” (1992, p. 145). This model is not a model of any 
particular cell, or even of any very specific type of cell. It is typically presented 
by means of a diagram and some surrounding text describing, for example, 
the functions of some of the organelles the cell contains. Crucially, no 
mathematics is employed. (Thomson-Jones 2012, p. 762 f.; reference to 
Downes in original)
Thomson-Jones briefly discusses other examples of non-mathematical mod-
els picked from biology, evolutionary theory, physics, and chemistry. It is, I 
take it, quite evident that if one were to look at less paradigmatic scientific dis-
ciplines, one would find an even greater abundance of cases of non-mathe-
matical modelling (while mathematical models would be scarce).
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The textbook model of cell structure involves no mathematical tools. If still 
we think of it as a model, its content must be of a different kind.
Instead, I propose that the textbook model of the cell is a collection of 
propositions. The following propositions are among those that make up the 
model: that the eukaryotic cell has a membrane, that it has a nucleus, that the 
nucleus contains a nucleolus, that the nucleolus has such-and-such 
functions, and that the cell contains mitochondria. These are some, but not 
all, of the propositions contained in the collection of propositions that we can 
take the model in question to be. (Thomson-Jones 2012, p. 764)
Thomson-Jones names his position the propositional view. On Thomson-
Jones’ account, then, it is possible to have models that involves no mathe-
matics at all. But even when discussing this, he remains in close proximity to 
the most paradigmatic and respectable types of science. This is wise, I think, 
in the sense that he thereby indicates that the non-mathematical aspects of 
his account are relevant and important even in the cases where they are least 
likely to be warmly welcomed. He even to some extent safeguards against 
this kind of resistance by stating that:
[…] we should bear in mind that if we want to understand the epistemology 
and methodology of modeling as an activity, then it will surely be important to 
understand all the stages of the modeling process, and even when the 
outcome of that process is a mathematical model, there will often be 
nonmathematical models lurking in the prehistory. This point provides us with 
another reason to take nonmathematical models seriously and to insist on an 
account of the nature of models that can accommodate them. (Thomson-
Jones 2012, p. 771)
On the other hand, he fails to address to what extent his argument opens for 
very non-exemplary cases to be included in his category of models. As 
examples of other things which might be considered models on the propo-
sitional view consider, e.g., models for literature analysis (e.g. the actantial 
model), models in psychology (e.g. the diathesis-stress model), models for 
stakeholder analysis (e.g. the Power/Interest-grid), or models for analysing 
corporate strategy (e.g. SWOT-analysis or The Strategy Diamond).
In my opinion, the inclusiveness of Thomson-Jones’ account is a virtue. 
Indeed, the propositional view on models is especially useful in relation to a 
general method for analysing interdisciplinarity for which one needs to be able 
to encompass miscellaneous scientific approaches. Nevertheless, Thomson-
Jones’ account of modelling ends up being somewhat messy, I believe, as 
exemplified by the following quotation:
[…] mathematical modeling (often, and perhaps always) involves 
constructing a collection of propositions that are, in part, about relations 
between a certain mathematical structure and the target system, and we 
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then use the term ‘model’ to refer both to the collection of propositions and to 
the mathematical structure. (Thomson-Jones 2012, p. 767) 
When Thomson-Jones describes models in this way, his concept of “model” 
comes very close to my notion of “approach”. This is, however, a potentially 
confusing way to use ‘model’. It is much clearer to separate out vehicles of 
representation and the intermediate layer as I have suggested above and 
then use ‘approach’ to refer to the two combined. My use of ‘vehicle of 
representation’ rather than ‘model’ has the dual function of highlighting the 
inclusiveness I prefer, while reducing the likelihood of infuriating people who 
are very devoted to a specific (less inclusive) sense of ‘model’.  Separating 56
out vehicles and intermediate layers further makes it easy to consider cases 
in which, for instance, a specific vehicle is retained even though the approach 
is altered. Such situations are certainly less straightforward to handle if the 
entire mess is denoted by ‘model’.
The propositions 
Which are these underlying propositions in which (perhaps all kinds of) 
models are embedded? This is a good question, not only since it is largely 
unaddressed by Thomson Jones’ treatment, but also since a good answer is 
needed for solving some difficulties haunting existing theories of represen-
tation, such as the so-called bridging problem (i.e. »the problem of how to 
bridge the gap between models and the world« (Contessa 2010, p. 516)).
Nancy Cartwright writes of bridging principles as that which connects the 
deepest (most abstract) theoretical layers (such as basic laws) with empirical 
systems (Cartwright 1983, p. 143 f.). Cartwright’s discussions are extremely 
apt and insightful, but they relate entirely to disciplines in which the empirical 
systems are neatly quantified. Consequently, the gaps that need to be bridged 
are to a large extent internal to mathematics. The bridging problem is relevant 
to all disciplines. But in some disciplines the conceptual gaps to be bridged 
are decidedly wider. Perhaps, for present purposes, it makes better sense to 
talk of bridging procedures, since ‘principle’ has a certain feel of a priority and 
explicitness to it. In many cases, it is far from explicit how gaps are bridged. 
Nevertheless, transformations of bridging procedures might be one outcome 
of interdisciplinary integration, and therefore we need to be able to figure out 
the bridging procedures in parent approaches involved in interdisciplinarity, 
and to what extent these bridging procedures are transferred or transformed 
during integration.
Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison have suggested that modelling 
involve »fitting together […] bits which come from disparate sources« (Morgan 
& Morrison 1999, p. 15). In the same volume Marcel Boumans suggested a 
variety of factors involved in the construction of models, such as metaphors, 
analogies, policy, stylisation, as well as mathematical techniques and 
 And of course, not everything that is used as a vehicle of representation is a model in most 56
of these senses.
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concepts (Boumans 1999, p. 93). The elements involved and their importance 
supposedly vary with disciplinary context.
My position is that the underlying propositional content (i.e. what I call »the 
intermediate layer«) can be fruitfully thought of in terms of bridging 
procedures (constituted by, among other things, Boumans’ factors). Further, I 
suggest that these bridging procedures can to a large extent be characterised 
in terms of tools, propositional algorithms, and assumptions as discussed 
above (in chapter 1. Further details await in chapters 6 and 7). Spelling out 
the involved elements is certainly not always easy or straightforward. But it is 
possible in most cases—at least to some extent. Further, I argue that in cases 
where this is impossible, serious doubts are raised about the trustworthiness 
of the scientific activities in question. If it is impossible to figure out how a 
vehicle of representation is linked to its target, it is hard to imagine how else 
one should evaluate the epistemic aspects of such a relation.
Weisberg on construal; assignment; fidelity 
Michael Weisberg makes use of some notions which may add useful nuance 
to the discussion at this point (Weisberg 2007b). In (1988, p. 75; see also 
2006b, p. 64) Giere introduced the distinction between interpretation and 
identification which can be considered as the general framework behind 
Weisberg’s “construal”. The interpretation of a model is the general 
assignment of the kind of thing represented by some parameter of a model 
(e.g. »x represents that weight of a falling object«), while identification is the 
assignment of a specific object as that which is represented (e.g. »x 
represents the mass of this particular object in this particular context«). 
Obviously, changes in both respects are relevant to the analysis of an 
instance of interdisciplinarity.
Drawing on Weisberg, the following can be considered as adding detail to 
the process of identification. First of all, Weisberg’s notion of the “construal” of 
a given model involves the assignment of which parts of the model are to be 
used in a given act of representation. The assignment also involves explicitly 
pointing out which aspects of the model are to be ignored in this particular 
use. Next, the specification of scope means pointing out which aspects of the 
targeted phenomena are supposed to be represented by the model. To this, 
one may reasonably add considerations of how »specifically« this process is 
carried out (that is, one may consider the level of accuracy of assignment and 
scope in the construal of a given model). Further, ‘explication’ may be used to 
refer to the process of making clear the construed internal relations in the 
model as well as the relations (bridging procedures) between the model and 
the target (including the involved processes of idealisation which will be 
discussed in chapter 6).
Finally, Weisberg operates with two fidelity criteria which determine how 
tightly the model must fit its target in order to count as adequate. Dynamical 
fidelity concerns to what extent the model succeeds in predicting the behavior 
of the target system. Representational fidelity, on the other hand, concerns 
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whether such predictive success is achieved for the right reasons, i.e. whether 
the structure of the model actually fits the causal structure of its target. A 
demand for high representational fidelity would obviously be much stronger 
than a demand for high dynamical fidelity. As mentioned above, ideal dynami-
cal fidelity corresponds to van Fraassen’s empirical adequacy, while ideal 
representational fidelity corresponds to the stronger demands of the realist. 
The difference is, of course, that dynamical as well as representational fidelity 
are scaleable criteria, and that an investigator is free to determine the level of 
either required in a given context. 
In the same vein, Giere plausibly considers the standards by which it is 
determined whether some approach is included in a theoretical cluster to be 
socially constructed (1988, p. 86). It is reasonable, I believe, to claim that 
interdisciplinarity at least sometimes involves (temporarily?) lowering stan-
dards for inclusion. Some ways of lowering this threshold would be to relax 
the requirement for the specification of bridging procedures, the requirements 
regarding fidelity criteria, or the required specificity of ones construal. 
Lowering such thresholds (temporarily) is not necessarily detrimental to the 
quality or fruitfulness of scientific activities, but it is certainly not an obvious 
epistemic virtue either!
In the next section, I will discuss the role of use and similarity in scientific 
representation—two central and controversial concepts in this context. Upon 
that, I will conclude this chapter by summing up why an enhanced version of 
Giere’s account of science is a good basis for our further discussions of 
interdisciplinarity.
Use & similarity
This section discusses the concepts of “use” and “similarity” as well as how 
they interconnect. The issue of similarity is relevant to review in further detail 
due to the quite heated debate on its role (along with resemblance, likeness, 
and isomorphism) in representational relations. As Nelson Goodman once 
wrote:
The most naïve view of representation might perhaps be put somewhat like 
this: “A represents B if and only if A appreciably resembles B”, or “A 
represents B to the extent that A resembles B”. Vestiges of this view, with 
assorted refinements, persist in most writing on representation. Yet more 
error could hardly be pressed into so short a formula. (Goodman 1976, p. 3 f.)
As briefly mentioned above, an influential argument against similarity is based 
on the view that while similarity (and isomorphism) are symmetrical relations, 
representation is asymmetrical. If A is similar to B, B is also (necessarily) simi-
lar to A. But if A represents B, B does not (necessarily) represent A (Suarez 
2003; Suarez 2004). As discussed above, Giere has argued in favour of a 
similarity-based account of scientific representation, though explicitly not of 
the dyadic kind which Suarez criticises (Giere 2004). Bas van Fraassen, in 
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spite of explicitly expressing his sympathies with Suarez’ view, has em-
phasised that resemblance does actually have a lot to say—at least in some 
instances of representation. At the same time, he questions the strength of the 
argument from asymmetry (Van Fraassen 2008, p. 17 f.).
There is, I believe, a combination of disagreement on basic issues and 
confusion at play here. But the difficulties might be quite easily resolved. Van 
Fraassen’s main point with his Hauptsatz  is, that it is of central importance 57
that representation is understood as an activity and not as a simple (truth-) 
relation between, e.g., linguistic units and aspects of reality. Giere certainly 
agrees. For A to be a model of B, someone has to use A as a model of B (in 
an act of representation) and thereby indicate that B is to be thought of in a 
certain way. There is, thus, nothing that in itself represents something else.
Think of the equation of the simple pendulum discussed in chapter one 
(and further below). This equation can, given the required specifications, be 
used as a strongly idealised model of the movements of a pendulum. But a 
pendulum could also be used as a model of the equation, e.g. as a clarifying 
exemplification. In any given context it is exactly the use that determines 
whether the equation is a model of the pendulum or vice versa. Use is not 
symmetrical and, consequently, representation (which involves use) is not 
symmetrical either. This does not preclude similarity relations from being 
involved in representational relations, though. We use A to represent B, and 
as part of this activity we specify in which respects and to what extent we 
consider A and B to be similar.
Van Fraassen asks questions such as: »How can an abstract entity, such 
as a mathematical structure, represent something that is not abstract, 
something in nature?« (Van Fraassen 2008, p. 240). Use seems to provide a 
straightforward solution. The abstract entity does not simply represent the 
non-abstract target, it is used to do so and from this use, it gains the indexical-
ity van Fraassen longs for. This also means that you can use anything to 
represent anything else. Not all such activities will be fruitful in a scientific 
sense, of course, but there is nothing in principle that prohibits one from doing 
so.
In this way, the focus on use and representation as an activity dissolves 
another issue that would seriously threaten a similarity-based account of 
scientific representation. If representation were a question of similarity be-
tween a vehicle and a target per se, one might reasonably wonder what level 
of similarity would be sufficient for a relation between vehicle and target 
system to constitute a scientific representation. Is a geocentric construal of 
our solar system, for instance, sufficiently similar to its target to count as a 
scientific representation of it or is heliocentricity required? Few would probably 
be prepared to say that Aristotle did not represent the heavenly bodies in his 
 As a service to the reader, I repeat from chapter 1: »There is no representation except in 57
the sense that some things are used, made, or taken, to represent some things as thus or 
so.« (Van Fraassen 2008, p. 23)
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cosmology, or for that matter that his works were not representational in at 
least a protoscientific sense.
The focus on use dissolves the problem of figuring out what is sufficient for 
counting as a representation since there are no other minimum requirements 
than that someone uses A to represent B. I might actually use my pencil and 
an open cheese sandwich to illustrate some difficulties concerning the landing 
of a lunar module on the moon (the holes in the cheese might neatly repre-
sent some of the deeper craters in which it would be unfortunate to land). This 
might sound odd at first, but it actually opens up a lot of possibilities, which 
serve us well in the attempt to analyse the integration of very distant scientific 
approaches. Especially, it is important that it allows us to include bad repre-
sentation in the discussion of scientific representation, since we need to be 
able to figure out if interdisciplinarity may be instrumental in improving poor 
science. Really bad science, the kind of science one would suppose to benefit 
the most from interdisciplinary collaborations, would be excluded from consi-
deration if stricter standards of similarity were selected as criteria for being a 
scientific representation.
Summing up
The following section will conclude this chapter by adding up the various 
elements discussed above. This is intended to provide the reader with an 
overview of what I consider to be the central elements of a workable account 
of scientific representation. First, though, let me sum up why Giere’s position 
is a good place to start for developing an analytical approach to inter-
disciplinarity, and how to handle its shortcomings. I am by no means alone in 
thinking of Giere’s account as a great starting point for further developments 
within the philosophy of science (e.g.: Godfrey-Smith 2006, p. 726). However, 
it seems reasonable to make my personal motivation explicit at this point:
Giere places activities of representation at the very centre of his account, 
which I believe is the way forward when one wants to capture what is com-
mon to a very broad-scoped class of disciplines. One of the great challenges 
in developing a general account of interdisciplinarity is certainly the required 
scope. A very diverse set of scientific practices may (and do) engage in all 
sorts of interdisciplinary activities. If an account of interdisciplinarity is to 
capture general characteristics of the epistemic aspects of this heterogenous 
class of scientific activities, it is required with some common ground. A level of 
analysis is needed that captures something which is both (a) common to all 
participants and (b) central to substantial epistemic aspects of science. Most 
existing accounts of interdisciplinarity focus on social aspects and thereby 
passes on test (a). But they fail on (b). Obviously, all scientific activities 
involves all sorts of social interaction. This is certainly common ground. On 
the other hand, it is, as discussed above, far from obvious that a focus on the 
social will lead to capturing anything substantial about epistemic issues. In 
this respect there are reasons to be much more optimistic with respect to 
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approach based analysis. It is not terribly controversial to claim that all scienti-
fic disciplines must involve representation.
It is very central to a characterisation of any scientific activity how repre-
sentation is carried out and what is represented. These dimensions are at the 
heart of Giere’s account.
On top of this, and in contrast to at least a good deal of scholars working in 
the philosophy of scientific representation, Giere explicitly includes the social 
aspects of science: Who is involved? Who is doing the representation? This is 
important not least because the social variable is the place to look when one 
wants to distinguish between e.g. the polymath mode and the social mode 
discussed above. Further, including social aspects builds bridges to other 
theorists working within this field. Giere explicitly expresses that he acknow-
ledges the importance of the contributions from the sociology and history of 
science. Certainly, many contributions from the historical and sociological ap-
proaches to science are also highly relevant to the analysis of interdisciplinar-
ity. But it is most fruitful for an epistemic analysis, to focus primarily on repre-
sentation and having ones representation based account enriched with social 
and historical nuances.
Giere emphasises the importance of use. Use is important since it bridges 
the central representational aspects and the social elements. Further, it dis-
solves the issue of demarcation which might otherwise threaten attempts at 
capturing scientific practice.
Giere’s account includes purposes which should quite obviously also be 
included in the discussion of whether to endorse interdisciplinarity.
One final significant benefit: As pointed out already, when all this is added 
together we end up having a very close fit between Giere’s account of science 
and the most nuanced account of the nature of disciplines we developed in 
chapter two. This, I believe, more than indicates that we are heading towards 
fertile ground.
Giere’s account, however, has a number of shortcomings as well.
First of all, he fails to make sufficient room for other things than models 
functioning as vehicles of representation. Even his later more liberal notion of 
“model” is arguably too narrow for the analysis of interdisciplinarity. Through 
discussions of various recent accounts of modelling, though, we have arrived 
at a deflationary understanding of modelling which is sufficiently inclusive for 
the purpose of analysing interdisciplinarity.
Second, Giere’s discussion of the targets represented as simply an aspect 
of reality is, if not exactly naïve, then at least too restricted to serve our 
present purposes. This problem is easily handled, since nothing in Giere’s 
account prevents us from including whatever we would like as targets of 
representation.
Third, the specification Giere provides of the relation between vehicles of 
representation and targets is inadequate for the present purposes. I have 
drawn on Thomson-Jones’ propositional view of modelling to indicate the roles 
various propositions play, and on several other accounts, most notably 
Weisberg, Cartwright, and Godfrey-Smith, in order to bring out more details 
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about this crucial link. As expressed above, for this purpose I will draw on 
specifications of approaches, vehicles of representation, intermediate layers 
(as constituted by assumptions, algorithms, and tools).
Fourth, he does not include Outputs. I think it is obvious that an analysis of 
interdisciplinary activities (as well as all other scientific activities) ought to 
include some account of the recommendations that are the final output of the 
scientific activities and, obviously, a central part of the motivation for doing 
science in the first place.
If we combine selected aspects from the early and the later versions of 
Giere’s account of scientific representation with the suggested adaptations, 
we end up with something like the following: Some person or persons (S) 
picks out a vehicle of representation (X) by means of a set of statements. (S) 
uses (X) to represent (W) for some purpose (P) through some more or less 
explicit intermediate layer. By claiming a specified set of similarities between 
(X) and (W) some outcome (O) is reached.  58
Understanding representation in this way provides us with a number of 
obvious dimensions along which to search for transformations and differences 
which are the consequences of interdisciplinarity in the pre- and post-inter-
action state of affairs.
(S): Who is involved?
(X): Which vehicles of representation are involved and are they combined or 
transformed?
How?
(W): Which targets are involved?
Which elements constitute the intermediate layer of the integrated 
approach?
How is the use of these elements changed or transformed compared to 
the parent approaches?
(P): Which purposes are involved?
(O): Which outputs are involved?
The most important issue to notice here is that we need to unfold especially 
the intermediate layer considerably.
The purpose for which we wanted to develop an account of scientific 
representation in the first place, was to evaluate the epistemic benefits (if any) 
of cases of interdisciplinarity. The bad (and somewhat old) news is that it is 
pretty difficult to develop measures for the quality of science (and it is not 
entirely clear at this stage to what extent my account of scientific represen-
tation is helpful in this respect). The good news is that for our present under-
taking we do not need absolute measures, but only relative measures. And 
these are significantly easier to get at. In fact, when viewing the topic in light 
 I have not discussed outcomes in this chapter, but I refer the reader to my discussion 58
hereof in chapter one.
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of the above discussion of modelling and representation, I believe we have a 
quite decent starting point on the latter enterprise.
In the next chapter, I will move on to discuss some important assumptions 
about pluralism, idealisation, and distortion prevalent in contemporary philo-
sophy of science (especially in the philosophy of scientific representation). As 
mentioned above in this chapter, these issues act as double-edged swords 
within the discussion of interdisciplinarity. On the one hand, they seem to 
provide all the reasons one needs for devoting oneself completely to 
uncurbed scientific crossbreeding. On the other hand, they seem to provide 
reason to think that interdisciplinarity, especially when involving distant 
approaches, requires considerable more care and effort than many inter-
disciples would like to think.
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6 – Pluralisms, perspectives, and potential 
problems
ABSTRACT. In this chapter, I discuss some central aspects of re-
presentation especially relevant for the evaluation of interdisciplin-
ary activities. Giere’s and other philosophers’ discussions of per-
spectives and pluralism provide all the reasons one could possibly 
want for wholeheartedly endorsing interdisciplinarity. At the same 
time, though, these discussions imply that, in many cases, the inte-
gration of different perspectives is everything but straight-forward. I 
attempt to elucidate these issues through a focus on perspectivism, 
idealisation, and distortion. I provide a number of examples that illu-
strate the considerable difficulties these considerations highlight.
This chapter discusses in more detail some central issues which were only 
hinted at in chapter 5, namely the issues of pluralism, perspectives, and dis-
tortions. In the discussions in this chapter, I will draw on Giere’s Perspectival 
Realism, the literature on scientific pluralism (Giere 2006a; Kellert et al. 2006; 
Mitchell 2002; Mitchell 2012), as well as valuable discussions of perspectives, 
idealisation, and distortion by van Fraassen (2008), Weisberg (2007a), 
Cartwright (1983; 1999), McMullin (1985), and Wimsatt (2007). Moreover, 
Godfrey-Smith has provided inspiration for the discussions of ID-idealisation 
below (e.g. 2006, p. 726).
Idealisation is at the heart of the position that representation of a complex 
world is always in terms of less complex vehicles of representation. Idealisa-
tion can be considered a type of epistemic distortion. But there are other types 
of distortion involved in representation, as well. Central to the arguments of 
this chapter is that representation always involves distortions—some of which 
are explicit and deliberate, others of which are unstated and therefore prone 
to go unnoticed. The natural question is: What happens if one attempts to 
integrate distorted approaches? Should we expect integration to level out 
distortions or should we expect some type of (constructive or destructive) 
interference to occur? Can we say anything in general about what to expect 
from divergent distorted interactions?
As this chapter reveals, once one starts looking for it, one quickly finds a 
pluralism of pluralisms within science. Pluralisms regarding perspectives, 
distortions, and ceteris paribus clauses. Internal, external, metaphysical, and 
epistemic pluralisms. And, not least, a pluralism of reasons for being cautious 
when integrating scientific approaches. As the following will show, maintaining 
a (rather plausible) weak pluralistic position coupled with a mild form of 
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realism (which is rather plausible as well, I believe) spells trouble for inter-
disciplinarity. There might be ways out of this predicament, but certainly one 
should carefully consider whether easy short-cuts is the way to go.
Pluralism—what is it?
Quite appropriately, the question »what is scientific pluralism?« is multi-
dimensional. There is, in other words, a multitude of ways in which science is 
pluralistic, at least according to advocates of scientific pluralism. Central, 
however, to most pluralistic accounts of science is a monistic assumption, 
which one might call »the one-world-hypothesis«.
Giere has phrased the one-world-hypothesis in the following terms:
Imagine the universe as having a definite structure, but exceedingly complex, 
so complex that no models humans can devise could ever capture more than 
limited aspects of the total complexity. Nevertheless, some ways of 
constructing models of the world do provide resources for capturing some 
aspects of the world more or less well. Other aspects may provide resources 
for capturing other aspects more or less well. Both ways, however, may 
capture some aspects of reality and thus be candidates for a realistic 
understanding of the world. […] It does not matter that different historical 
paths might lead to different sciences. Each might genuinely capture some 
aspects of reality. (Giere 1999a, p. 79)
Giere’s view is that different scientific models emphasise different aspects of 
reality. Reality itself is so immensely complex that no scientific model (or 
theory) will ever be able to capture all of its aspects. Giere emphasises that 
he intends the one-world-hypothesis to be understood as an instrumentally 
motivated working hypotheses—not as a piece of a priori metaphysics (Ibid.).
The hypothesis that there is one, and only one, reality may seem self-
evidently true (especially if one is realistically inclined). After all, if there were 
more than one world or reality, one might reasonably argue that all these 
different realities would add up to the sum total of realities, which could then 
simply be called ‘reality’. But, at least in principle, there are other possibilities. 
Especially if considered in less realistic perspectives, matters sometimes 
appear less straightforward than described by Giere.
Some other possible positions are:
(1) There does not exist a mind-independent reality.
(2) There exist a plurality of distinct mind-dependent realities.
(3) There exist a plurality of distinct, non-interacting mind-independent 
realities.
(4) Reality consist of one (or more) physical mind-independent reality(s) plus 
a number of other kinds of reality contingent on, e.g., social and mental 
factors.
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One could undoubtedly find people actually endorsing each of these positions, 
even if none of them seem very attractive. But even though there are indeed 
an abundance of writings on the social construction of various things,  it is 59
quite rare to encounter people who seriously doubt that physical reality exists 
independently of someone’s mental or social activities.  Position (4), on the 60
other hand, is not all that implausible as long as the different realities are not 
thought of as isolated, non-interacting domains. But in that case, (4) would not 
be incompatible with the one-world-hypothesis. 
In Explaining Science, Giere discusses the views of Gilbert and Mulkay, in 
Opening Pandora’s Box (1984), as an example of someone apparently believ-
ing in multiple realities. Indeed, the opening line of the final chapter of their 
book is: »In this book we have approached the social world of science as a 
multiple reality« (ibid., p. 188). But notice that it is the social world of science 
they have approached as a multiple reality. Not the physical world, which the 
science in question targets.  Gilbert and Mulkay’s main conclusion is that 61
scientists operate with distinct frameworks for explaining their own results and 
other scientists’ conflicting results. Accordingly, scientists often construe their 
own results as determined strictly by experimental data, whereas contingency 
and the influence of social factors is emphasised in descriptions of the activi-
ties of opponents. Even though Gilbert and Mulkay’s topic is certainly interest-
ing and the reality of the problems they address is plausible, it seems suffici-
ent to talk of multiple accounts or frameworks to explain the phenomena in 
question (Giere 1988, p. 61).
Sandra Mitchell has suggested an alternative: »However complex, and 
however many contributing causes participated, there is only one causal 
history that, in fact, has generated a phenomenon to be explained« (Mitchell 
2002, p. 66). This would be true regardless of whether there are indeed 
multiple realities, and whether or not these multiple realities were capable of 
interacting. One might call this position causal realism involving a subscription 
to a one-causal-history-hypothesis.
It is difficult to think of good arguments against the one-world-hypothesis or 
the one-causal-history-hypothesis. Indeed, these seem to constitute a reason-
able default position when pursuing an analysis of interdisciplinarity. So for 
 … such as “quarks” (Pickering 1984), “gender” (Lorber & Farrell 1991),”scientific 59
knowledge” (MacKenzie 1981), and, of course, “reality” (Berger & Luckmann 1966),  In most 
cases, though, the positions seem to be that certain concepts or conceptual frameworks are 
socially constructed, rather than the entities in question themselves. The most sober 
discussion of this issue is still (Hacking 1999), I believe.
 On separate occasions, at seminars I have attended, I have heard as well Bruno Latour as 60
Harry Collins assuring that (of course) they are (ontological) realists, and that anything else 
would be foolish.
 Gilbert and Mulkay focus on developments and disagreements within research on oxidative 61
phosphorylation of all things
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now, let us allow ourselves to be monists regarding the causal structure of the 
world.
Of course, Mitchell’s account only holds when considering tokens of a 
given phenomenon. If we instead consider a type of phenomena, the tokens 
of any type will have divergent causal histories—sometimes even qualitatively 
quite different causal histories. One might argue that, at least in some cases, 
causal history has a lot to say when deciding whether two distinct phenomena 
are of the same type. But certainly this cannot be generalised. There are lots 
of phenomena which are categorised as being tokens of some type in com-
plete disregard of their causal history. A house is a house regardless of how it 
was built. »God only knows« and »Heroes« both belong to the category »love 
songs performed by David Bowie«, even though the first (tormentingly embar-
rassing cover version) came into existence as a consequence of bad career 
management, while the latter is considered the result of a musical genius at 
his creative peak. Causal history has little influence on categorisation in many 
cases. This will, for instance, turn out to be crucial in the psychopathological 
cases discussed below.
Perhaps, in the above quotation, Giere comes across as a little rash in 
writing off concerns about there being different and competing sciences. 
Mitchell, at least, refers to this as perhaps the chief predicament of a pluralis-
tic realism:
[I]f science is representing and explaining the structure of the one world, why 
is there such a diversity of representations and explanations in some 
domains? One response is that pluralism simply reflects the immaturity of the 
science (Kuhn 1962). Yet history shows us that many sciences do not exhibit 
a diminution in the multiplicity of theories, models, and explanations they 
generate. This 'fact' of pluralism, on the face of it, seems to be correlated not 
with maturity of the discipline, but with the complexity of the subject matter. 
Thus the diversity of views found in contemporary science is not an 
embarrassment or sign of failure, but rather the product of scientists doing 
what they must do to produce effective science. Pluralism reflects complexity. 
(Mitchell 2002, p. 55; reference to Kuhn in the original)
The question seems to be whether one can coherently combine the following 
three elements into a coherent position:
(1) Support for the one-world-hypothesis.
(2) Belief in the ability of science to generate (approximately) true 
representations of reality.
(3) Acknowledgement that there is a multitude of different and often 
conflicting ways of representing and explaining even apparently simple 
phenomena. 
I take the above three elements to constitute the core of pluralistic realism. As 
I have stated clearly above, I have no ambition of entering into the realism vs. 
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anti-realism-debate in this thesis. But it is worth mentioning that in light of the 
above, anti-realism is obviously less problematic to defend. The anti-realist 
may respond that the plurality of models and theories is simply the best 
method of optimising empirical adequacy. The realist, on the other hand, is 
obliged to deliver a more elaborate response to this challenge (Weisberg 
2007a, p. 656). We can uncover some central parts of such a response by 
considering different dimensions of scientific pluralism in more detail.
The Pluralisms
To make sense of the tension between the one-world-hypothesis and conflicts 
at the theoretical level, we need to disentangle the multitude of pluralisms at 
play within the scientific pluralism position. The following  will reveal the most 
important dimensions along which science is pluralistic. Some of these dimen-
sions will be recognisable from discussions in previous chapters.
The following section will briefly discuss four ways in which science is 
pluralistic. Of the four types of pluralism, I believe we are ready to accept the 
first two (internal and external pluralisms) on grounds of evidence provided 
above. These are, certainly, both important in the present context. Regarding 
the third one, metaphysical (or nomological) pluralism, I will remain agnostic, 
since it is less important for present purposes. For present purposes, there is 
more than enough to deal with when considering the more accessible ways in 
which science is pluralistic.
The fourth type of pluralism discussed in the following, epistemic pluralism, 
is the central component of Giere’s perspectivism as well as a very central 
component in a representation based discussion of interdisciplinarity. This, 
then, is the most important addition to my account in the present chapter. 
Therefore I will embark on a more thorough discussion of epistemic pluralism 
and perspectives after the following (brief) discussion of the first three 
dimensions of pluralisms.
#1 – Internal pluralism 
Internal pluralism refers to the diversity of the class of elements involved in 
theorising and modelling. Examples, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
include mathematical and meta-mathematical tools and concepts, proposition-
al algorithms, various (e.g. ontological or epistemic) assumptions, ways of ar-
riving at distinctions and classifications, all kinds of kinds, concepts, meta-
phors, analogies, values, and policy related issues.
All of these are candidates for being transferred as part of interdisciplinary 
activities. Further, none of these are guaranteed to work well in new contexts 
simply because of having performed satisfactorily in the contexts from which 
they are imported (this is insight a again). I will provide detailed examples 
hereof below in this chapter.
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#2 – External pluralism  
External pluralism refers to the many different kinds of models and theories. 
We have already discussed the prevalence in the literature of discussions of 
physical models, diagrammatic models, historical models, remnant models, 
mathematical models, fictional models, and model organisms (Downes 1992; 
Griesemer 1990; Levy & Currie 2014; Weisberg 2013a). Further, computer 
simulation is on some accounts considered to be a distinct type of modelling 
for being situated somewhere between theory and experiment and for incor-
porating practical and epistemological challenges entirely different from other 
types of modelling (Lenhard et al. 2010; Weisberg 2013a; Winsberg 2010).
It is certainly possible to transfer types of models as part of an interdiscip-
linary activity.
The diversity captured by the internal and external dimensions of pluralism 
is central to the philosophical opposition to accounts of modelling along strictly 
mathematical and/or set-theoretical lines discussed in the previous chapter 
(Downes 1992; Godfrey-Smith 2006; Thomson-Jones 2012; Weisberg 
2013a).
#3 – Metaphysical (nomological) pluralism and CP-clauses 
Nancy Cartwright’s work on modelling, pluralism, and the limitations of 
scientific theories is among the most influential contributions of »The Stanford 
School« (Cartwright 1983; 1989; 1999; Morgan & Morrison 1999). In (1999) 
Cartwright discussed metaphysical pluralism, which she characterised as »the 
doctrine that nature is governed in different domains by different systems of 
laws not necessarily related to each other in any systematic or uniform way; 
by a patchwork of laws« (p. 32). In case metaphysical pluralism reflects reali-
ty, it would certainly have consequences for the viability of transferring theore-
tical elements from one context to another. Indeed, the better the fit between 
model and its target, the less likely it might be for the model (or some other 
element involved in modelling) to fit well in other contexts. For now, however, I 
will remain agnostic on this issue, partly due the difficulties related to settling 
the matter, and partly because (as already mentioned) the other three plura-
lisms (#1, #2, #4) provide us with more than sufficient material to consider for 
present purposes.
Cartwright is the major proponent of the idea of metaphysical pluralism, but 
she has also contributed significantly to developing insights into other dimen-
sions of modelling and theory construction, including the internal/external dis-
tinction. As part of her discussion of these issues in (1999), Cartwright made a 
quite convincing case that the utility of theories and models is strongly 
restricted by ceteris paribus clauses. Laws, models, and theories work well in 
many cases, she states, but these many well-functioning cases are out-
numbered (by far) by the many cases in which laws, models, and theories do 
not work well (if at all). And when something works well, it only works well 
ceteris paribus. Therefore there is little reason to assume that a given model 
or theory will work well if conditions, or contexts, are changed.
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I think we have good reasons to assume that something similar is the case 
with the internal elements as well as the external kinds of modelling. We learn 
from internal and external pluralism that when we represent reality, we make 
use of many different kinds of elements, which we combine in many different 
ways. These elements, and the different ways in which they are combined, 
are developed for use in certain contexts, and their performance has been 
calibrated and evaluated under specific, context-dependent conditions. Even if 
they work well in a particular contexts, their satisfactory performance cannot 
be generalised. 
A number of dimensions have been distinguished along which generali-
sations might be non-universal:
[…] many central and well-entrenched generalizations in the sciences deviate 
from the received characteristics by being ‘‘non-strict’’, ‘‘inexact’’, ‘‘exception-
ridden’’, ‘‘contingent on the circumstances’’, ‘‘sensitive’’, ‘‘non-robust’’, ‘’idea-
lized’’, ‘‘abstract’’, ‘‘merely statistical’’, and so forth. We call generalizations 
with these features ‘’non-universal’’ (Reutlinger & Unterhuber 2014, p. 1705)
Non-universality is multi-faceted. This means that sensitivity to changes in, 
e.g., idealisations, in use of statistical tools, in initial and background condi-
tions, and so on, may differ from case to case. Viewed in this perspective 
interdisciplinarity takes on a distinctly audacious, perhaps even reckless, 
flavour. When you integrate or combine approaches or apply vehicles to new 
targets, other things certainly aren’t equal.
It is superfluous to state that one should be careful when generalising. In 
this context, though, it is perhaps fair to revitalise this commonplace by stating 
that (generally) one should pay attention to potential risks related to ignoring 
ceteris paribus clauses when transferring theoretical elements between con-
texts. If anything is characteristic of interdisciplinarity in general, however, it is 
not, I believe, close attention to ceteris paribus clauses. Below, in this chapter 
and the next, I will provide examples of tools and assumptions that seem to 
work well under certain conditions, and less well when conditions are differ-
ent. These examples will illustrate that not taking these matters into account 
might have quite serious consequences. Further, in relation to the discussion 
of ID-idealisation below in this chapter, I assert that ceteris paribus clauses 
may be lost when vehicles of representation, or other theoretical elements, 
are transferred between contexts.
In the next section, however, I will turn to what I term ‘epistemic pluralism’ 
which is very central to the accounts of, among others, Giere and Mitchell. 
This dimension of plurality adds considerably to our appreciation of the diffi-
culties related to interdisciplinarity.
#4 – Epistemic (representational) pluralism 
For present concerns, the most interesting pluralism is what one might call 
epistemic pluralism, which indicates that there is a multitude of ways to know 
something about any given phenomena. Importantly, several ways of knowing 
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something about some object may all be useful, even though they seem to be 
mutually exclusive. Therefore even seemingly incompatible, models can sup-
plement each other in useful ways (Giere 1999a, p. 79). An example could be 
two different models of water, one in which water is considered as a fluid; the 
other in which water is considered as a collection of molecules. The first 
model is good for studying the viscosity of water, but if you are interested in 
Brownian motion, the second model is better. 
If we compare two other classical examples of competitive accounts, inter-
esting questions arise. Compare the (apparently) conflicting wave and particle 
theories of light with the (apparently) conflicting Darwinian and Lamarckian 
theories of inheritance. In (2002) Mitchell discussed these as two instances of 
what she calls competitive pluralism. According to Mitchell, competitive 
pluralism is characterised by the presumption that pluralism is temporary and 
will eventually be eliminated. This she distinguishes from compatible plura-
lism, i.e. a pluralism of models which are not mutually exclusive (even though 
they cannot be unified) and can therefore be expected to co-exist peacefully. 
It seems, though, that we need a further distinction within the group of 
theories and models subsumed under competitive pluralism. At least 
considered at a certain level of generalisation, we need to ascribe as well 
particle as wave properties to light in order to represent the phenomena we 
observe. This is not the case (at least not according to established common 
scientific sense) with the competing theories of inheritance. In a sense you 
can say that in the case of light, the phenomenon requires multiple represen-
tations which are (at least at the face of it) incompatible. The same is not the 
case regarding the inheritance issue, in respect to which Mendelian genetics 
simply undermined the trust in inheritance of acquired traits.
The central claim of epistemic pluralism is that different ways of knowing 
something about some topic may not be mutually exclusive in the sense that 
we will, eventually, have to decide upon one or the other. On the pluralistic 
account they may both be required for our best combined explanation even 
though they appear to conflict.
Perspectivism
Giere’s discussion of perspectives is a nicely elaborated example of epistemic 
pluralism (the most central text is 2006b). A central assumption in Giere’s Per-
spectival Realism is that representation always involves a certain perspective. 
The metaphor of perspectives is both quite rich and quite dominant in Giere’s 
later work. Therefore it is worth taking a close look at—not least since a focus 
on perspectives has important consequences for any account of interdisciplin-
arity. As in all cases of metaphorical thinking, though, one must be careful not 
to put too much weight on the literal meaning of ‘perspective’. Giere uses ‘per-
spective’ as a technical term that captures central aspects of literal visual per-
spectives involved in observation, as well as important issues about how the 
internal make up of theories, tools, and models affect the results we get from 
applying them.
 126
On Giere’s account, scientific representations are perspectival in a number 
of different ways. The most straightforward example is at the level of obser-
vation. An accessible illustration is the views of some object, e.g., a house, 
from different positions. Straightforwardly, any way of observing a house will 
implicate a perspective: You see the house from above, from its southeast 
corner, or from the inside, and so on and so forth. There is no view from no-
where and neither a view from everywhere which can provide all perspectives 
simultaneously—any observational perspective shows only part of the pheno-
menon in focus (Giere 1999a, p. 79 f.).
The physiology of our sense organs adds another dimension to the meta-
phor. If I look at a house, I experience it in colour. Someone with monochrom-
atic vision would experience it quite differently. Put in very simple terms, Giere 
considers this human ability to see colour as a perspective (Giere 2006b, p. 
17 ff.). And the specific perspective depends on how inputs from the environ-
ment are processed (ibid., p. 59). The perspective of normal colour vision 
emerges when a specific set of physiological circumstances are in place and 
are fully operational.
As Giere states:
[…] [M]aybe the most important feature of perspectives is that they are 
always partial. When looking out at a scene, a typical human trichromat is 
visually affected by only a narrow range of all that electromagnetic radiation 
available. (Giere 2006b, p. 35)
Thus, only parts of the available phenomena is registered during observation 
due to limitations inherent in the physical makeup of normal vision.
Importantly, light with distinct spectral characteristics, which are experien-
ced as identical by the person with dichromatic colour vision, are in some 
cases experienced as clearly distinct by the person with normal trichromatic 
colour vision. A tetrachromat, that is a person whose retinae contains four 
classes of cones instead of the usual three, is further capable of discrimi-
nating spectral stimuli indistinguishable to the person with normal colour 
vision (Jordan et al. 2010). Phenomena may, then, when viewed in one colour 
perspective, come across as obviously identical,  but as clearly distinct when 62
viewed in a different perspective.
We may add further dimensions to our understanding of observational per-
spectives by considering scientific equipment. If we observe the house 
through an electron microscope, we get an entirely different observational per-
 For instance, monochromatic light with a wavelength of 590 nm is experienced as orange. 62
So is a combination of the wavelengths 670 nm (red) and 546 nm (green). At certain red/
green-ratios, people with normal trichromatic vision have trouble discriminating between 
these. This is the phenomena known as metamerism (Giere 2006b, p. 21 f.). A studie of 
anomalous human vision showed that at least one person discriminates very fast and reliably 
between orange light with different spectral characteristics. This at least indicates that human 
(behavioural) tetrachromacy does exist (Jordan et al. 2010).
 127
spective. Each of these different observational perspectives provide access to 
reality, but they all draw only a partial image hereof.
As Giere states, scientific instruments 
[…] process inputs from the environment in ways peculiar to their own 
physical make up, ways that render these inputs similar or different not just 
according to features of the inputs themselves, but also according to features 
of the instrument. (Giere 2006b, p. 59)
The same is certainly true about the human visual system.  I will return to, 63
and paraphrase, this quotation several times below. It captures something 
very central which also applies to the perspectives of models, theories, con-
ceptual tools, and approaches. I will demonstrate the significance of this in 
discussions of Simpson’s paradox and operational definition below in this 
chapter.
Importantly these different perspectives cannot be integrated in a unified 
»inter-perspective« without (further) distorting the individual contributions. We 
cannot, for instance, visually represent a house from without and within in one 
and the same image without significantly distorting its appearance to the 
naked eye (Giere 2006b, p. 14). Further, it is certainly hard to imagine how it 
should be possible to integrate the perspective of monochromacy with that of 
trichromatic (»normal«) colour vision (not to mention dichromatic, tetrachrom-
atic or plain achromatic colour vision).
Perspectives of theory 
The next step is to explain the perspectives of scientific theories and models. 
This step forces us further away from the literal meaning of ‘perspective’. By 
analogy, Giere claims that theories represent reality in the same way that 
maps represent (parts of) the world. A map can represent in many ways: 
quantitatively or qualitatively, in more or less detail, focusing on various 
aspects (e.g. geographical, political, geological, demographical), and so on. 
This corresponds to the different perspectives of models selectively empha-
sising aspects of the world.
Map projection is a neat example one might offer as an illustration of 
Giere’s analogy. Map projection is the construction of two-dimensional repres-
entations of curved three-dimensional objects. The most obvious example is 
the representation of the Earth on a plane map. The Earth has many proper-
ties which are candidates for representation on maps, e.g. area, distance, 
shape, direction and so on. Map projections can be constructed to preserve 
some of these properties, but not all of them at once. Any projection will 
 If this is not obvious, I recommend Giere’s very careful discussion hereof in (2006b) as well 63
as perhaps The Island of the Colorblind by Oliver Sacks (1997).
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compromise or approximate basic metric properties.  And as a consequence, 64
every distinct map projection distorts reality in some way. Large scale maps of 
small proportions of the Earth may come close to being accurate, but distor-
tions build up as the size of the depicted area increases.
As opposed to (some) observations, maps, like theories and models, are 
deliberate constructions. They are vehicles of representation constructed for 
specific representational purposes. Different ways of drawing maps empha-
sise different aspects of reality. One can even construct maps that deliberately 
misrepresent or maps that represent fictive places. Further, properties of a 
map can be re-projected onto reality (think, for instance, of the global position-
ing system). This reciprocal relationship is also a feature of the relation be-
tween scientific theories and reality.
To make the move from analogy to concrete examples of theoretical 
models, Giere uses the mathematical description of the movements of a 
simple pendulum:65
FIGURE 5: THE SIMPLE PENDULUM RETURNS.
Again: P is the period (the length of a full cycle) of the pendulum, g is the local 
gravitational acceleration and l is the length of the pendulum. The equation 
corresponds to the experimental results by Newton and Galilei, which showed 
that a pendulum’s period is proportional to the square root of its length and 
independent of its mass. This equation is far from an accurate description of 
how a physical pendulum actually moves, though.
The equation corresponds to the motion of a simple pendulum, which is an 
idealisation of a real pendulum based on the following assumptions: The bob 
is a point mass; The rod or cord on which the bob swings is massless, 
inextensible and remains taut at all times; Motion is frictionless; The angle of 
the swing is very small, so that the two-dimensional swing of the actual 
pendulum approximates a strictly horizontal, one-dimensional motion (Giere 
1988, p. 70).
On this background we can safely conclude that the mathematical model of 
the simple pendulum is quite strongly idealised. Point masses and massless 
suspensions are prototypical instances of what in the literature are called 
Galilean idealisations (McMullin 1985). No such things exist in physical reality. 
The equation is further idealised since it does not include aspects such as the 
 http://thetruesize.com/ is a fun web-resource for experimenting with the distortions of map 64
projections.
 I realise that it might be somewhat tiring that I keep returning to this equation. However, 65
Giere (and others as well) has spent a few decades analysing this example for which reason I 
cannot simply ignore it here.
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materials of which the pendulum is made (this is the Aristotelian sense of 
idealisation ). The choice of material of the bob does, however, matter in 66
relation to how much the movement of an actual pendulum is affected by the 
earth’s magnetic field, while the length of the suspension may vary as a result 
of changes in temperature to different degrees depending on what it is made 
from. Moreover, this model in no way takes into account the moving pendul-
um’s reflection of light, its history (e.g. the role played by pendulum move-
ments in the determination of the standard meter), or its potential hypnotic 
effect. Consequently, one must conclude that the equation is very far from an 
exhaustive representation of the movements of physical pendulums. No one, 
of course, claims that it is anything but a highly idealised mathematical model. 
A model that excludes friction, mass, extension, and so on, and is only able 
to deal with a small fraction of the pendulums actual potential amplitude can 
reasonably be termed »partial«. But notice, then, how insight into these ideali-
sations are required in order to be able to make use of the equation to repre-
sent a pendulum at all. In other words: The equation is worth little as a vehicle 
of representation if isolated from the assumptions and algorithms by which it 
is connected it to its (traditional) target. Knowledge of the intermediate layer is 
required to use this (and any other) specific vehicle of representation properly.
How is the equation of the simple pendulum perspectival? By only provid-
ing a partial image of its target (by means of idealisations) and by processing 
inputs in ways peculiar to its own conceptual makeup. To completely ap-
preciate the perspectives of vehicles of representation,however, we need to 
construe them as part of the approach in which they are used.
In this context, an approach is defined as a specific way of using a specific 
vehicle of representation to represent a specific (kind of) target. A specific way 
of use incorporates the conceptual tools, procedures, and assumptions which 
serve to link (the selected parts of) the vehicle of representation to (the selec-
ted parts of) the target.
The conceptual make up of an approach is constituted by a specific com-
bination of the internal elements that are used in the context. If an element is 
changed, so is the perspective (and the approach). This is to be understood in 
analogy to the different perspectives of vision where differences in physio-
logical constitution is used to account for different observational perspectives.
On this background we can rephrase Giere’s statement about scientific 
instruments in the following way: An approach processes inputs in ways 
peculiar to its own conceptual make up, ways that render these inputs similar 
 In which some properties or elements are omitted from representation leaving only the 66
»essential« ones. This type of idealisation is sometimes referred to as 
‘abstraction’ (Cartwright 1989; Jones 2005). I, however, prefer to use ‘idealisation’ for several 
reasons. 1) I agree with Weisberg’s views about the utility of a pluralistic account of 
idealisation (Weisberg 2007a), 2) I think ‘abstraction’ is a potentially confusing term, given the 
many senses with which it is related, and 3) I believe it makes best sense to use ‘idealisation’ 
to describe all the different ways that lead to the construction of »ideal systems« (which are 
also the results of abstraction or omission, as I see it).
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or different not just according to features of the inputs themselves, but also 
according to features of the approach.
Laws and perspectives 
According to Giere, then, even laws are perspectival. Indeed Giere under-
stands laws as defining basic perspectives:
[…] the grand principles objectivists cite as universal laws of nature are better 
understood as defining highly generalized models that characterize a 
theoretical perspective. Thus, Newton’s laws characterize the classical 
mechanical perspective; Maxwell’s laws characterize the classical 
electromagnetic perspective; the Schrödinger equation characterizes a 
quantum mechanical perspective; the principles of natural selection 
characterize an evolutionary perspective, and so on. On this account, general 
principles by themselves make no claims about the world, but more specific 
models constructed in accordance with the principles can be used to make 
claims about specific aspects of the world. And these claims can be tested 
against various instrumental perspectives. Nevertheless, all theoretical claims 
remain perspectival in that they apply only to aspects of the world and then, 
partly because they apply only to some aspects of the world, never with 
complete precision. (Giere 2006b, p. 14 f.)
Below, I will expand Giere’s notion of perspectives to further include concep-
tual tools in addition to observation, instruments, models, theories, approach-
es, and laws. But first I will turn to the discussion of some consequences of 
partiality and perspectivism.
Distortions
Recent discussions of scientific perspectives (Giere 2006b; Van Fraassen 
2008) highlight how the selectiveness of representation results in various 
forms of distortion. In the words of Van Fraassen: »It seems then that distor-
tion, infidelity, lack of resemblance in some respect, may in general be crucial 
to the success of a representation« (Van Fraassen 2008, p. 13). In the follow-
ing, I will provide some examples of inevitable representational distortion. 
Distortion is a central and important topic in itself in discussions of scientific 
representation. However, issues related to distortion take on a whole new 
level of significance in cases of interdisciplinary integration. Interdisciplinarity, 
thus, does not neutralise van Fraassen’s verdict quoted above. Interdisciplin-
ary representation will still involve distortion. But distortions may be transform-
ed as a consequence of integration, and these changes may be quite difficult 
to track.
Idealisation 
As already touched upon, idealisation is a central type of distortion discussed 
at length in the philosophical literature. Especially Cartwright (1989), McMullin 
(1985), Wimsatt (2007), and Suppe (1972) have contributed to establishing 
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the centrality of idealisation in philosophy of science. Idealisation is often 
characterised as deliberate misrepresentation, either by distorting represen-
tational elements or entirely leaving out some of the elements known to 
actually be a part of the target system. However, it is worth keeping in mind 
that in many cases misrepresentations may not be deliberate.  In some 67
cases it may not be clear whether or not, or to what extent, central elements 
are indeed misrepresented. Especially relevant to cases of interdisciplinary 
integration, awareness that some element is misrepresented may be reduced 
when elements are handled in settings with less than optimal expertise.
One might think of idealisation as the theoretical (modelling) counterpart to 
the experimental isolation of causes and effects. In Nature’s Capacities and 
their Measurement (1989), Cartwright indeed states that abstraction (her 
preferred term for Aristotelian idealisation) is the process of subtracting every-
thing but the causal factors from a model. In experimental settings, of course, 
you will often get an unmistakable response if you isolate in inappropriate 
ways. That is, the effect you are attempting to control or generate will change 
or disappear if you remove central, contributing causes. One should not 
expect such clear feedback when idealising beyond the reasonable. In prin-
ciple nothing prevents the postulation of causal relationships between any ele-
ments one might think to combine in a model. The lack of response is 
especially treacherous in cases where it is not possible to construct empirical 
tests or simulations of the situations in question, for one reason or another. 
Further, as argued above, there is nothing that stops us from developing non-
causal models which are, indeed, also idealised in all sorts of way. Con-
sequently, it will be inadequate to focus exclusively on capturing causal ele-
ments.
One overall goal of representational activity is to emphasise certain featur-
es, to make some point or show that some aspect is particularly significant. 
When we represent a person as suffering from schizophrenia, we are not 
interested in his or her digestion. Therefore, processes of digestion are ex-
cluded from most models of schizophrenia, because we want to focus only on 
issues we take to be relevant to the phenomena we wish to understand. This 
is only partly due to concerns for cognitive economy. Incidentally, there is a 
widespread agreement that matters of digestion does not play a vital part in 
the aetiology of schizophrenia. Nevertheless, the idealisation involved in ex-
cluding digestion from consideration results in a somewhat distorted represen-
tation, since suffering from schizophrenia actually does involve digestive pro-
cesses (in the sense that digestion is necessary for staying alive, and dead 
people do not suffer from schizophrenia, at least not according to the opera-
tional criteria of current diagnostics).
Above we discussed the idealisations involved when representing by 
means of the equation of the simple pendulum. An examination of a quite 
different model will show that the characteristics of representational ideali-
 A good source for these kinds of considerations is (Jones 2005).67
 132
sations are repeated across traditional disciplinary boundaries, with some 
significant differences though.
The diathesis-stress model is an example picked from psychopathology. 
The model is used to cast light on why some people develop pathological 
mental disorders in contexts which others are able to cope with without similar 
consequences (Ingram & Luxton 2005).68
‘Diathesis’ here refers to a person’s level of vulnerability and may be 
understood as the opposite of resilience. ‘Stress’ is not to be understood in 
the everyday sense, but as any major or minor life event that disturbs the 
stability of a person’s physical, emotional, or cognitive mechanisms. In the 
simplest version the diathesis-stress model has only two parameters, 
vulnerability and accumulated stress, which, taken together, determines if the 
person suffers “a breakdown” and develops a mental disorder.
Graphically, the diathesis-stress model can be represented as in figure 6 
below. Much like the equation for the movements of a pendulum the diathesis-
stress model is strongly idealised in the Galileian sense. The model is focused 
upon an alleged isolatable and generalisable aspect of reality, i.e. the relation 
between the tendency of human beings to develop mental disorders and their 
exposure to stressors. The two parameters, »diathesis« and »stress«, are 
also strongly idealised. Vulnerability seems to be a very dynamic and complex 
phenomenon, quite far from being a static innate threshold. Similarly, stress 
can hardly be claimed to accumulate in any simple way through a person’s life 
until »critical mass« has been reached and a mental breakdown occurs.
FIGURE 6: THE DIATHESIS-STRESS MODEL
 Diathesis-stress-models come in many more or less specified versions and goes back at 68
least to Pierre Briquet’s systematic studies of hysteria in 1859 (Ellenberger 1970, p. 142). 
More recently Paul Meehl’s discussion of Schizophrenia is a well-known example (Meehl 
1962). Presently, I make use of a strongly idealised version of the diathesis-stress-model 
(allegedly capturing general aspects of the relationship between vulnerability and breakdown) 
since it provides the best basis for comparison with the equally strongly idealised model of the 
simple pendulum.
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The breaking of a leg can, of course, be a significant stressor, but it seems 
reasonable to claim that the resulting stress decreases as physical function-
ality is regained. Similarly, the stressfulness of more emotionally traumatic 
events, such as the divorce of one’s parents or the loss of a loved one, tend to 
decrease over time. And even though one might develop a persistent hyper-
sensitivity in situations reminiscent of the one in which the original crisis 
occurred, this by no means indicate a simple accumulation of stress over 
time.
Furthermore, the model is idealised in the (Aristotelian) sense since several 
(relevant?) factors are left out of the equation (so to speak). Helpful social 
relations might significantly reduce the impact of a given stressor; so might 
the acquisition of coping-strategies. And, as the old wisdom goes, the over-
coming of previous stressful situations might actually strengthen one’s ability 
to combat novel trials.
The diathesis-stress model and the equation of the simple pendulum are 
two very different models. They nevertheless share certain patterns, which 
makes them comparable as potential vehicles for representation. The main 
difference between the two is that the equation of the simple pendulum, 
obviously, has a mathematical structure doing a significant part of the work. 
The diathesis-stress model, on the other hand, involves no apparent 
mathematical tools (though it is sometimes, as above, somewhat deceptively 
depicted as a linear function). But the two models are also very similar in the 
sense that they both rely on more or less explicated intermediate layers, 
which serve to point out which aspects of the world the model is supposed to 
be about, how to properly idealise, and so on and so forth.
The model of the pendulum entails much more specific claims about 
(aspects of) how an actual pendulum is supposed to move in order for the 
model to fit its target than does the diathesis-stress model. We might say that 
use of the pendulum-model is a stronger representational act since it makes 
much stronger claims about reality. The diathesis-stress model is no less a 
model, however, even though it is somewhat feeble.
Reflection on the examples of idealisation above reveals important 
tensions between the concepts of “specificity” and “explication” discussed in 
chapter 5 above. It is easier to construct exactly specified models if its ele-
ments and internal relations are strongly idealised, but strong idealisation 
makes it more demanding to explicate the relation between the model and the 
phenomena it is about.
In the ordinary use of the model of the simple pendulum it is clearly speci-
fied what its elements are and which parts of which phenomena they are used 
to represent. Further it is very explicit which relations are taken to hold be-
tween the elements of the model. This specificity, however, very much de-
pends on the high degree of idealisation of the model’s internal relations and 
elements. In the case of the diathesis-stress model the elements of the model 
and the relations between them are less clearly specified and explicated, 
though still highly idealised. It is worth noting that the literature on simple 
pendulums is also very explicit about the idealisations used in the model 
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(Giere 1988, p. 69 f.). This is unfortunately not the case in the treatment of 
diathesis-stress models in which the transformation from real world pheno-
mena to idealised element of the model is left in the dark (Ingram & Luxton 
2005). Consequently, the model of the simple pendulum is a High Fidelity 
model (as discussed in chapter 5). In contrast, the diathesis-stress model is 
very loosely described, which, among other problems, makes it difficult con-
clusively to decide whether the model is empirically adequate. In Weisberg’s 
terms, we might simply be unable to determine whether the model lives up to 
its fidelity criteria (if such had been worked out in the first place).
ID-idealisation 
When tools, algorithms, assumptions, or vehicles are transferred from one 
setting to another it is often the case that the transferred elements are altered 
during the process. One might think of this in terms of idealisation of 
theoretical elements. Both types of idealisation discussed above apply here. 
Sometimes certain parts of the theoretical structures are considered to be 
essential and only these are transferred (the Aristotelian approach to ideali-
sation). In other cases, simplified and otherwise distorted versions of theoreti-
cal elements are put to use in new settings, in analogy with the Galilean 
approach to idealisation. 
I suggest thinking of idealisation of theoretical elements transferred be-
tween representational contexts as ID-idealisation.  Explicating whether and 69
how transferred theoretical elements are ID-idealised during integration of 
approaches is an important task when analysing cases of interdisciplinarity. 
I will provide examples of ID-idealisation below in this chapter.
Approximation 
Approximation is another kind of distortion often distinguished from ideali-
sation, though they are closely related. One might distinguish between 
numerical, algorithmic, conceptual, and empirical approximations.
Numerical approximations are straightforward: »Every case in which a 
quantitative property of an object in the system is substituted in the model by 
a property that has an approximately similar value is a case of approximation« 
(Contessa 2006, p. 374).
The discussion of the statistical tool ANOVA below will provide a detailed 
account of an algorithmic approximation, in which a simpler algorithmic struc-
ture is used instead of a more accurate, but also more complex, structure. 
The use of such approximations has been shown to cause significant 
problems in many cases.
With respect to conceptual approximations, one might think of the non-
expert’s use of more general categories as a form of approximation. An 
interesting study of this phenomena involves the comparison of folk-biological 
categories and classifications among tree-experts and the influence of these 
 Short for ‘interdisciplinary idealisation’.69
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differences on inductive reasoning (Medin et al. 1997). Differences in terms of 
fundamental conceptual structure are not automatically imported along with 
models or tools in interdisciplinary integration. This may cause confusion and 
be a source for unintentional distortion. 
An example of what I refer to as empirical approximation is described in the 
following quotation by Deena Weisberg;
All brains are shaped and organized slightly differently, just like other parts of 
the body. My brain might be slightly smaller than yours, or my hippocampus 
located slightly more to the left. This means that a scan of my brain and a 
scan of your brain would not overlap exactly. But research studies require 
responses from multiple participants to ensure that the phenomenon under 
study is general, not subject-dependent. To solve the difficult problem of 
comparing the spatial structure of many brains when each of these 
structures is different, scientists have developed technical methods for 
standardizing each brain picture to fit a common template. This process 
ensures that all of the brains to be compared are of exactly the same shape 
and size, allowing the creation of a single measure of brain activation from 
brains with disparate shapes and sizes. (Weisberg 2008, p. 52)
Such approximations are certainly not always emphasised in publications of 
interdisciplinary results informed by neurobiology. When elements are trans-
ferred between approaches appreciation of all kinds of approximation is likely 
to be ID-idealised away.
Distortions of scale 
Specific challenges are involved in the construction of scaled models. An 
example of a scaled model could be a 30x30x12 centimetres model of a 
10x10x4 metres wooden cabin. Scaled models involve important (and to 
some extent unapparent) types of distortion. The diminished wooden cabin is 
necessarily distorted since not all properties of wood changes proportionally 
when they are upscaled or downscaled. The weight of a cylindrical beam is 
proportional to its volume, which is again proportional to the cube of its radius. 
But the strength of the beam de- and increases proportionally to the square of 
its radius, why, obviously, the mass to strength ratio will not de- and increase 
proportionally even through perfect geometrical up- and downscaling (Van 
Fraassen 2008, p. 49 f.).
This example is banal by the standards of contemporary engineering. 
Nevertheless, it is an example in which it is impossible to create a non-
distorted scale model. One cannot simultaneously retain the geometric pro-
portions and the mass to strength-ratio. Up- and downscaling along various 
other dimensions will often involve more or less apparent distortions. One 
must choose between different distortions, and appropriate choices based on 
the characteristics of a given model can only be made if the adequate insights 
are available. 
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Simpson’s distortions
As a further example let us look at a case of statistical distortion, which is, as I 
shall discuss below, especially relevant to analyses of contemporary psycho-
pathology. Simpson’s paradox is named after the statistician Edward H. 
Simpson who pointed out a quite counterintuitive aspect of associations be-
tween fractions and potential consequences of sub-division (Simpson 1951).
Let us assume the following scenario: A medical company wants to test the 
effect of a wonderful newly developed anti-depressant (with no side-effects, of 
course). The gold standard of such tests is the randomised double-blinded 
study: N number of participants are randomly divided into two groups receiv-
ing the new drug and a placebo respectively. In the following example (N = 
878) the data shows the (statistically significant) result that treatment (T) has 
a positive effect on recovery from the treated disorder (D):  70
If the population is partitioned by gender, however, we get the opposite result: 
T has a negative effect on recovery from D as well in the male part of the 
population as in the female part of the population (this effect is also statistic-
ally significant):
Put in different terms: The recovery rate is higher among those receiving the 
actual drug than among those receiving a placebo when N is considered in 
total. However, the recovery rate is higher among those receiving placebo 
when we look at N partitioned by gender. 
The important thing to notice, of course, is that you get different results 
depending on the level of generalisation at which you look for associations. 
The main issue is that this must be a case of distortion by means of numbers. 
It cannot be the case, remembering our one-causal-history-hypotheses, that 
the drug has a positive as well as a negative effect on the disorder. Several 
problems lurk here: 1) There will always be more ways of partitioning the data 
by adding additional variables which might turn things upside down once 
more. 2) How can you know which level of abstraction is the »true« one?
(Malinas & Bigelow 2012; Van Fraassen 2008, p. 48).
 The figures in this example is borrowed from (Malinas & Bigelow 2012).70
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R ~R rec.-rate
Treatment 369 340 (≈ 52%)
Placebo 152 176 (≈ 46%)
Male Female
R ¬R rec.-rate R ¬R rec.-rate
Treatment 48 152 (= 24%) 321 188 (≈ 63%)
Placebo 73 145 (≈ 33%) 79 31 (≈ 72%)
Quickly matters become even more frustrating if we start imagining poten-
tial, but perfectly plausible, partitions along less tangible dimensions than 
gender. For instance, current psychiatric diagnostics is created to be neutral 
towards aetiology and the operational methodology allows that patients re-
ceive the same diagnosis even though they only share symptomatology to a 
quite limited extent. Consequently it is more than plausible that patients with 
distinct aetiologies are grouped together at the level of diagnosis. This would 
constitute a »secret« partition very difficult to control. I will return to some 
complications resulting from this issue towards the end of this chapter.
The above example is hypothetical and stylised. It has been constructed 
specifically for the purpose of demonstrating that it is mathematically possible 
to get conflicting (yet statistically significant) results when a partitioned level is 
compared to the aggregate level. This might prompt the suspicion that there 
might be very strict conditions for this type of problem to occur, making it more 
of a theoretical conversation piece and less of a practical problem. This is not 
the case. In the words of Rogier Kievat and colleagues: »Simpson’s paradox 
is not a rare statistical curiosity, but a striking illustration of our inferential blind 
spots […]« (2013, p. 11). 
There are reasons to believe that people without specific statistical training 
find it difficult to understand the challenge of Simpson’s paradox. This seems 
to be the case even when subjects are explicitly prompted to focus on the 
central aspects. In (2003), Fiedler et al. studied exactly this issue and con-
cluded that »[…] there is little evidence for a mastery of Simpson’s paradox 
that goes beyond the most primitive level of undifferentiated guessing«. Even 
though other studies have reached more optimistic conclusions (e.g. 
Spellman et al. 2001), it is quite clear that most people have considerable dif-
ficulties with engaging in »sound trivariate reasoning« (i.e. analysing problems 
that involve the joint impact of two input variables on an output variable 
without committing the common fallacy of ignoring one of the input variables)
(Kievit et al. 2013). On this background, at the very least, it seems reasonable 
to claim that there are reasons for concern that non-expert users may not 
notice inbuilt distortions of statistical tools.
Distortion of variance 
This section will provide another example from statistics which shows that not 
only do certain arrangements of numbers contain tacit distortions, so do tech-
niques for handling numbers.
Statistics may be regarded as a class of tools, which are prime candidates 
for transferral between approaches. Numerous examples could be provided of 
statistical techniques originally developed for handling specific problems in a 
particular context, only later to spread out to be used across the disciplines. 
Think of correlation analysis, developed to measure the deviation of 
characteristics in offspring of farm animals, or factor analysis designed for use 
with Spearman’s two-factor theory of intelligence. Both of these are now used 
across the board with little regard to their original application.
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It is indeed a common assumption that statistical techniques are »neutral« 
and, thus, readily transferable between disciplines (Gigerenzer 2004). Statis-
tics may be used for deliberate manipulation, but the math itself is unbiased, 
many seem to think. I will argue to the contrary, that statistical techniques are 
clearcut examples of perspectival scientific tools. Indeed, they fit Giere’s 
characterisation of what it means to incorporate a perspective more or less 
perfectly. As Gerd Gigerenzer has stated: 
[…] factor analysis and multiple linear regression can only "see" the linear 
relationships in the world, and the correlation coefficient is like an observer 
that ignores differences in means and variances in the two variables 
correlated. Thus, these methods are strictly limited tools — they let us clearly 
see some aspects of the world, and are mute on others. (1997, p. 142 f.)
Considered in this way, statistical techniques process inputs in ways peculiar 
to their conceptual make up, ways that render these inputs similar or different 
not just according to features of the inputs themselves, but also according to 
features of the statistical technique in question, to paraphrase Giere once 
more. Statistical tools are perspectival, in other words.
As one example in prevalent use, ANOVA, short for Analysis Of Variance, is 
a statistical technique originally developed by Sir Ronald A. Fisher.  ANOVA 71
was first developed and used to examine the manurial response of twelve 
different potato varieties (Fisher & Mackenzie 1923). From studies of manure, 
the use of ANOVA spread out through biology and the social sciences to 
become especially popular in psychology. A survey of the use of statistical 
techniques in journals published by the American Psychological Association 
showed that the ANOVA was used in as much as 71 percent of the papers by 
1972 (Edgington 1974, p. 25; Haase & Ellis 1987).
Very briefly, the ANOVA is a tool for distinguishing the relative contribution 
of the variance of a number of causal factors to the variance of some pheno-
type. The ANOVA can thus (apparently) illuminate, for instance, »what propor-
tion of the deviation of height from the population mean can be ascribed to 
deviation of environment from the average environment and how much to the 
deviation of this genetic value from the mean genetic value« (Lewontin 2006, 
p. 521).
One basic and central question in analyses of causation involving several 
contributing causes is, of course, how the involved variables combine to 
produce the phenotype. In common use of ANOVA when studying humans 
this question is sidestepped, however. Due to methodological shortcomings, it 
is widely assumed that additivity  captures (most of) the nature of causal 72
 Fisher is an interesting example since he himself drew heavily on statistical 71
thermodynamics in developing his contributions to genetics (Depew & Weber 1995; Griffiths & 
Stoltz 2013, p. 2)
 Additivity means that the variance of the phenotype can be calculated simply by adding up 72
the variance of environment and the variance of the genotype. (Griffiths & Stoltz 2013, p. 183)
 139
combination. One of the attractions of additivity is that it allows the calculation 
of hereditary coefficients (equal to the variance of heredity divided by the 
variance of the phenotype). The hereditary coefficient is the figure presented 
in familiar claims such as »IQ has a 60 percent heritability«, as asserted by 
the authors of the infamous The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray 1994; Kievit 
et al. 2013, p. 5).73
If the relation is indeed additive one should be able to predict the effect of a 
genetic difference without knowing the environment of the organism in 
question. If, however, environment and gene interact in ways so that the 
environment affects gene behaviour (or vice versa) the case gets much more 
complicated (Griffiths & Stoltz 2013, p. 184).
Think of a gene which, if the individual is exposed to a sufficient amount of 
Irish folk tunes during the first years of upbringing, is expressed as a particular 
annoying habit of always humming and tapping the table when contemplating. 
If two individuals are raised in environments below that critical level, there will 
be no phenotypic difference between them, even though one of them carries 
the gene. If, on the other hand, they are brought up by barn dance enthusi-
asts, one will show the effect.74
It is, thus, by no means evident that simple additivity is the right way to con-
strue causal combinations regarding heredity. For that matter, it is far from 
evident that there is one universal right way to construe causal combinations 
in cases of heredity.
In order to get a firm grip on the contributions of genotype and environment 
respectively as well as potential interactions between them, it is most often 
required to be able to manipulate both factors in experimentally controlled 
settings. When one cannot study one’s phenomenon of interest in controlled 
settings, one must rely on observation. But when relying on observation, it is 
much more difficult to detect interaction. Since manipulation of nature and 
nurture is not normally accepted in studies of human,  some statistical ingen-75
uity is required when studying human behaviour, for instance.
The standard approach is to set up a null hypothesis which is basically the 
assumption that no relevant statistically significant variation can be detected 
 Since what is truly interesting is the contribution of genes and environment respectively, 73
there is a tendency to forget that the deviation of some value from the mean is not the same 
as the contribution of the value. The hereditary coefficient would increase in a more uniform 
environment due to more of the phenotypic variance being ascribed to the genetic variance. If 
people, on the other hand, were more genetically similar, the hereditary coefficient would 
decrease due to less genetic difference to correlate with phenotypic differences. This, 
however, tells us little about the actual genetic contribution. For instance, increasing equality 
in terms of access to education increases the heritability of IQ (Griffiths & Stoltz 2013, p. 185).
 The nasty habit will, of course, slowly but surely interact with the gene carrier’s 74
environment, which will turn increasingly hostile towards him.
 In studies of human behaviour, ethical considerations prevents otherwise respectable 75
methods such as experimental control of mating patterns as well as radical manipulation of 
nurture.
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in the data. Rejecting the null hypothesis would provide indirect support for an 
alternative hypothesis: that there is indeed indications of some (more or less) 
specified interaction in the data. In case of failure to reject the null hypothesis, 
however, one might conclude the absence of interaction and proceed to focus 
on the main effect. One may certainly question the use of null hypotheses in 
the first place, but that is not necessary for the point I wish to make in the 
following.
When dealing with null hypothesis, there are a number of standard errors 
to avoid. A type I error is to reject a null hypothesis when it is true. The 
significance level (α) is equivalent to what one considers to be the acceptable 
probability of committing a type I error. Another mistake is to accept the null 
hypothesis when it is false. This is a type II error, the probability of which is 
called ß.
The weight of a statistically significant result depends on the statistical 
power of the test carried out. Statistical power is the probability of rejecting the 
null hypothesis when it is false (power thus equals 1–ß). Put differently, 
statistical power is the probability of obtaining a statistically significant result.
Calculating statistical power is quite complex, and the calculations are not 
neatly written out. For the present discussion, however, it is sufficient to know 
that power depends on the significance level (α), the size of ones sample (N), 
and the population effect size (ES). The lower the α, and the higher the N and 
the ES, the higher the statistical power. One frequent use of power analysis, 
then, is in the determination of the N required to attain significant results given 
a hypothesised ES.
Unfortunately, when calculating statistical power in relation to using 
ANOVA, it is often overlooked that the power of interactions is magnitudes 
smaller than the power of main effects—since the ES of interactions are much 
smaller than the ES of main effects. The consequence is that power is often 
calculated solely on the basis of main effects, which leads to tests of inter-
action being significantly underpowered. This means not only that one cannot 
conclude that there is no interaction simply because one’s test hereof does 
not show significant results to the contrary. Another consequence is, and this 
is much worse, that we have little reason to trust the results of studies of here-
dity relying on the ANOVA. Indeed, when interaction is evaluated in studies of 
human characteristics (such as IQ) usually no interaction is found. But labora-
tory studies based on controlled experimental settings consistently produce 
convincing evidence of various kinds of interesting interactions between 
nature and nurture (Wahlsten 1990, p. 112). There are few if any reasons to 
assume that interactions between genes and environment are less likely in 
humans than in, say, potatoes or rats.
The mistake is, thus, to assume that power is the same for main effect and 
interaction. Power is calculated on the basis of hypothesised main effect. But 
even in cases where power is .99 for the main effect, it can easily be as low 
as .40 for interaction. This means that there is a high risk of committing type II 
error, even though the risk appears to be negligible. In other words, there is a 
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high risk of not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is indeed false. (Wahlsten 
1990, p. 116)
Since the likelihood of detecting interactions is low, interactions are rarely 
found. This has lead to the (wrong) conclusion that a »no interaction-
approach« is reasonable.
The use of null hypotheses to detect interaction is certainly a clever 
construction. And the ambition of detecting interaction is praiseworthy. But 
dealing with such advanced tools requires careful conduct. Otherwise one 
risks using tools in ways for which they are not suited. In the paper in which 
he originally presented the concept of “variance”, Fisher did explicitly warn 
that »loose phrases about the "percentage of causation" which obscure the 
essential distinction between the individual and population should be carefully 
avoided« (Fisher 1918, p. 399 f.).
At times, the motivations behind the use of sloppy power tests is question-
ed:
Transformation solely to eliminate interaction is a device to create the 
appearance of simplicity in the data, and there is a danger that this will be an 
entirely false appearance. For those who wish to learn how development 
actually works, wholesale and ad hoc testing of various transformations for 
the express purpose of getting rid of H X E interaction is counterproductive, 
because the shape of a functional relationship between variables provides a 
valuable clue to their causal connections. On the other hand, those whose 
only goal is to parcel out the variance among separate causes can proceed 
only in the absence of H X E interaction and therefore they may be more 
willing to transform the scale of measurement, even if causal relations 
become distorted. (Wahlsten 1990, p. 118)
Regardless of whether the use of ANOVA is at times deliberately fraudulent, 
inadequate administrations of power analysis in ANOVA tests have lead 
prominent statisticians to state things like »[…] most of the literature on herita-
bility in species that cannot be experimentally manipulated, for example, in 
mating, should be ignored« (Kempthorne 1990, p. 139), and: »The simple 
analysis of variance […] has no use at all. In view of the terrible mischief that 
has been done by confusing the spatiotemporally local analysis of variance 
with the global analysis of causes, I suggest that we stop the endless search 
for better methods of estimating useless quantities. There are plenty of real 
problems« (Lewontin 2006, p. 525).
The relevance of this example is multifaceted. 
First, the example shows that data treated by means of ANOVA are 
distorted in the sense that they appear to be additive even when they are not. 
This challenge is made worse by the problem that standard methods for 
detecting interaction fail to do so in most cases.
Second, it is an example of a tool developed for a specific purpose which is 
subsequently imported into different contexts in which conditions are signifi-
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cantly different (e.g. in terms of the possibility of manipulation) and the poten-
tial to attain useful results is considerably lower.
Third, since power analysis is a later development than ANOVA itself, we 
also have an example showing the problem that importing a tool at a given 
point in time does not include »automatic updating« (as discussed in chapter 
2 above). Though developed in the early 1960s, power analysis did not be-
come a topic in its own right in statistics textbooks until around 1990 (Cohen 
1992, p. 100). But psychologists learn their statistics mainly from psychology 
textbooks in which discussions of power remain rare even today (Gigerenzer 
2004). Consequently, psychology students will only learn the proper careful 
conduct if they study beyond their curricula.
Fourth, the example shows that tools are idealised to some extent before 
being applied in the new context. In this case, ANOVA is stripped of the 
demand of the possibility of experimentally manipulating the input parameters. 
ID-idealisation removing requirements and background assumptions means 
that insufficient attention is payed to important qualifications when the ID-
idealised element is put to use in a new context.
The point I am trying to make is not that statistics is an evil. Statistical tools 
are certainly useful in the appropriate circumstances. The point is that tools 
are perspectival in the sense of emphasising certain aspects and only being 
able to »see« certain kinds of relations. In the case of ANOVA as used in stu-
dies of human heredity, all causal connections are represented as additive, 
when additivity is probably rarely how causal factors combine.
Representing some connection as additive is perspectival in itself. And per-
spectives turns into distortions whenever they do not fit their targeted pheno-
mena perfectly and whenever they leave out relevant aspects. To repeat: 
statistical techniques process inputs in ways peculiar to their conceptual make 
up, ways that render these inputs similar or different not just according to 
features of the inputs themselves, but also according to features of the 
statistical technique in question.
This, I believe, can be generalised as conceptual tools process inputs in 
ways peculiar to their conceptual make up, ways that render these inputs 
similar or different not just according to features of the inputs themselves, but 
also according to features of the conceptual tool in question. Conceptual tools 
are perspectival, in other words.
In the next section, I will present an account of an example of the trans-
ferral of a non-mathematical tool from one context to another. The discussion 
involved is somewhat wordy, but the benefit is that we end up with corro-
boration for the generalisation stated just above.
The case of operational definition
To further illustrate the concerns related to the transfer of tools from one 
context to another, I will discuss in some detail the introduction of operational 
definitions in the official diagnostic manuals of psychiatry since the DSM-III 
and the ICD-8 (Berrios & Porter 1995; Sato & Berrios 2001). The import of 
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operational definition into psychopathology could be considered a prototypical 
example of a conceptual tool imported into a not very closely related science. 
This example is especially good, I believe, partly since it is relevant to my 
case study below, and partly because it is quite explicit what is going on.
Operational definition is a clear example of what I call a propositional 
algorithm. You input some data into the algorithm, go through a series of 
specified steps, and get an output which might be processed further through 
other tool or fit into some representational vehicle. Further, the example of 
operational definitions in psychopathology makes very clear one of the 
dangers involved in importing propositional algorithms from quite distant 
approaches. Somehow, even though they were warned by Carl Hempel, the 
psychopathologists developing the DSM-III and subsequent versions failed to 
take into account the nature of inputs suitable for the algorithm. 
Definitions are conceptual tools used for making clear what one is referring 
to in a given context—whether or not some phenomenon belongs to a cate-
gory of interest. Definitions will, as a consequence, often play a significant role 
in representational activities. There are various types of definition, which are 
used more or less explicitly in different scientific settings (e.g. operational defi-
nitions, stipulative definitions, explicative definitions, and lexical definitions). 
As discussed in chapter 1, in some scientific contexts you might not need defi-
nitions at all, in other contexts they are crucial. I suggest that we think of 
definitions as essentially algorithmic structures, i.e. as sets of rules to be 
followed in conceptual procedures.
In the following discussion of operational definitions it is crucial to keep in 
mind that what I am referring to by ‘propositional algorithm’ is the algorithmic 
structure of a type of definition. I argue that this specific type of definition is ill-
suited to perform the task it is used for in psychopathology. Notice also that 
operational definition considered as a propositional algorithm in itself does not 
serve to represent anything. It is a tool deliberately constructed to point out 
which phenomena to include in a category once a token of operational defini-
tion has been specified. But what has been transferred into psychopathology 
is the type of definition, not specified tokens of operational definitions once 
used elsewhere.
“Operational definition” is a notion developed by the physicist and 1946 
Nobel laureate Percy W. Bridgman who introduced the idea in his book The 
Logic of Modern Physics (1927). Bridgman was motivated in part by the 
general commotion caused by the theories of relativity, as well as by specific 
challenges he faced as part of his work within high-pressure physics. One 
challenge was how to measure pressure when one’s measuring devices 
break as a direct result of the high pressures achieved. The central, and radi-
cal, thought Bridgman put forward was that any meaningful (theoretical) con-
cept should be defined by a set of operations. The outcome of carrying out 
this set of operations would decide whether the concept applied in the specific 
situation or not. Bridgman believed (at first) that this was a fruitful method for 
replacing vague and intangible concepts.
Bridgman’s formulation of the principle was the following:
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In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; 
the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations. 
(Bridgman 1927, p. 5, italics in the original).
This is a quite peculiar and radical formulation, of course, and it has wide-
ranging implications. The key to grasping this peculiar claim is to focus on 
symmetry. If the concept applies in a given situation, carrying out the set of 
operations would lead to a specific result. Vice versa, if the operations lead to 
a specific result in a given situation, the concept applies.
The algorithmic structure of operational definitions might be spelled out as 
such:
Operational definition: Stipulate a list of operations {O1, …, On} as 
inclusion criteria for the category X and specify a (set of) result(s) {R} 
which carrying out {O1, …, On} may or may not lead to. Include any 
object in X if carrying out {O1, …, On} on it, leads to (an instance of) 
{R}. {O1, …, On} and their specified relations to {R} constitutes the 
operational definition of X.
One can compare this with the algorithmic structure of other types of 
definitions:
Lexical definition: Carefully select a set of criteria {C1, …, Cn} that 
approximates as closely as possible what is common to all the entities 
normally included in the category referred to by Y in everyday 
language L. Use {C1, …, Cn} to make distinctions between what is and 
what is not correctly referred to by Y in L. {C1, …, Cn} constitutes the 
lexical definition of Y.
or
Stipulative definition: Decide on criteria {C1*, …, Cn*} for 
membership of a given category Z (without worrying too much about 
how the term is usually used). Use {C1*, …, Cn*} to make distinctions 
between what is and what is not correctly included in Z. {C1*, …, Cn*} 
constitutes the stipulative definition of Z.
These types of definition are all useful, though in different circumstances. 
Lexical definitions, for instance, are only useful for defining terms that are 
already in (more or less common) use, whereas stipulative definitions can be 
used to define new terms (or redefine old ones). Operational definitions are 
certainly useful in some contexts. But when put to use in other contexts, ope-
rational definitions can have some rather regrettable consequences.
Similarly, one might spell out algorithms for different ways of observing, 
doing experiments, modelling data, analysing, manipulating statistics, concep-
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tualising, constructing models, and so on and so forth. As mentioned above, 
some of the involved steps may involve skills, e.g. for constructing and using 
technological equipment in physics (Collins 1985; Galison 1997). Similar argu-
ments can be made for other sciences, for instance in psychopathological 
research skills regarding establishing rapport with patients (or persuading 
them to participate at all) are extremely important parts of establishing targets 
for representation in the first place. But even though there might be some 
parts of such processes which are skill-like in a non-propositional way and 
therefore cannot be easily spelled out or communicated in writing, a very large 
and significant part can (with some effort) be elucidated, I believe. If this were 
not the case, the efforts put in to publication of scientific results would be in 
vain in quite a number of cases.
Now, Bridgman did not develop operational definition from scratch. Actually 
Bridgman’s achievement was more or less to generalise some fundamental 
ideas from Einstein’s work on the special theory of relativity. Einstein’s redefi-
nitions of “length” and “time” are perhaps the most well known examples 
which could be considered instances of operational definition. Indeed, 
Bridgman drew to a very large extent on Einstein in his book from 1927.
Operational definition makes its way into psychopathology 
As a response to a series of unpleasant challenges (e.g. Cooper et al. 1972; 
Rosenhan 1973) combined with a wish to rid psychiatry of the heavy influence 
from Freudian psychoanalysis, The American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
chose to base their diagnostic systems on operational definitions in the 1970s 
onwards. Importantly, the operational definitions should be based on »theory-
free« concepts cleansed of etiological assumptions. Operational definitions 
were chosen in spite of the fact that this notion had been heavily criticised 
throughout its existence and incorporates a number of significant weak-
nesses, which were widely recognised long before operational definitions 
made their way into psychiatry (Bridgman 1945; 1954; Hempel 1954; 1959; 
Skinner 1945; Van Fraassen 2008, p. 144).
The introduction of operational definitions in psychopathology is usually 
traced back to a paper presented by Carl Hempel at a 1959 WHO-conference 
on psychiatric nosology (Hempel 1959). In this paper, Hempel explicitly 
recommends the use of operational definition as a possible way of moving 
psychopathology towards scientific maturity. But Hempel's recommendation 
included some significant alterations compared to the way operational 
definition was used in physics.
First, Hempel stated that if operational definitions were to do any good in 
psychopathology, one would have to allow mere observations (as compared 
to measurements and experiments) to count as operations. Second, and very 
importantly, he shifted the conceptual level at which operational definitions 
were to be put to use. Einstein, and to a large extent Bridgman, used 
operational definition to define or redefine very basic, fundamental concepts 
by means of quite simple operations. Hempel, on the other hand, suggested 
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defining diagnoses operationally. Diagnoses are concepts of a very different 
and less fundamental nature than, say, “time” or “length”. I will return to the 
consequences of this shift below.
Expressed in universal terms as it is, Bridgman’s statement is quite absurd. 
We do not need operational definitions for terms like ‘hot dog’ or ‘Lars Løkke 
Rasmussen’ in order for these to be meaningful. There are, however, very 
good reasons to think that Bridgman did not intend this as a general semantic 
theory, partly because later on he explicitly denied having had such intensions 
(Bridgman 1954). It is probably the case, that Bridgman operated with an im-
plicit quantifier domain restriction. That is, by »any concept« he might have 
meant something like »all sufficiently important and fundamental concepts in 
physics«.
Speculative interpretations aside, Bridgman’s use of the universal quantifier 
nevertheless impressed Hempel to the extent that he felt he had to warn 
against a potentially threatening regress: that the terms used to define some-
thing operationally themselves required operational definition and so on 
(perhaps ad infinitum).
In his 1959 paper, Hempel pointed explicitly to the problem of the regress. 
But Hempel also pointed out a potential solution of basing operational defini-
tions on a foundation of concepts, which require no further definition. Hempel 
perspicuously emphasised that not all concepts will serve equally well as the 
regress-stopping »certain« foundation on which operational definitions may be 
based. Hempel wrote:
In any definitional context (quite independently of the issue of operationism), 
some terms must be taken to be antecedently understood; and the objectivity 
of science demands that the terms which thus serve as a basis for the 
introduction of other scientific terms be used with a high degree of uniformity 
by different investigators in the field. (Hempel 1959, p. 11)
So far, so good. Hempel is right in diagnosing the problem of the regress 
(obviously), and also right in prescribing a treatment of ultimately basing ones 
definitions on concepts which might be defined in non-operational manners. 
But, as we shall see below, that terms are used with a high degree of uni-
formity do not guarantee their capacities as the basis for distinguishing accu-
rately between complex phenomena.
Psychiatrist Erwin Stengel arranged the 1959 conference and summarised 
the results in a rapport the same year. His conclusions were very true to 
Hempel’s suggestions. But with this report he provided a crucial link by which 
operational definition could enter further into psychopathology.
Another psychiatrist, Sir Aubrey Lewis who also attended the 1959 
conference, was subsequently involved in a WHO programme on psychiatric 
epidemiology. During this work he proposed a dual system where global cross 
cultural issues were dealt with by means of an operationalised a-theoretical 
part based on non-specialist terms for ease of use, while research were to be 
carried out using a theory-based version.
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WHO and APA followed Lewis’ recommendations, but discarded the 
research-version. They opted for a single system incorporating operationally 
defined diagnoses based on observational/descriptive theory-neutral layman 
terms. This system is, well, operational today (Fulford & Sartorius 2009).
Obviously, even though a few additional steps is added to the story as it is 
normally told, a lot of detail is still omitted. Nevertheless, an interesting picture 
emerges if we look closer at how the use of the operational definition algo-
rithm changed at each of these steps.
Let me, therefore, try to sum this up. I claim that the operational definition 
algorithm is virtually unchanged from its origin in physics to its contemporary 
use in psychopathology. In the discussion above we have traced operational 
definitions back to Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity. Now, Einstein’s use 
of operationalisation was completely legit and healthy in every sense. So if the 
algorithm is itself well-shaped, what else is out of order and can account for 
the claim that operational definition is dysfunctional in psychopathological 
diagnostics?
A closer look at how the use of operational definitions has changed will be 
revealing.
First we have Einstein with the fruitful assumption that we might gain 
something by operationally redefining certain central terms.
Bridgman then made the sweeping (unintentional) generalisation that all 
terms must be operationally defined in order to be meaningful. 
As an antidote, Hempel recommended basing operational definitions on 
antecedently understood terms which are used with a high degree of 
uniformity among »investigators in the field«. As mentioned, acknowledging 
the limited possibilities for direct measurements and experiments in 
psychopathology, Hempel added the point about allowing observations to 
count as input into operational definitions in the context of psychopathology.
Sir Aubrey Lewis added the idea of basing operational definitions on non-
specialist theory neutral concepts for general statistical purposes, with 
another etiologically informed version for research purposes. The theory-
neutral half was eventually chosen as the exclusive basis for ICD-8 and DSM 
III as well as the subsequent editions of psychiatric diagnostic manuals.
If we compare the first and the last steps in this development it is evident 
that the use of operational definition is significantly different in contemporary 
psychopathology compared to its original context. There is, of course, no 
reason to assume that a specific way of using a tool is the best one, simply 
because it was first. But in this case there can be little doubt that the theories 
of relativity are superior to DSM 5 (to phrase it in a somewhat popular way).
In the original version, the algorithm is fed simple, publicly observable 
actions and measurements in order to define primitive, fundamental concepts. 
In psychopathology the algorithm is fed vague, non-specialist layman terms 
denoting subjective observation in order to define complex and poorly under-
stood symptom clusters.
In his (1959) paper, Carl Hempel used the following example to illustrate 
the nature of operational definitions:
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A simple operational definition of the term harder than as used in mineralogy 
might specify that a piece of mineral x is to be called harder than another 
piece of mineral y, if the operation of drawing a sharp point of x under 
pressure across a smooth surface of y has as its outcome a scratch on y, 
whereas y does not thus scratch x. (p. 8)
This is a very nice example, since it exemplifies the advantages as well as the 
limitations of operational definitions. In mineralogy this method for deciding 
which of two minerals is the hardest has proven its worth long ago. Indeed, 
the method dates back at least to year 300 BC where Theophrastus (who 
succeeded Aristotle as head of the academy in Athens) mentioned the method 
in his treatise On Stones. Reputedly, this method works quite well for identi-
fying minerals in the field even today.
Notice, however, how the recipe for deciding which of two minerals are the 
hardest presuppose that we already know (or at least agree) that the two ob-
jects compared are both instances of the category of minerals. Notice also 
that the method for determining which of the two objects is the hardest relies 
heavily on the result of an experiment, which is directly publicly observable by 
anyone with a well functioning sense-apparatus.
None of these characteristics apply to psychopathology. For instance, in 
spite of occasional disagreement over taxonomic issues in mineralogy (Nickel 
1995; Nickel 1996), there are no anti-mineralogy-movements and no deniers 
of the existence of minerals as such. Further, the operational definitions in 
psychopathology are not just supposed to determine which of a number of 
possible disorders a person suffers from, but also whether he or she suffers 
from anything at all.
Now, compared to the hardness of minerals, mental disorders or patho-
logies are much more complex phenomena tangled up in innumerable 
interacting causal processes. This is no reason to believe that, literally or 
metaphorically, drawing a sharp point of one psychiatric patient under 
pressure across a smooth surface of another psychiatric patient would provide 
us with any interesting information about their respective pathologies.
Stupidities aside, Hempel’s example quite clearly shows the utility of opera-
tionalisation in one specific setting. Ironically, the example also demonstrates 
why operational definition cannot be expected to be useful for the solving of 
psychopathological taxonomic difficulties. It ought not be necessary to make 
silly jokes in order to make plain the limits of Hempel’s analogy in relation to 
psychopathology.
Current problems facing operational definition in psychopathology 
If a set of operations defines a concept, then carrying out the set of operations 
and registering the result will tell us whether the concept applies or not. On 
the one hand, this corresponds neatly to filling out an ADHD-questionary and 
deciding on a diagnosis from looking at the pencil marks on the paper. The 
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central propositional algorithm of Operational Definition is intact in its contem-
porary use in psychiatry.
On the other hand, of course, there does seem to be somewhat of a ten-
sion here. People tend to construe being diagnosed with ADHD as something 
more than this. You rarely hear anybody say »I have ADHD. ADHD is defined 
as a quite heterogeneous class of combinations of answers to a certain ques-
tionnaire«. This is the consequence of operational definition being a very arti-
ficial type of definition, quite far from how the human conceptual system natur-
ally operates. It does not mean that it is useless in scientific settings, of 
course.
But any algorithm is heavily dependent on the inputs it is fed. In contempo-
rary diagnostics the inputs into the operational definition algorithm consist to a 
very large extent of everyday concepts such as “nervous”, “indecisive”, and 
“inattentive”. The reasoning behind the choice of lay terminology is based on 
the assumption that since everyday concepts are concepts we are all 
intimately familiar with, they can be expected to be applied stably by all sub-
jects. Everybody knows what it means to be nervous. This is a grave mistake
—a mistake which can be traced directly back to Hempel’s recommendation 
of »antecedently understood terms that are used with a high degree of 
uniformity among investigators in the field«. In contemporary psychopathology 
the »investigators in the field« include the parents, teachers, relatives, and so 
on, who are asked to fill out the questionaries which are the central tools in 
parts of contemporary diagnostics. These people are indeed, with all respect, 
genuine laymen. And the terminology that is used with a high degree of uni-
formity in this group of people is, of course, lay terminology.
Lay expressions such as ‘often interrupts’ or ‘often forgetful’ or ‘often fails to 
give close attention to details’ covers very wide sets of phenomena. Some of 
the phenomena included are completely healthy, others are indeed more or 
less pathological. There is a huge difference between the reliability, stability, 
and conceptual coordination of basic measurements of contemporary physics 
and the concepts that serve as the inputs into the operational definitions in 
psychopathology. Remember, it is not the case, that input terms in psycho-
pathology are used in special »specialist’s senses« which simply recycle lay 
terminology. Indeed, as just mentioned, it is to a large extent genuine laymen 
who carry out diagnostics in contemporary psychiatry by assessing various 
difficulties via multiple-choice tests.
Even though the algorithm of operational definition is a useful idea in the 
right contexts, it is no more reliable than the inputs it is fed. And there is no 
feature in the algorithm for distinguishing between manifestations of patho-
logical issues and perfectly healthy and normal responses to challenges of 
everyday life.
Final remarks on OD? 
This, then, has been a story about transferring a conceptual tool, operational 
definition, from one scientific context to another. The central motivation for this 
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account, of course, is that it substantiates the claim that conceptual tools are 
perspectival. The perspective of operational definitions is well suited to define 
or redefine central basic concepts when fed accurate and reliable inputs. On 
the other hand, it is not suited for defining complex concepts by being fed 
vague and indeterminate inputs.
Part of the explanation for the operational degeneration described is 
probably a lack of sensitivity to the special requirements of the different 
contexts in which operational definition is put to work. Though the central 
algorithm remains unchanged through the process, the inputs fed into the 
algorithm are of very different kinds in the different contexts. Further, the 
conceptual level at which the algorithm is applied is also very different from 
the original use. Indeed, Hempel knew very little about psychiatry, as he 
explicitly stated in his nosology paper. The people eventually responsible for 
deciding on putting operational definition to work in ICD 8 & DSM III have 
probably not been aware of the important differences between defining funda-
mental, primitive concepts by means of operational definition, and defining 
higher level complex concepts by the same method.
It is my claim, that the present use of operational definitions in psycho-
pathology bears a significant part of the responsibility for the conceptual 
inaccuracy which plagues contemporary psychiatry and psychopathology. And 
even though this is not an exhaustive explanation for the dramatic increase in 
diagnoses such as depression and ADHD, the use of operational definitions 
based on lay terminology to define complex concepts certainly facilitates 
diagnostic explosions due to its inherent over-inclusive nature (Haslam 2013; 
Parnas & Bovet 2014; Sato & Berrios 2001).
The above should give an impression of what I refer to by ‘propositional 
algorithm’. Propositional algorithms constitute one of the types of element I 
claim make up the intermediate layer of scientific representation. By analogy, 
one might think of the involved elements as having specific functions like the 
different parts of a car engine. There are different types of car engines that 
require different types of parts to perform their overall function, i.e. to convert 
energy into motion. Some of these parts are interchangeable, while others are 
important in one type of engine and superfluous in others (e.g. spark-plugs 
without which a gasoline engine will not work, but which serve no purpose in a 
diesel engine). Similarly, some elements might be indispensible in some 
scientific approaches, but superfluous in others; transferable between some 
scientific approaches, but not between others.
As mentioned above, it is hard to see principled limitations as to which 
kinds of elements might be transferred and from where to where. Insight a 
and insight b tells us that we cannot easily conclude how well elements will 
perform in new contexts. We need to determine in detail how elements are 
used, which purposes they serve, and how they are combined. Determining 
this, will bring one significantly closer to being able to assess how wellformed 
a given interdisciplinary approach is.
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Simpson’s revisited
My discussion of operational definitions has been quite lengthy. But I am not 
letting the patient reader off the hook just yet. Before letting the topic of 
operational definition rest, I want to draw out a further consequence related to 
concealed distortions which may, in some cases, be a consequence of the 
transferral of theoretical elements. This consequence of using operational 
definitions in psychiatry is relevant to the discussions of Simpson’s paradox 
and ANOVA above.
As is well known, there is quite a bit of public debate regarding whether to 
medicate people diagnosed with mental illnesses. The opposition to medica-
tion in psychiatry is represented most saliently by anti-psychiatrists such as 
Thomas Szasz (Szasz 1960; Szasz 1961), who is infamous for outright deny-
ing that mental illnesses are real phenomena. But people with significantly 
less radical convictions also raise doubts about whether to medicate, for in-
stance, people diagnosed with depression or ADHD.
In Denmark, Peter Gøtzsche recently released a controversial book (2015) 
in which he concludes that there is no evidence that medication prescribed for 
depression has any beneficial effects for the patients. He bases his conclu-
sions on a metastudy of a large number of published and unpublished studies 
of double-blinded trials of the effects of antidepressants.
In a double-blinded study neither the participants nor the researchers 
studying them are supposed to know who gets the placebo and who gets the 
active ingredients. But as it turns out, the active ingredients of antidepressants 
has a number of easily recognisable side-effects, which in many cases make 
it easy for the researcher to figure out which kind of pill a participant has re-
ceived. 
Gøtzsche claims, that once corrected for biases of such pseudo-double-
blinded approaches, the positive effects of anti-depressants vanishes com-
pletely. All that remains are the negative side-effects. As a consequence, 
Gøtzsche concludes, all treatments with antidepressants should be stopped.
Interestingly, however, since diagnostics are based on operational defini-
tions which are (1) based on very broad input concepts, and (2) deliberately 
cut off from aetiology, we end up in a situation where Gøtzsche’s conclusion 
cannot be drawn conclusively. And what is worse, the operational non-
etiological approach prevents us from concluding anything.
As a consequence of (1), it is a quite heterogenous group of people who is 
diagnosed as suffering from depression. As a consequence of (2), it is un-
reasonably difficult to figure out to what extent the causal pathways leading 
the diagnosed patients to being diagnosed are similar. The only formally 
accepted method for deciding whether to include someone in a sample of 
people suffering from depression is the official operationalised taxonomic sys-
tems. 
Discussions of differences in aetiology are rarely included in studies of the 
effects of anti-depressants. Rather, »major depressive disorder« is considered 
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more or less as a natural kind for which we are searching for the one effective 
treatment.
It is thus misleading to say that depression may manifest itself in various 
ways. Far more correct would to be it to state that a large number of divergent 
phenomena may lead someone to being diagnosed with major depressive 
disorder and we do not know the extent to which these expressions of distress 
are related at the causal level. Therefore we do not know, either, to what 
extent some medication might have different effects depending on distinct 
aetiology. In other words, while we have means to decide which of a group of 
applicants are men and which are women, the contemporary taxonomic 
system provides no means to decide whether a cohort of people diagnosed 
with major depressive disorder do so as an effect of cause A, B, or C, and so 
on.
Say, for the sake of simplicity (although we have little reason to assume 
that reality is this simple), that there are two distinct causal pathways, CPa 
and CPb, which both lead to a diagnosis of major depressive disorder. Since 
we do not distinguish between CPa and CPb in clinical trials of anti-
depressants, it might be the case that the drug has a beneficial effect on CPa-
patients and a negative on CPb-patients which would add up to the absence 
of positive effects that Gøtzsche reports. But, and this a substantial compli-
cation, as we have learned from the discussion of Simpson’s paradox above, 
it is even possible to have a positive effect in both sub-groups while seeing 
negative effect (or no effect) in the aggregated group.
Due to the nature of psychiatric diagnostics, then, we cannot decide 
whether Gøtzsche’s conclusions are correct. There is little doubt that he 
points out important and severe difficulties inherent to psychiatric research. 
But his conclusions regarding the effects of anti-depressants may be wrong 
due to tacit diagnostic distortions, and we can only escape this predicament if 
we reconstruct the entire psychopathological systems in more exact and, 
importantly, aetiology based terms—and, of course, do all the studies all over 
again. One might wonder whether difficulties like these contribute to the 
current replication crisis of the pharmaceutical industry (Begley & Ellis 2012; 
Osherovich 2011; Prinz et al. 2011).
Summing up
Since all acts of representation involve (more or less unapparent) distortions, 
one could provide innumerable further examples. For now, let the above 
suffice to show that for the non-expert it is sometimes far from evident which 
unapparent distortions are imported along with perfectly proportional surface 
transformations. 
That some salient surface characteristics, like geometric proportions, are 
invariant through a given representational transformation might divert atten-
tion from that less apparent properties, like strength, are changed through the 
process. As another example: the surface characteristic that the same 
statistical technique is used to analyse two different data sets may divert 
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attention from the fact that the possibility of experimental manipulation makes 
a significant difference regarding what can be concluded about causal con-
nections in the two cases.
When we add to this that interdisciplinarity most often involves dealing with 
theoretical elements from outside one’s central field of expertise, we may 
safely assume that the appropriate insights are not always available. This is 
equally problematic for the person pushing her expertise onto a field different 
from her home discipline, as for the person importing theory of which she has 
only limited understanding.
One might also imagine that there are degrees of problems with transfer-
ability. It is probably much more challenging to transfer propositional structure 
from quantum mechanics to musicology than from say, physics to biology or 
from biology to economics. Due to the larger distance between the parent 
approaches, much more of the tacit knowledge of quantum mechanics is likely 
to be lost in the process. This is likely to result in the use of superficially 
understood theoretical elements.
There are, thus, very good reasons for increasing the focus on represen-
tation, and the issue of distortion, in connection with analyses of interdisciplin-
arity: In the combination of two or more approaches, all aspects of the invol-
ved acts of representation are in play. This includes idealisations, approxi-
mations, distortions, vehicles, tools, algorithms, and basic assumptions. One 
cannot simply identify and replace distorted elements of one approach with 
»undistorted« elements of another. Further, two combined distortions cannot 
be assumed to level each other out. Presumably some sort of interference will 
occur between the (distortions of the) combined elements when approaches 
are integrated. Whether this will result in more or less valid, robust or relevant-
ly purpose-serving approaches must be evaluated through careful analysis on 
a case-by-case basis. A good place to start such a case-by-case analyses 
would be by identifying the vehicles and intermediate elements of the integrat-
ed approach, and figuring out how they are used.
Approach based analysis thus identifies a number of aspects to focus on in 
analysis of interdisciplinary activities. This brings us considerably closer to an 
adequate method for assessing epistemic aspects of interdisciplinarity. It also 
reveals a number of pressing difficulties which ought to generate ample motiv-
ation for caution in the development, evaluation, and execution of interdiscipli-
nary research projects.
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7 – Representational crossbreeding
ABSTRACT. In this chapter, I will present my take on how to carry 
out approach based analyses of cases of interdisciplinary science. I 
will start out by providing the general framework for such an analy-
sis: The Giere duplex. With that in place, I will zoom in on the de-
tails emphasised by approach based analysis in order to show how 
to disentangle the epistemic elements of integrated approaches.
In this chapter, the central elements discussed above will be combined into a 
method for analysing interdisciplinarity. The account is intended to make clear 
the most important focal points when applying approach based analysis to 
interdisciplinary science. In this chapter, then, we resurface from the details of 
scientific representation. On the background of the discussions above we will 
attempt to arrive at an overview and a concise guideline for how to evaluate 
cases of interdisciplinarity.
The discussion in this chapter will be quite abstract. It will provide the 
structure of approach based analysis. In the following chapter, the developed 
method will be applied in a case study of a specific interdisciplinary activity in 
order to demonstrate how such an analysis might be carried out in practice.
The framework presented will highlight potential pitfalls in relation to inter-
disciplinary work by pointing out aspects of the transferral of representational 
elements which require special attention. This may appear uninspiring and 
dull to those who just want to go ahead and be innovative. The aim is not to 
be overly conservative or restrictive, but applying approach based analysis 
indicates that some caution is in place. Science, including interdisciplinary 
science, requires meticulous care. Everyone involved in scientific activities 
knows this, of course. What is highlighted by approach based analysis is a 
number of unapparent pitfalls specific to interdisciplinary science which 
require more attention than they usually get. The prevalence of actually 
committing the possible mistakes pointed out is obviously an empirical 
question. Locating the pitfalls, however, is a prerequisite for determining the 
extent to which researchers actually fall into them.
One central challenge is that the path suggested leads to recommending a 
cautious one-small-step-at-a-time approach, which is not sufficiently bold or 
audacious to satisfy the requirements for being categorised as interdisciplinar-
ity on many accounts. One goal of interdisciplinary work could certainly be 
(and in many cases is) to make »representational quantum leaps«, i.e. creat-
ing entirely new original and innovative ways of representing phenomena by 
combining elements »like they have never been combined before«. The more 
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cautious goal of de-idealisation has its own set of challenges. Some of the 
more successful cases of interdisciplinarity discussed above certainly qualifies 
for being categorised as de-idealisation (even if their starting point may not 
have been deliberately idealised, but were simply an initial best approxima-
tion). I will discuss these two strategies and the continuum between them later 
in this chapter.
As will be evident, the framework presented in this chapter differs radically 
from ordinary ways of construing interdisciplinarity. Viewed in the presented 
perspective and at this level of detail, interdisciplinarity understood as integra-
tion between approaches includes activities which would not be included on 
standard interpretations hereof. For instance, the import of  operational defini-
tion into psychiatry is not normally considered an example of interdisciplinar-
ity. On the other hand, the approach based analysis is able to encompass 
everything that one will find discussed in the interdisciplinarity studies literatu-
re, though it is not certain, of course, that noteworthy epistemic integrations 
take place in all these cases.
But even though the approach based rendition of interdisciplinarity does 
not overlap nicely with the common usage of ‘interdisciplinarity’, it draws out 
aspects which ought to be included in any assessment of the epistemic vices 
and virtues of cases of disciplinary integration.
As a final, important remark, in the discussion below it is assumed that 
integration is achieved by adding elements to a base approach belonging to 
one’s home discipline. But of course it would be possible to cherrypick and 
combine elements more freely without relying at all on a familiar basis. This is, 
however, probably rarely how interdisciplinary integration proceeds. Indeed, it 
would require considerable effort to free oneself completely from one’s 
educational and professional background. And funding would be considerably 
more difficult to obtain if one were not affiliated with some academic milieu. In 
the following, then, it is assumed that there is one discipline more basic than 
the others involved. This means that in many cases, what is not changed will 
remain in the order of the base discipline.
The simple Duplex
As argued above, Giere’s account of scientific representation provides a good 
foundation for understanding scientific activities in terms of representation. A 
very simple move, the construction of the Giere duplex, provides a useful 
backdrop for understanding the dynamics of interdisciplinarity. In this chapter, 
the primary discussion of epistemic aspects of interdisciplinarity will be carried 
out in terms of approaches. But before we focus narrowly on the integration of 
approaches, we must first situate our discussion in its natural environment: 
The integration of representational activities.
Supposing that scientific activities can be characterised by how some 
specified phenomenon is represented, interdisciplinarity can be understood as 
the combination of two (or more) Giere-style representational relations. For 
the sake of simplicity, assume two distinct groups of scientists using distinct 
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models to represent distinct aspects of the world for distinct purposes. Based 
on Giere’s four-place-relation, the relation between pre-integration activities 
and their integrated state of affairs could be represented in this way:
FIGURE 7: THE GIERE DUPLEX.
This duplex version of Giere’s representational relation leaves us with four 
primary dimensions along which to analyse integration, namely S, X, W, and 
P. Put differently, the Giere duplex provides us with four very general aspects 
of representation, which gives us some initial idea of different ways in which 
scientific activities can be integrated. As mentioned above, the beauty of the 
duplex is that aligns almost perfectly with the best and most nuanced charac-
terisations of the nature of disciplines discussed in chapter 2. 
To repeat, S means ‘someone’ (rather than ‘scientist’). S includes institu-
tional affiliations, educational background, power relations, personal and 
professional ambi-ions, as well as other aspects of sociological interest. X is 
the vehicle of representation; W is the targeted (class of) phenomena; and P 
is the purpose of the representational enterprise.
S, X, W, and P are the parameters to study when looking for initial indica-
tions that interdisciplinarity is taking place. Publications are where we look.  76
Approaches are what we ought to look at in order to evaluate the epistemic 
aspects of interdisciplinarity.
In figure 8, the red and blue ellipses indicate the parent approaches and 
the purple ellipse indicate the integrated approach.
FIGURE 8: THE GIERE DUPLEX—APPROACH-STYLE.
Representing the pre-integrated state of affairs of a case of interdisciplinarity 
in the manner of the Giere Duplex is strongly idealised in several ways. 
First, it is unlikely to find a group of scientist operating with only a single 
vehicle of representation which they apply to only a single aspect of reality. 
 Of course, a large part of the interdisciplinary activities may take place prior to the first 76
publication of an interdisciplinary research project. Approach based analysis is primarily a 
method for retrospective assessment of interdisciplinary science. However, the pointing out of 
potential difficulties to avoid means that the method has considerable utility in the early 
design phases of interdisciplinary science as well.
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S1 uses X1 to represent W1 for P1
S2 uses X2 to represent W2 for P2
SID uses XID to represent WID for PIDintegration
S1 uses X1 to represent W1 for P1
S2 uses X2 to represent W2 for P2
SID uses XID to represent WID for PIDintegration
Nevertheless, in a given (part of a) publication where a specific approach is 
presented, one specific vehicle is used to represent one specific class of 
phenomena. In case more than one vehicle is used to represent one (or more) 
phenomena, or one single vehicle is used to represent several phenomena, 
this will simply mean that more than one approach is being presented.
Second, in many interdisciplinary cases integration is not restricted to the 
combination of elements derived from two parent approaches. Thus, in many 
cases it would be more adequate to represent integration in the following way 
instead:
FIGURE 9: THE GIERE N-PLEX.
However, since integrating two distinct parent approaches must be the 
minimal requirement for interdisciplinarity, I think it is reasonable to stick to the 
simple duplex version for the present discussion. Once we get a handle on 
the challenges of the simple duplex, the move to considering more complex 
»n-plex« integration is relatively straightforward. Consequently, this idealisa-
tion is acceptable, not least since it is now made explicit that in actual cases, 
things will often be more complicated.
Third, the relation between X (the vehicle) and W (the target) is far less 
simple than displayed in Giere’s four-place-relation. As discussed at length 
above, the relation between X and W is mediated through an intermediate 
layer of propositions, assumptions, and tools, and there is, therefore, not a 
simple, direct relation between vehicle of representation and the targeted 
phenomenon.
Central to the account of representation presented above is the need to 
make explicit how vehicles are used to represent phenomena. That is, what is 
the make-up of the intermediate layer linking vehicle and target? Which 
elements are retained in the integrated state of affairs, and how are they 
combined? One important conclusion above was that each of the elements 
constituting the intermediate layer are themselves candidates for transferral 
between approaches in interdisciplinary integration. However, in the Giere 
Duplex this crucial, mediating layer is black boxed.
FIGURE 10: THE SMALL BLACK BOX.
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S1 uses X1 to represent W1 for P1
S2 uses X2 to represent W2 for P2
… …
Sn uses Xn to represent Wn for Pn
SID uses XID to represent WID for PIDintegration
S1 uses X1 to represent W1 for P1
S2 uses X2 to represent W2 for P2
but how? SID uses XID to represent WID for PIDintegration but how?
In spite of these imperfections and difficulties incorporated in the Giere 
duplex, my conclusion is that it is beneficial initially to consider interdisciplinar-
ity in this very simplistic way. One central benefit is that the Giere duplex 
makes these idealisations plain for everyone to see. I will stick with Giere’s 
basic four-place-relation for the initial discussion, before addressing the more 
delicate issues by means of approach based analysis.
Starting out, then, with the (simple) duplex version of Giere’s represen-
tational relation we have four obvious parameters for integration. Before 
turning to the central discussion of approach integration, I will briefly go 
through integration along the dimensions which are not considered to be part 
of the approaches.
Social integration 
Viewed in the perspective of the Giere Duplex, the first thing to catch the eye 
is that in most of the Interdisciplinarity Studies literature focus is almost exclu-
sively on S-integration as discussed in some detail in chapter 3. The next 
thing to notice, is that the strong focus on the social aspects of interdisciplin-
ary integration in this literature seems to partly occlude the complexities of 
integrating along the X-, W-, and P-dimensions.
S-integration is first and foremost a question of unifying otherwise distinct 
groups of people involved in scientific representation. How might that be 
done? At first glance, S-integration may seem simple: The original groups 
must be united somehow. The involved scientists may be physically placed in 
the same building, perhaps complete with a plate on the door saying »The 
Interdisciplinary Centre of XYZ«, or, less thoroughgoing, administratively 
placed under a common leadership (perhaps, if denied a door-sign, at least 
provided with a website). Nevertheless, in many cases the integrated group 
will be provided with some sum of money, which they are to spend on carrying 
out their interdisciplinary collaboration.
Expressed in a less silly fashion, there are many different ways of inte-
grating along the S-dimension, ranging from informal collaborations involving 
little more than the discussion of relevant topics with people affiliated with 
departments other than one’s own, to establishing full-fledged new institu-
tional units including educational programs, peer structure, dedicated outlets 
for publication, and so on.
As indicated, S-integrations are, though far from straightforward, the as-
pects of interdisciplinarity most thoroughly dealt with in the literature. Put in 
somewhat provocative terms, there is little epistemic challenge in agreeing on 
which people to invite for participation. One might take this provocation a step 
further by claiming that when we are interested in matters epistemic, it does 
not really seem to matter who is using a given approach. Only in cases where 
change in the S-dimension result in change in the other dimensions as well 
would the S-change be interesting at all. And in this case the XWP-change 
would still be our primary object of study. To add one further issue, it is clear 
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that interdisciplinarity is not required to involve more than one person and 
does not require any changes to affiliations either. Consequently, S-integration 
ought not be the primary dimension of inquiry in studies of interdisciplinarity.
As discussed in chapter 3, however, it is in many cases exclusively along 
the S-dimension that interdisciplinary projects are evaluated. In such cases, 
the way interdisciplinary projects are evaluated, completely circumvent the 
epistemically substantial aspects of scientific collaborations. The interesting 
and difficult central epistemic issues in the representational relation are 
placed in an academic and administrative black box, as illustrated below.
FIGURE 11: THE LARGER BLACK BOX.
This leaves the most philosophically interesting dimensions of the duplex 
version of Giere’s model of representation unaddressed. Consequently, accor-
ding to this perspective, little if any attention is paid to epistemic aspects of 
interdisciplinary collaborations. In opposition to this, the overall goal of this 
thesis is to remove both black boxes and uncover whatever they may conceal.
Target integration 
W-integration involves arriving at a common object of study. Of the four para-
meters in Giere’s representational relation, integration of this parameter is 
probably the one that seems most straightforward at first glance. Isn’t it simply 
a question of scientists belonging to different disciplines applying their dif-
ferent perspectives to a common object and thereby reaching an enriched, 
deeper, broader, more accurate, and more nuanced appreciation of the com-
mon object? A little consideration will show that things are not that simple.
Interdisciplinarity as well as multidisciplinarity, of course, are often under-
stood as processes in which various perspectives are applied to a common 
object. This raises a natural question regarding whether one can claim that an 
object observed in two or more ways are in a relevant way »the same« object, 
and further, whether what is observed must be »the same« object, for the re-
sult of the process to contribute constructively to the generation of knowledge 
in one or more of the involved disciplines?
Such considerations may seem unduly academic to some engulfed in the 
practical everyday issues of concrete science. But since it is widely accepted 
today that all observations are to some extent theory-laden (Hanson 1958), it 
is a quite obvious question whether two different perspectives are able to 
capture the same object. 
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S1 uses X1 to represent W1 for P1
S2 uses X2 to represent W2 for P2
 but how? SID uses XID to represent WID for PIDintegration    but how?
Let us, once more, contemplate the movements of a pendulum. Kuhn has 
argued that if Aristotle and Galileo had observed the same pendulum in 
movement they would have registered something entirely different (Kuhn 
1962, p. 123). Galileo would have measured period, length of the suspension 
and amplitude, while Aristotle would have measured weight, elevation above 
ground and the time it takes for the pendulum to reach rest. Would Galileo 
and Aristotle have had a common object?
Here we are touching upon the classical Kuhnian discussion of 
incommensurability. But in spite of the abundant commotion caused by Kuhn’s 
considerations (Davidson 1974; Hacking 1983; Putnam 1975; Shapere 1966), 
this issue has received relatively little attention in discussions of scientific 
representation—and perhaps for good reason. Perhaps the focus on repre-
sentation takes us to a level of detail at which the problems of incommensur-
ability crystallises into specifications of the way in which a given model is 
idealised?
In fact, Kuhn’s discussion of the incommensurability of the Galilean and the 
Aristotelian understanding of pendula seems to be a perfectly good example 
of an explication of two different ways of representing one and the same (type 
of) phenomena. In a more contemporary phrasing, it seems reasonable to 
argue, as Mitchell does, that differently idealised models do not target the 
same ideal system even if they ultimately centre on the same real world phe-
nomena (Mitchell 2002, p. 66). Thus, there is reason to believe that incom-
mensurability in the classic sense is less of a problem for interdisciplinarity 
(given adequate explication) than one might have initially supposed.
As long as one is considering concrete real world phenomena, integration 
of targets must simply mean to agree on a common target. It makes little sen-
se to literally integrate the objects of interest. If one group of scientists study 
lions and another group study horses, it is far from straightforward how to inte-
grate their targets. However in cases where the target is some idealised 
system or for that matter some constructed class of objects (such as those 
suffering from a specific mental illness) literal target integration may be more 
easily achieved. And of course if one group studies emotions and another 
group studies the brain, it can make sense to collaborate on studying the neu-
rological manifestations of emotions.
In an approach based perspective, pointing out the target is part of the 
approach. Approaches must have inbuilt indexical capacities, so to speak. 
Though it is of course relevant what targets are chosen, the most interesting 
aspects of how vehicle is connected to its target is internal to the approach. 
Therefore approaches are the primary focus in the approach based approach.
Targeting a different target by means of the same approach? 
There is one further target-related issue that requires attention. What does it 
mean to apply the same approach to a different target? If we consider the 
means for pointing out the target to be part of the approach, the approach 
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must be changed if it is to point out something different. You can hardly use 
the definition of ‘horse’ to point out lions.
At this point, we must be careful. Since according to definition all the tools 
and assumptions which serve to connect vehicle and target are part of the 
approach, it seems that one cannot use the same approach to target two 
different phenomena. Something must be changed, if an approach is made to 
target something different. Does this mean that when an approach is trans-
ferred, something is always changed at least in terms of the elements which 
are used to point out the target? In most cases, something will probably be 
changed, yes. One might in principle use the exact same approach in a 
different setting or context, but most cases of transferral will implicate change 
of (at least some details of) the intermediate layer. Of course, gaps are 
bridged by means of assumptions, and one may simply change assumptions 
about how to bridge the ultimate gap between approach and target. Still, this 
constitutes a (small, perhaps minimal?) change of approach.
On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent two different approaches 
from targeting the same phenomena. The only thing required is that the parts 
of the approach that serve to point out the target are identical (in the relevant 
sense). The rest of the approaches may be entirely different.
Since the processes that point out the target are part of the approach, 
changes to what is pointed out should be detectable in an approach based 
analysis. This, once more, indicates that approaches are a reasonable to 
place at centre stage when analysing interdisciplinarity.
Purpose integration 
With respect to the integration of purposes, the cynic might be tempted to 
claim that an obvious common purpose for two groups of scientists engaging 
in interdisciplinary collaboration might simply be to obtain funding. The 
initiations of interdisciplinary collaborations are, indeed, probably sometimes 
motivated by the need for funding, not least since interdisciplinarity to some 
extent is often more or less a formal requirement for approval. But such sar-
casm might nevertheless be somewhat misplaced.
In Giere’s framework, funding is not a representational purpose of the 
relevant type. Rather, ‘purpose’ denotes the goal which the specific represen-
tational activity is intended to achieve, such as Watson’s purpose of represen-
ting the physical structure of DNA (Giere 2004, p. 749). 
The set of purposes to which funding belongs is a matter for economical, 
psychological and sociological, rather than representational, analysis. In 
contrast, the purposes discussed in the Interdisciplinarity Studies literature are 
more along the lines of »we should do a lot of interdisciplinary collaboration 
because then we can solve a lot of complex problems« which is yet another 
version of ‘purposes’. Bottom line is that ‘purpose’ is used in many different 
senses, which needs to be kept apart in order to avoid confusion. 
Apart from this, it is difficult to state very much in general about the inte-
gration of representational purposes other than there is little standing in the 
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way of choosing purposes freely. The assessment of the epistemic virtues of a 
given approach can to a large extent be carried out independently of the 
purposes of the representational efforts. Indeed, the evaluation of whether 
some efforts lives up to its purpose is dependent on a primary epistemic 
assessment. Again, the discussion of the involved approaches should be the 
primary focus.
One more thing worth considering is cases of explorative interdisciplinarity 
where the purposes of the efforts may not be clear at the outset. Giere has 
stated that literal truth is rarely important to scientists in practice, but »what 
matters is the purpose at hand« (Giere 1988, p. 78). This raises the interest-
ing question of whether one can develop or appraise a vehicle without know-
ing its purpose, and whether a post hoc developed purpose is a bad thing?
Approach integration
Rather than discussing the integration of vehicles in isolation (i.e. the X-
dimension), we shall move directly to discuss integration of approaches. In the 
presented framework, it makes little sense to discuss the X in isolation from 
the elements which serve to link it to its target.
One might, of course, imagine two vehicles of representation being com-
bined, e.g. in a case where one equation is inserted in another equation so as 
to de-idealise a parameter. However, one of the most significant conclusions I 
have reached so far, is that it makes little sense when analysing scientific 
representation to study vehicles in isolation from its target and the elements 
constituting the link between the two. Therefore, I will refrain from discussing 
vehicle-integration and focus my attention on the integration of approaches. 
Thus:
Obviously, integrating scientific approaches is a tremendously complex pro-
cess. There are innumerable ways in which such combinations can be made, 
and I do not suggest, at all, that I am able to deliver an exhaustive analysis of 
all possible ways of integration in this thesis. What I do attempt, though, is to 
provide some illustrative exemplifications and point out some of the causes of 
the great complexity of such integrations.
In many cases, it is possible to distinguish the vehicle of representation 
clearly from the elements mediating its connection to the target, simply since 
the vehicle is often proudly presented in publications as the model or the 
theory. Functionally, however, there are but arbitrary ways of distinguishing 
the vehicle itself from the elements mediating its connection to the target phe-
nomena.
Consequently, in the following discussion of approach integration, the inter-
mediate layer and the vehicle of representation will be considered as a unity, 
while the target is considered in isolation. One reason why I think this way of 
carving up representation makes especially good sense in the analysis of 
interdisciplinarity, is that it is possible to transfer elements between the media-
ting layer and a vehicle of representation or using what is used as a vehicle in 
one context as an element of the intermediate layer in another context. On the 
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other hand, it does not seem to make much sense to say that one transfers 
some theoretical element to some real world phenomena. Of course, a 
theoretical element may be targeted in an act of representation, but that is a 
different story.
As discussed above, I construe the connection between vehicle and target 
as constituted by an intermediate layer consisting of more or less explicit, 
more or less taken for granted, assumptions and (conceptual) tools of various 
kinds.
The function of each element is to translate inputs into forms (e.g. concepts 
or figures) which can be processed further by means of other tools, until the 
connection to the parameters of the vehicle of representation can be estab-
lished. Some of the tools involved are literal tools such as scientific instru-
ments, others are mathematical tools like statistical methods. Yet others are 
conceptual tools such as reasoning strategies or definitions. A subgroup of 
tools involved are those I call ‘propositional algorithms’ and define as (more or 
less explicitly stated) sets of rules for carrying out conceptual operations.
Involved in the intermediate layer are also sub-representations, including 
what is often referred to as ‘data models’. Data models are ordered groups of 
data represented in ways appropriate for a certain purpose. Data models can 
be analysed in order to derive inputs to feed other elements further down the 
representational chain. The results of processes of measurement and catego-
risation also count as sub-representations (as discussed in chapter 1 above).
As a highly stylised illustration of how to construe the intermediate layer 
and its role in linking vehicle and target, consider the following illustration:
FIGURE 12: A STYLISED APPROACH.
The blue, pointy shape demarcates the approach, whereas the black line illu-
strates the series of steps of the intermediate layer which serve to link the 
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vehicle to the chosen target. Each of the zigzags of the black line marks the 
effect of an element of the intermediate layer.
Obviously, this is not a true to life picture of scientific representation, which 
hardly proceeds along a series of steps in as simple a way as portrayed here. 
It would be more adequate to represent the intermediate layer as a complex 
network of interacting elements, but this would also be a far less accessible 
illustration. Indeed, representational activities often do involve observing in a 
certain way, and the results of observation are often processed through 
definitions of a certain kind, and so on. For present purposes, this corre-
sponds sufficiently well to the activities of, for instance, the imaginary social 
psychologist studying the »pet-effect« as discussed in chapter 1 above.
As mentioned, integrating two or more approaches is certainly a very com-
plex undertaking, even in the very simplified version. In the following illustra-
tion the elements of the parent approaches (blue and red) are integrated in 
the purple approach.
FIGURE 13: INTEGRATING APPROACHES.
There are a number of different complications which must be pointed out.
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(1) Importantly, all the elements of the parent approaches are candidates for 
being reused in an integrated approach. 
(2) Equally important, nothing stands in the way of using the elements 
differently in the integrated approach compared to their origin. 
(3) No elements of the parent approaches are guaranteed a place in the 
integrated approach. Even the most fundamental assumptions of parent 
approaches can be (more or less deliberately) disregarded in the 
integrated approach.
(4) In many cases, combining elements from various sources requires 
additional elements (often in the form of assumptions) not found in the 
primary parent approaches. These may then be developed specifically for 
the integrated approach or may be transferred from somewhere else. 
These must be identified and their function must be determined.
A further very important complication: Certainly, the origin of the specific com-
bined elements is far from always explicated. To complicate matters even 
more, in most cases the elements will not be imported directly from the origin-
al source, or even from a source in near disciplinary proximity to the original 
application of the theoretical element. A prime example hereof could be the 
use of statistical tools as discussed in the previous chapter. When psycholo-
gists make use of the ANOVA, they are rarely interested in its original applica-
tion. Indeed, in psychology textbooks statistical tools are most often presented 
anonymously, i.e. without reference to the originator or the original context of 
a specific tool. It has been argued that this can have the unfortunate side-
effect of strengthening the impression of neutrality and of statistics as consti-
tuted by a bundle of more or less »given truths« (Gigerenzer 2004, p. 589). 
The same pattern will be seen in relation to other tools such as semi-
structured interviews, which will play a role in the case study discussed in the 
following chapter. In the eyes of the non-expert, the semistructured interview 
may appear as a firmly established specific method, when in fact there is 
room for almost endless variation regarding how to carry out such interviews 
(Kvale & Brinkmann 2009).
To large extent, Giere draws his examples for analysing representational 
activities from science textbooks. This provides for an interesting contrast to 
our concern with interdisciplinary scientific work. Since interdisciplinary pro-
jects are almost by definition groundbreaking, their conclusions cannot as of 
yet have sedimented into textbooks. Often people engaged in interdisciplinary 
projects will be hesitant in drawing on textbooks as well, since textbooks are 
(reasonably) considered less advanced. (Further there is the interesting com-
plication that drawing on textbooks will provide you with what is often insuffi-
cient insight into an ID-idealised version of »the real thing«).
An approach to representation as inclusive as advocated in this thesis 
results in an enormous diversity with regard to types of vehicles, structure of 
the representational relation, types of explanations used, degrees of univer-
sality or individuality, level of specificity, and so on and so forth. This diversity 
inspires a lot of questions. One obvious question is whether there are any 
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restrictions as to which types of approaches are possible to integrate? It is dif-
ficult to see principled limitations here. There is nothing that hinders the 
construction of approaches that combine elements from chemistry, biology 
and, perhaps, psychology or literature theory to ascribe agency to molecules 
or bacteria, for instance. Obviously, there are relevant questions of adequacy, 
validity, power of prediction and so on. But these are questions related to the 
evaluation of the resulting approaches, not to the possibility of constructing 
them (Collin 2011; Latour 1988).77
So, at the outset there are no principled limitations as to which parent ap-
proaches it is possible to combine. Whether the combined approaches are 
distant or proximate or somewhere in between, there is little inherent resistan-
ce (if any) in the process of combining theoretical elements into some repre-
sentational relation. Representation is certainly constructive in this sense: 
Representation is something you do, and at the outset you are free to do (i.e. 
represent) as you please. It is not until we stringently and systematically start 
checking the mediated fit between vehicle and target that we start to realise to 
which extent a particular way of representing is epistemically successful. 
The integration of two or more approaches can thus appear to be quite 
easy at first glance. But creating a representational approach with a good fit is 
a tremendously challenging process. There are numerous ways to combine 
elements—and most of these will show poor results (from an epistemic point 
of view). 
The method
If we are to evaluate a case of interdisciplinarity along the lines suggested, the 
first step, once we have decided on a specific publication to analyse, is to 
single out the parent approaches and estimate the distance between them. 
The next step is to determine which elements from the parent approaches are 
reused in the integrated approach as presented in the publication and how 
they are combined. The third step is to determine which functions the ele-
ments serve in the integrated approach and whether there are newly develop-
ed elements involved, or elements imported from elsewhere than the primary 
parent approaches. In all cases, with respect to all imported elements the ex-
tent to which they are transformed, ID-idealised, or assigned new roles should 
be determined.
Spelling this out in as much detail as we are able will provide us with some 
insight into the structure of the integration taking place. Recalling the sugges-
 I thank one referee of an early version of (Hvidtfeldt 2016a) for bringing to my attention (by 77
criticising me for using imagined examples of metaphorical use of psychology to understand 
bacteria) that it is too subtle to simply support that claim with a reference to The 
Pasteurization of France by Bruno Latour. With an enchanting touch of modesty Latour refers 
to this book as his »Tractatus Scientifico-Politicus« (Latour 1988, p. 7). If one consults this 
seminal and explicitly interdisciplinary work within actor-network theory, one will see that the 
ascription of agency to even the tiniest of non-human »actors« is 1) apparently not meant 
metaphorically, and 2) not something that I have imagined!
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tion to consider disciplines as bundles (of bundles) of approaches, one must 
keep in mind that some aspects might be more or less taken for granted 
characteristics of an entire bundle (or even a bundle of bundles). Issues taken 
for granted may not be explicitly stated in the presentation of a particular 
approach.
The final and most demanding step is to evaluate how the transferred ele-
ments fare in their new contexts and, on this background, how the interdiscip-
linary approach fares. The more proximate the parent approaches are, the 
easier one can expect the task to be, because alterations are likely to be less 
radical. As distance increases, the demands of integration, as well as the ana-
lysis hereof, increases as well. This is, however, only a rule of thumb of 
course. And one should always beware of important changes even in proxi-
mate integration.
Transferring vehicles 
The obvious place to start a dissection of an interdisciplinary case is by focus-
ing on vehicles of representation. That is, one must determine what is used as 
a vehicle of representation in the integrated approach, and how this vehicle 
relates to the vehicles of the parent approaches. 
The most high profiled examples of transferral of theoretical elements be-
tween approaches are the transfer of entire vehicles of representation which 
are assigned to new targets. Especially in the case of mathematical models 
this may appear to be straightforward. Due to the abstract nature of mathema-
tical models, (apparently) little if anything tie such models to their original ap-
plications. Thus, nothing (apparently) prevents one from transferring, for in-
stance, equations developed in physics and using them to represent some 
phenomena in economics. For example, Philip Mirowski has argued that 
modern economics came into existence by importing mathematical structures 
from energetics into social science (Mirowski 1989). 
Indeed, economists appear to be large-scale importers of mathematical 
models. Michael Weisberg has discussed one example, in which Richard M. 
Goodwin has imported one of Weisberg’s favourite analytical specimens, the 
Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey-interactions, into economics (Goodwin 
1967; Weisberg 2013b, p. 77).
Goodwin originally presented this idea as »a starkly schematized and hen-
ce quite unrealistic model of cycles in growth rates« (Goodwin 1967, p. 54). In 
his reinterpretation, Goodwin replaces predators and prey with wages and 
profit respectively. This raises the interesting question of to which extent a 
given mathematical structure used as vehicle of representation in a new 
context retains any connection to its original context. Does anything but 
history connect a mathematical equation to the contexts in which it was pre-
viously used? There is no clear answer to this question.
On the one hand, if viewed in isolation the mathematical structure is not 
tied to its original target by anything but the way it was used. And indeed, 
there  are probably many examples in which some equation fit better in a new 
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context.  On the other hand, in many cases it is not just the equation which is 78
imported. In many cases, when importing a certain equation (or other theoreti-
cal element) one (more or less deliberately) imports other aspects as well. For 
instance, for the shareholder there is an element of moral support in consider-
ing one’s hard-earned profit to be predated by employees driven by their wild 
and insatiable demands for higher wages.
A further interesting consideration is whether there are special circumstan-
ces in economics which makes it especially tempting to import mathematical 
structures. Indeed, there might be. Throughout economic history theorists 
have been attracted to the combination of strong idealisation and quantifica-
tion. Think for instance of the idealisations required in order to be able to pro-
vide numerical measures on a common scale for divergent types of value. 
Such procedures are required for, among many other things, the mathemati-
cal analysis of opportunity costs. Other frequently discussed examples of cen-
tral and important economic idealisations are the perfectly transparent free 
market as well as its inhabitants. Homo economicus is the strongly idealised 
model of man sometimes considered to capture economic behaviour in con-
densed form.79
Once something is quantified, it is tempting to feed the numerical data into 
equations—and why not use off the shelf equations? But as discussed above 
in chapter 5, while strong idealisation makes it easier to construct mathemati-
cal systems which fit nicely together, one might pay a high price in the curren-
cy of fidelity.
The pattern of importing and re-construing a vehicle of representation in its 
entirety is hardly the way most interdisciplinary activities proceed. It is rarely 
the case that one party provides the vehicle of representation while the other 
party provides the intermediate layer (and the target?). We therefore need a 
more fine-grained analytical approach to capture more of what is going on. 
Luckily in our present framework, we are by no means restricted to analysing 
the transfer of vehicles of representation.
 This certainly does not imply that mathematical structures are neutral, understood as non-78
perspectival (as discussed in the previous chapter).
 Mill introduced the concept of “homo economicus“ in his treatise on method in a deliberate 79
attempt at making economics more scientific. Ironically, he was confident that no political 
economist would ever be »so absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus 
constituted« (Mill 1836, p. 322). Interestingly, there is a tension between two possible 
interpretations of the idealisations involved in the construction of the model of economic man. 
According to one interpretation the idealisation emphasises the »essential« characteristics of 
human economic behaviour. Since they are essential, they are common to all economic 
agents, and the model thus applies everywhere—in other words: it is generalisable. If we 
encounter differences between instances of actual behaviour, they are accidental and ought 
(ideally) to be negligible. The other interpretation reaches the opposite conclusion: The model 
of economic man applies nowhere, since persons thus characterised in fact does not exist 
(Morgan 2006, p. 6). In economics it often seems that the first interpretation is accepted, even 
though the latter is probably much closer to actual fact.
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Inserting elements of approaches as parts of vehicles 
The next option to consider is whether an existing vehicle of representation 
has been changed as a consequence of the integration. This can, for instan-
ce, arise through the transferral and insertion of elements of one approach as 
part of a vehicle of representation.
In some cases (elements of) one approach may be able to cast light on an 
underdeveloped aspect of another act of representation. A good example can 
be found in the history of evolutionary biology, where, as is well known, 
Darwin had postulated inheritance and variation as central parts of his theory 
of natural selection, without being able to explain the underlying mechanisms. 
Indeed, Mendelian geneticists argued that Darwinians had no adequate basis 
from which to explain changes resulting in speciation (Burian 2005, p. 105).
When Dobzhansky published Genetics and the Origin of Species (1937) he 
very successfully provided the missing link.80
It was Dobzhansky’s virtue to bridge the communities of naturalists and geneti-
cists, to find a methodology for doing experimental work with natural populations, 
and to write a book that so formulated the issues that, after much dispute, both 
communities were, by and large, persuaded. […] In Genetics and the Origin of 
Species [Dobzhansky] synthesized his findings and those of many others to 
provide an integrated account, consistent with genetics, of the origin of species 
as an extrapolation of the microevolutionary changes that the naturalists had 
described in detail. (Burian 2005, p. 106)
 
No doubt the introduction of genetics added considerable strength, nuance, 
and accuracy to evolutionary biology. But even though the synthesis of gene-
tics and evolutionary theory has been tremendously successful, lots of 
unanswered questions remain. Importantly, it is worth noticing that genetics as 
well as the naturalist approach are both perspectival in the sense that gene-
tics emphasises microscopic structures and gene frequencies while the focus 
of naturalism is on the role of possessing different phenotypes. Even though, I 
believe, most will agree that the evolutionary synthesis is superior to each of 
its parent approaches, 80 years of careful efforts has not yet fully solved the 
inherent controversies. Topics such as what level of abstraction (genes, 
phenotype, species, ecosystem, and so on) might be the most proper level of 
selection remain controversial even today. Not even the most impressive of 
integrative successes seem to deliver instant gratification.
Transferring elements of the intermediate layer 
The next task is to determine which elements of the intermediate layer of the 
parent approaches are reused in the integrated approach. In this case, one 
must distinguish between two classes of transferral. The first is the transfer of 
elements to serve the same function they did in the parent approach. The 
other is, as discussed extensively above, situations in which elements are 
 Pardon the (deliberate) pun.80
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used differently in the integrated approach than in the parent approaches from 
which they are imported.
When a tool is transferred there are a number of aspects which one might 
inquire into in order to determine to what extent it is used similarly to the 
original context. Most importantly, where it is located in the line of reasoning, 
the nature of the inputs it is fed, and what its outputs are used for further down 
the line.
As discussed above (the treatment of insight a and b in chapter 3) there 
are no a priori reasons to assume that some element will be more or less use-
ful simple for being used differently. However, in cases where a certain tool 
has a long track record it has often been rigorously scrutinised by people with 
specific, relevant expertise. Therefore one might suspect that tools have often 
been optimised and calibrated to serve their functions reasonably well in their 
original contexts. If this is the case, one should expect to find a comprehen-
sive literature on the development and use of the particular tool. In this litera-
ture details about the utility and special requirements of the tool in question 
will often be spelled out. Indeed, this was the case in the examples I discus-
sed in the previous chapters. Non-experts in new contexts, on the other hand, 
are less likely to check in deep detail the viability of, for instance, some statis-
tical tool or a certain odd type of definition. 
FIGURE 14: TRANSFERRAL OF ELEMENTS.
Examples of tools moved to a different function in a new context include ope-
rational definitions and the ANOVA discussed in detail in the previous chapter. 
The figure above illustrates moving some element from carrying out a very 
basic function to a different location in some ways similar to the discussion of 
operational definition in psychopathology. But the patterns exhibited in the 
examples discussed above do not exhaust the possibilities, of course. One 
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might transfer and mix up techniques, instruments, tools (literal as well as 
mathematical and conceptual), ways of observing, ways of doing experiments, 
ways of collaborating, ways of communicating. The possibilities are innumer-
able.
It would be a foolish exercise to attempt to go through each and every pos-
sibility here. The important thing is to be cognisant of the general pattern of 
transferring elements that serve various functions in connecting vehicles of 
representation to their targets. One must pay close attention to alterations in 
the function elements are used to serve and the inputs they are fed in the new 
interdisciplinary context. One must further pay close attention to ID-idealisa-
tions as discussed in chapter 6 above.
The discussion of ceteris paribus clauses in chapter 6 emphasised that we 
should not expect tools to work universally. When assessing the viability of 
transferring a specific tool one should pay close attention to its specific re-
quirements and restrictions. Some tools will only operate well within narrow 
limits, in other cases restrictions may be more loose. When measuring gravity 
waves (Abbott et al. 2016) or slowing the speed of light (Hau 2011) there is 
very little room for play or variation, especially in the experimental set-up. In 
other settings, such as when normal functioning capacities for categorisation 
are used to decide whether an elderly person owns a dog or a canary, re-
quirements are considerably more lax. One will consequently need to assess 
the strictness of ceteris paribus clauses on a case by case basis.
Two strategies
I believe there are two general strategies which may direct interdisciplinary 
activities. One can be characterised as the attempt at an asymptotic approach 
towards truth(likeness) by carefully clearing up imprecisions resulting from 
idealisations and approximations. The other is less careful and characterised 
by a more radical innovative attitude (perhaps by making bold conjectures). 
The latter of these is far more difficult to analyse and, one could fear, likely to 
raise more questions than one will be able to answer.
Strategy 1: De-idealisation 
Most of the successful instances of interdisciplinarity I have been able to 
identify proceed in the manner of de-idealising. The ideal of de-idealisation so 
to speak can be illustrated by returning to an earlier used example.  As 81
discussed at length above, the equation of the simple pendulum is highly 
idealised. One of the ways in which the equation is simple, is that it only 
captures pendula with a very small angular amplitude (Θ) (i.e. the angle of the 
rod measured from the downward vertical). Indeed, the angular amplitude is 
required to be so small that it is not even represented in the equation.
 You guessed it: The simple pendulum! 81
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FIGURE 15: THE SIMPLE PENDULUM ONCE MORE.
The consequence is that the equation for the period of a pendulum is only 
reasonably accurate with regard to angular amplitude of a few degrees. The 
treatment of the large amplitude pendulum, however, is much more complex. 
One might de-idealise the equation of the simple pendulum by inserting an 
additional mathematical structure. One can approximate a solution to this 
problem by a series, for which the first terms would be: 
FIGURE 16: THE LESS SIMPLE PENDULUM.
It should be obvious that as Θ approaches 0 the influence of this addition be-
comes more and more negligible. Nevertheless, adding an approximation to 
angular acceleration to the equation of the simple pendulum is a way of de-
idealising it. By this procedure we get a less idealised equation which is a 
better approximation of the real thing (or actually in this case enables the  de-
idealised vehicle to capture a larger part of the potential behaviours of real 
pendula).
According to Weisberg, we idealise for pragmatic reasons, i.e. because we 
lack the computational power or insights required to compute the problem at 
hand in all its gory complexity. Analysing an idealised version of the issue at 
stake, however, may provide us with some of the insight required to take the 
analysis to the next step by developing a carefully de-idealised version. Once 
we get a handle on some isolated aspect of a complex problem, this might 
reveal ways forward towards handling the issue with more context included.
McMullin discussed de-idealisation in his paper on Galilean idealisation:
[…] [M]odels can be made more specific by eliminating simplifying 
assumptions and ‘de-idealizing’, as it were. The model then serves as the 
basis for a continuing research program. […] If simplifications have been 
made in the course of formulating the original model, once the operations of 
this model have been explored and tested against experimental data, the 
model can be improved by gradually adding back the complexities. Of course, 
this requires a knowledge of how that particular ‘complexity’ operates. 
(McMullin 1985, p. 261)
Mitchell has discussed similar kinds of representational improvement in terms 
of »[…] a strategy of asymptotic approach to a non-idealized representation of 
the [target] system.« (Mitchell 2002, p. 65) 
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In many interdisciplinary activities one can detect a somewhat naïve 
aspiration of de-idealisation. The naïve thought can be expressed in terms like 
»By adding an additional theoretical element to our construal of our target we 
combat over-simplifications and gain in actual similarity between vehicle and 
target«. However, it is somewhat paradoxical that in many cases the imported 
theory is indeed itself idealised as part of the importing process. In some 
ways, then, idealisations are used as a means for interdisciplinary de-idealisa-
tion.
Good idealisations are carefully worked out step by step for specific pur-
poses in specific contexts. The same holds for de-idealisation as described in 
the McMullin quotation just above. As stated several times, there are no good 
reasons to assume that the combination of two or more approaches automa-
tically adds up to anything like an asymptotic approach to a non-distorted, de-
idealized representation (Mitchell 2002; Wimsatt 1987).
Strategy 2: Bold conjectures 
As should be evident by now, according to the present analysis interdisciplin-
arity is not expected to be an easy shortcut to epistemically sound scientific 
originality or innovation. On some accounts, however, the ideal of inter-
disciplinarity seem to be a variation on the bold leaps once endorsed by Karl 
Popper (1963). However, unless issues such as those pointed out in this 
thesis are taken into account, interdisciplinarity is in danger of ending up be-
ing all about bold conjectures while completely ignoring the significant part 
about refutation.
The bold way of combining distant approaches could also be construed as 
explorative interdisciplinarity. Let’s integrate something and see what hap-
pens. Other than these scarce remarks, it is difficult to say anything in general 
about the bold strategy, except that it is likely to require considerable more 
effort to assess compared to the de-idealising strategy.
Most interdisciplinary projects will probably be located somewhere on a 
continuum between the extremes constituted by strategy #1 and strategy #2. 
Nevertheless, it may be worth considering which of the extremes some inter-
disciplinary activity most closely resembles.
Summing up
The suggestion of this chapter is to turn standard methods for analysing 
interdisciplinarity inside out and focus exclusively on what is usually black 
boxed. This means bracketing (or black boxing) everything but approaches 
and targets. This approach does not constitute an exhaustive analysis of inter-
disciplinarity, of course, but it captures the central epistemic aspects of such 
activities.
The Giere Duplex is only useful for a coarse, initial analysis of actual cases 
of interdisciplinarity. For the purpose of epistemic evaluation, we must main-
tain the focus on approaches as developed above. Still it is worthwhile to start 
out a representation based analysis of a case of interdisciplinarity by drawing 
 176
out the dimensions emphasised by the Giere duplex. This will constitute 
useful contextualisation when moving on to the more detailed approach based 
analysis. 
The suggestion is, then, to first and foremost focus on approaches when 
addressing issues related to the epistemic benefits of interdisciplinarity. I do 
not suggest (at all) that one should ignore the social aspects of interdisciplin-
arity. When addressing troubling issues such as degenerating core sets or the 
lack of peers sufficiently competent to do qualified reviews, social matters can 
hardly be ignored. But when it comes to analysing the extent to which a 
certain interdisciplinary activity has lead to epistemically beneficial results, 
approaches are the heart of the matter.
One central assumption in approach based analysis of interdisciplinarity is 
that one should not trust the prima facie authority provided by imported tools, 
propositional algorithms, assumptions, vehicles, or what have we. Any act of 
representation must be evaluated afresh. This is very laborious and requires a 
stringent and systematic attitude—but it is the way forward.
Once having determined as closely as possible what is being used as 
vehicle of representation, the next step is to identify as many relevant ele-
ments of the intermediate layer as possible. One cannot evaluate the vehicle 
in isolation from the intermediate layer, not least since a significant part of the 
integration might take place there.
When evaluating the individual elements of the intermediate layer, the fol-
lowing focal points are useful:
What is the representational context in which the element is put to use?  
How does this context differ from the context in which the element was 
used in the parent approach?
What inputs are the element fed?
How do these inputs differ compared to the inputs in the parent approach?
What are the requirements of the element? 
How do the present use live up to these requirements, and how does this 
differ compared to the parent approach?
What can the element be expected to deliver?
How well do the element perform in the parent approach
as well as, perhaps, in its original or optimal context?
How well can the element be expected to work in the function it is assigned 
in the integrated approach?
One might think that it is unnecessary to consider how well a certain element 
performed in the parent approach since »insights a« and »insight b« above 
gave us reason to think that we need to evaluate its performance from scratch 
anyway. However, as mentioned above, since many tools are developed by 
experts in a specific area these will often have engaged in thorough discus-
sions with their peers about the specific tools. Even though these discussions 
do not provide the final word on how a tool will fare in an interdisciplinary con-
text, expert discussions may certainly point out issues relevant to consider. 
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You don’t have to be an expert on statistics to appreciate some of the chal-
lenges pointed out in the statistical literature on ANOVA, for instance.
In many cases, unfortunately, it is impossibly difficult to figure out what is 
actually going on. What elements are mixed up? Where do the elements 
come from? Anonymisation plays a crucial role here. Because if insufficiently 
explicated contributions are anonymised and, for instance, only referred to as 
‘psychoanalytical’, matters may be impossibly difficult to figure out.82
Focus in the literature on interdisciplinarity has neglected epistemic 
aspects. The way to make up for this shortcoming is to pay especially close 
attention to transferrals and alterations of vehicles and mediating theoretical 
elements. A focus on vehicles and elements of the intermediate layer and the 
transformations they go through will reveal a lot about the viability of specific 
interdisciplinary approaches. In this way, approach based analysis will consti-
tute a fruitful alternative to standard approaches to the study of interdisciplin-
arity.
I believe, thus, that a number of the shortcomings of Giere’s represen-
tational relation can be handled by making some of the adjustments and addi-
tions I have already discussed above. The problem with underdetermination 
of the relation between X and W can be properly handled by including discus-
sions of assumptions, tools, and propositional algorithms. The problem with 
analysing interdisciplinary representation in terms of groups of scientist using 
only a single model to represent a single target can be handled reasonably by 
means of my approach notion as discussed above.
The result is, I believe, a method capable of drawing out numerous inter-
esting aspects of scientific crossbreeding highly relevant to the epistemic as-
sessment of interdisciplinary activities.
 Since there are no generally agreed upon psychoanalytic approaches to rely on.82
 178
 
 179
 
 180
8 — Phenomenology imported with EASE
ABSTRACT. In this chapter, I apply the method developed above in 
a case study of an interdisciplinary approach. The case in question 
is a study which is part of an ongoing research project, EASE, in 
which philosophical phenomenology is integrated with more traditio-
nal approaches to schizophrenia research. I point out a number of 
problems with this specific act of integration, some of which can be 
blamed on the participants, others of which are due to structural 
issues of psychiatry, the home discipline. Indeed, there are a lot of 
good things to say about the EASE-project. The basic idea is cer-
tainly a good one, and it has the potential to significantly improve 
how we understand and handle schizophrenia. Nevertheless, ap-
proach based analysis reveals considerable epistemic prob-ems 
with the specific approach in focus.
In the preceding chapters I have developed and argued in favour of a repre-
sentation based method for capturing and assessing a number of epistemic 
aspects of interdisciplinary science. I have not presented a full analysis of a 
specific case of scientific crossbreeding, though. This chapter will provide, if 
not a full analysis, at least a quite detailed case study utilising the framework 
developed above. The case study will focus on an explicitly interdisciplinary 
research project within psychopathology; the so-called EASE-project (Evalua-
tion of Anomalous Self-Experience) developed under the leadership of Profes-
sor Josef Parnas at the University of Copenhagen. The main focus will be on 
one approach of this project, which is presented in an article by Julie 
Nordgaard and Josef Parnas entitled »Self-disorders and the Schizophrenia 
Spectrum: A Study of 100 First Hospital Admissions« published in Schizo-
phrenia Bulletin (2014).  I will further draw on a number of other publications 83
within the EASE framework in order to close in on some aspects of NP2014 
which are not explicitly addressed in the article in focus.
NP2014 is one approach out of the bundle of approaches which collectively 
constitute the EASE project. One could certainly argue in favour of analysing 
 We need to distinguish clearly between the EASE project and the distinct constitutive 83
approaches as presented in individual publications. To repeat myself: An approach based 
analysis of interdisciplinary activities requires focus on one interdisciplinary approach (at a 
time). As discussed in several places above, in approach based analysis specific research 
projects (or programmes, perhaps) are considered to be bundles of closely related 
approaches. A discipline, on the other hand, is considered to be a bundle (of bundles) of 
approaches. For convenience and clarity, I will use ‘NP2014’ to refer to the approach in focus 
in this case study and ‘EASE’ to refer the bundle, of which NP2014 is a constitutive element.
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another approach of this bundle. But the focus on NP2014 is chosen since I 
believe that particular specimen exhibits a number of interesting aspects and, 
due to its recent publication, represents a fairly mature version of EASE.
While developing the research proposal which lead to this thesis, I was 
employed at the psychiatric research facility where most of the efforts in 
EASE has been carried out. This includes the training of psychiatrists in using 
the methods developed in EASE. As a consequence of my employment at the 
facility, I have participated in two EASE-courses (a basic three day course and 
a two day »advanced workshop«). This means that I am by now a certified 
EASE-practitioner.  Due to this employment and previous work related to the 84
philosophy of psychiatry and psychopathology, I have gained considerable 
insight into the specifics of EASE as well as the structure and dynamics of 
psychiatry and psychopathology in general.
Having stated these opportunistic factors outright, let me also state that I 
do find psychiatry and psychopathology to be especially interesting domains 
to study with regard to interdisciplinarity. I will discuss why in the next section. 
Further, the EASE project is interesting in this context since it makes use of 
propositional modelling in combination with various tools for translating quali-
tative representations into quantitative measures. This gives the reader good 
opportunity to assess whether these aspects are captured convincingly by 
approach based analysis.
EASE is firmly situated within psychiatry. Indeed, all the publications related 
to EASE are published in psychiatric journals or edited volumes focused on 
psychiatric or psychopathological matters. I will therefore treat EASE as basic-
ally a psychiatric / psychopathological project. Non-psychiatric elements of the 
integrated approach will be considered as imported from »alien« approaches 
into the psychiatric setting.
For this reason, this chapter starts out by outlining the context of psychiatry 
and psychopathology in general and the main target of EASE, namely schizo-
phrenia. On this background, the EASE-project and its general motivations 
are presented. This leads to the main analysis of NP2014. As should be plain 
by now, the analysis will involve identifying parent approaches, assessing the 
distance between them, identifying vehicles of representation, identifying 
targets, determining which tools, assumptions, and algorithms are combined 
as well as their function in parent and integrated approaches, and identifying 
idealisations, ID-idealisations, distortions, and perspectives—to the extent 
possible. This will eventually lead to interesting conclusions about the epi-
stemic merits of the interdisciplinary EASE-project.
Importantly, the purpose of the presented analysis is not to pass final judg-
ment on EASE or NP2014. Rather, the point is to demonstrate how approach 
based analysis is capable of drawing out interesting aspects of interdisciplin-
ary activities.
 With the important caveat that I am not a trained psychiatrist. Consequently, I do not 84
possess the competences to carry out any kind of psychiatric diagnostics with or without the 
EASE-methods involved. See Appendix A for documentation.
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I do believe that the case study presented in this chapter displays some 
considerable virtues of approach based analysis of interdisciplinary activities. 
Even though the exact details for all aspects of the integration in NP2014 can-
not be discerned, the analytical tools developed above prove their worth, I be-
lieve. Indeed, in this context, making lack of clarity explicit is a virtue in itself.
The analysis below will bring forth interesting aspects of how to evaluate 
the EASE-project qua interdisciplinary activity. It will highlight some note-
worthy qualities of the EASE-project as well as point out some difficulties 
which are yet to be overcome. Some of the difficulties revealed can best be 
described as built-in constraints of current psychiatry. For instance, it makes 
little sense to state that self-disturbances are the fundamental characteristic of 
a category of interest, and then immediately move on to delimit this category 
by means of a method which does not take self-disturbance-related issues 
into account at all. However, it is a basic requirement of psychiatric research 
that the latter method is used. Such constraints certainly have the potential to 
stop many innovative approaches in their tracks. Further, the analysis will 
show how some central elements involved in the integration are distorted al-
most beyond recognition. Other elements, which are considered more or less 
indispensable in the parent approaches, are left out of the integrated ap-
proach resulting in considerable causes for concern when viewed from the 
present perspective.
Since EASE is based on disciplines each incorporating vast literatures, an 
exhaustive analysis is impossible to achieve here. Nevertheless, it is possible 
within the present framework to reach interesting conclusions. Indeed, a tool 
for assessing interdisciplinary activities would be of little utility if it required 
book-length treatments of each case evaluated. Luckily, it appears that ap-
proach based analysis does no such thing.
As noted above, the first step will be to contextualise the discussion within 
the general framework of psychiatry and psychopathology, before moving on 
to a presentation of the EASE-projects.
So, what is psychiatry and psychopathology?
Psychiatry is the medical specialty that deals with the diagnosis and treatment 
of mental illnesses, emotional disturbances, and (detrimental) abnormal beha-
viour. ‘Disorder’ is a central term within contemporary psychiatry and means 
something like »a disruption of normal mental functions«. It is not sharply de-
lineated what qualifies as a disorder. This should not come as a surprise, 
however, since neither “normal” nor “mental” are clearly defined concepts 
(Murphy 2006, p. 53 ff.).
Psychopathology, on the other hand, denotes the study of the nature and 
aetiology of the phenomena psychiatry attempts to handle. Psychiatry and 
psychopathology ought to be closely interconnected, one should think. But 
this is the case to a lesser extent than seems preferable. For instance, as dis-
cussed above in relation to operational definition, contemporary psychiatric 
diagnostics is deliberately (to the extent possible) cut-off from theories about 
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causation as well as from the subjective experience of patients (American 
Psychiatric Association 1980; 1994; 2000; 2013; World Health Organization 
1992).
The category of mental disorders covers a vast range of diverse ways of 
being psychologically (in a broad sense) and emotionally troubled. At the one 
end of the spectrum, there are people suffering from mild emotional disturban-
ces, for instance certain mild forms of depression, who, with or with-out treat-
ment, are likely to quickly make full recovery. At the other end are, for in-
stance, cases of schizophrenia, which are often chronic and accompanied by 
significant cognitive, social and emotional dysfunctions. 
In spite of internal disagreements, it is not unfair to say that psychiatric and 
psychopathological research is largely dominated by the so-called medical 
model. According to the medical model, mental disorders are manifestations 
of dysfunctions of some sort. One might distinguish weak from strong inter-
pretations of the medical model. A weak interpretation is not committed to dys-
functions of a specific type, and explanations can draw on psychological, 
social, as well as biological elements. A strong interpretation, on the other 
hand, requires explanations in terms of anatomical pathology. More specific-
ally, it is committed to causal explanations in terms of neurological abnormali-
ties. In plain terms, something must be wrong with the brain. Unfortunately, 
very few mental disorders have known organic causes. And indeed, in cases 
where organic causes are determined, there is a tendency for disorders to 
migrate out of psychiatry and into »real« medicine (syphilis is one well known 
historical example).
Psychiatry (as well as psychopathology) is dominated by the current ver-
sions of the two diagnostic manuals, the DSM and ICD (American Psychiatric 
Association 2013; World Health Organization 1992).  In their current ver-85
sions, both of these manuals are based on operational definitions, which I 
criticised at length in chapter 6. It is further important to be clear about the fol-
lowing: The diagnostic manuals are sometimes described as being »pheno-
menologically descriptive« or similar (Andreasen 2007; Webb et al. 1981). 
This is, however, quite far from the sense of ‘phenomenology’ as described in 
the continental philosophical tradition following Edmund Husserl. Whereas the 
latter version of phenomenology is focused on investigating the structures of 
subjective experience, the standard sense of ‘phenomenological description’ 
in psychiatry is something like »a description of how symptoms appear to a 
neutral observer«, which is, in fact, more akin to behaviourism than to conti-
nental philosophy (Parnas & Zahavi 2002b, p. 139).
 Short for ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ (published the American 85
Psychiatric Association) and ‘The International Classification of Diseases’ (published by 
WHO). 
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One consequence of the dominance of the medical model in combination 
with the descriptive phenomenological approach, is that the study of subjec-
tive aspects of mental disorders is largely neglected.86
Research within psychiatry and psychopathology involves taking implicit or 
explicit stands on philosophically controversial issues, such as theories of 
mind and philosophy of science, as well as all kinds of conceptual, ethical, 
metaphysical, social, political, and epistemological topics. This includes dif-
ficult issues such as how best to classify mental disorders, behaviour, percep-
tions, sensations, and emotions. Though these issues may not necessarily 
pose manifest practical problems during everyday clinical activities, they cer-
tainly have important implications for the handling and treatment of psychiatric 
patients.
Psychopathology is an extraordinarily interesting area of research for the 
application of approach based analysis of interdisciplinarity.
First, because there are straightforward arguments for why contributions 
from several different disciplines are needed to encompass the phenomena in 
question. One can hardly deny that biological, neurological as well as psycho-
logical, linguistic, and socially orientated approaches are relevant each in their 
own way. Pedagogical and educational perspectives are also relevant, 
especially in relation to child psychiatry (Hvidtfeldt 2016b).
Second, compared to interdisciplinary integrations of distant approaches 
such as literature studies and evolutionary theory, practitioners in psychiatry 
are operating with quite tangible criteria of success. The aim is to make better 
distinctions between various kinds of dysfunctions in ways that will eventually 
lead to more precise prognoses and more effective therapeutic interventions.
So even though one frequently encounters complaints that the phenomena 
dealt with in psychiatry are somewhat obscure and intangible, this is only part-
ly true (e.g. in comparison to certain exemplary cases in somatic medicine). 
Psychiatry is in a much better position than literature studies with regard to 
figuring out whether some study is on the right track. Indeed, it is much easier 
to argue that there is a right track at all. When faced with the reality of clinical 
psychiatry, one must be exceedingly stubborn to deny the obvious difference 
between, e.g., people who are well-functioning and people who are deeply 
psychotic. Providing effective treatment for deeply psychotic patients would 
constitute a quite tangible »right track«.
A further complicating factor, however, is that in psychiatry the targets are 
what Ian Hacking has called ‘interactive kinds’ (Hacking 1999), i.e. kinds (of 
people) with the capacity to alter their behaviour as a consequence of being 
categorised. This means, for instance, that patients may conform to the symp-
 In (Hvidtfeldt 2011), I analysed differences between how anxiety patients and psychiatrists 86
described what it is to suffer from anxiety. Interestingly, in the patients’ descriptions 
expressions such ‘being afraid’, ‘feeling scared’, ‘to panic, or ‘feeling terrified’ were absolutely 
central, but these played only a very minor role in descriptions of anxiety by the psychiatrists.
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tomatology described in the diagnostic manuals.  Consequently, quite a con-87
siderable part of the objects studied in psychiatry are moving targets.
What is Schizophrenia?
Schizophrenia, previously known as dementia praecox, has been considered 
a distinct disease for more than a century. This in spite of the fact that its defi-
nition and categorial boundaries have changed many times during this period, 
and that its aetiology and pathophysiology remain elusive and strongly con-
tested. It is widely accepted that there is some genetic component to schizo-
phrenia. But the nature of this component is far from clear. There is at the mo-
ment little hope of establishing genetically based diagnostics of schizophrenia.
Schizophrenia is the closest one gets to prototypical madness. It involves 
hallucinations of all kinds (i.e. tactile, auditory, visual, olfactory and gustatory 
»visions«), delusions, paranoia, and strange (at times scary and even danger-
ous) behaviour. The clinical manifestations of schizophrenia are immensely 
diverse, however, with this heterogeneity being poorly explained by current 
diagnostics. Importantly, there are substantial overlaps between a number of 
different diagnosis in the psychosis spectrum, as well as marked heterogene-
ity internal to the group diagnosed with schizophrenia. In the development of 
DSM-5, it has been acknowledged that the heterogeneity of schizophrenia is 
poorly explained by the selection of subtypes of schizophrenia in DSM-IV. The 
treatment prescribed for this has been to simply stop subdividing schizo-
phrenia and go for one big mess instead (Tandon et al. 2013)
Patients suffering from schizophrenia have a significantly reduced life ex-
pectancy. On top of high suicide rates and adverse side-effects of medication, 
schizophrenia is often correlated with socioeconomic and lifestyle risk factors 
such as poor diet, inadequate exercise, obesity, and smoking. All these fac-
tors translate into patients diagnosed with schizophrenia dying 12–15 years 
before the average population (Saha et al. 2007). This means that schizo-
phrenia shortens lifespan more than most somatic illnesses.
The established construal of schizophrenia involves three dimensions: 
positive symptoms, negative symptoms, and disorganisation symptoms.
Positive symptoms, often referred to as Schneiderian first-rank symptoms 
(after the German psychiatrist Kurt Schneider), include delusions, hallucina-
tions, and paranoia. They are called ‘positive’ since the phenomena referred 
to are considered to add something out of the ordinary or to be an excess of 
something in a clinically significant way. At the outset, positive symptoms 
respond well to medication.
 Another interesting finding of (Hvidtfeldt 2011) was that anxiety patients in some cases 87
seemed to develop the official symptoms of anxiety only after being presented with the 
suspicion that anxiety might be the explanation for some indeterminable somatic complaint 
(such as more or less chronic bellyache) for which they had consulted their GP. Importantly, 
the symptoms of anxiety are perfectly healthy reactions in threatening situations. Indeed, it 
does not seem completely irrational to be more than a little alarmed by being diagnosed with 
a mental disorder.
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Negative symptoms, on the other hand, are deficits of »normal« behaviour, 
cognition, or emotional responses. This group of symptoms include flat ex-
pression, minimal emotional response, poverty of speech, anhedonia, lack of 
motivation and lack of interest in social intercourse. Negative symptoms re-
spond less well to medication.
The distinction between positive and negative symptoms is not all that 
clear, however. Though the positive symptoms of schizophrenia involves ex-
traordinary experiences, e.g. delusions of one’s mind or body being control-
led by some external force or agency, they also imply the absence of some-
thing which is normally present such as the sense of ownership or deliberate 
control (Sass & Parnas 2003, p. 431). One might further ask whether dis-
organisation implies the presence of a mess of the absence of order?
The following are the official diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia according 
to the most recent edition of DSM: 
A. Two (or more) of the following, each present for a significant portion of time during 
a 1-month period (or less if successfully treated). At least one of these must be 
(1), (2), or (3): 
A. Delusions.
B. Hallucinations.
C. Disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence).
D. Grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior.
E. Negative symptoms (i.e., diminished emotional expression or avolition). 
B. For a significant portion of the time since the onset of the disturbance, level of 
functioning in one or more major areas, such as work, interpersonal relations, or 
self-care, is markedly below the level achieved prior to the onset (or when the 
onset is in childhood or adolescence, there is failure to achieve expected level of 
interpersonal, academic, or occupational functioning). 
C. Continuous signs of the disturbance persist for at least 6 months. This 6-month 
period must include at least 1 month of symptoms (or less if successfully treated) 
that meet Criterion A (i.e., active-phase symptoms) and may include periods of 
prodromal or residual symptoms. During these prodromal or residual periods, the 
signs of the disturbance may be manifested by only negative symptoms or by two 
or more symptoms listed in Criterion A present in an attenuated form (e.g., odd 
beliefs, unusual perceptual experiences). 
D. Schizoaffective disorder and depressive or bipolar disorder with psychotic features 
have been ruled out because either 1) no major depressive or manic episodes 
have occurred concurrently with the active-phase symptoms, or 2) if mood 
episodes have occurred during active-phase symptoms, they have been present 
for a minority of the total duration of the active and residual periods of the illness. 
E. The disturbance is not attributable to the physiological effects of a substance (e.g., 
a drug of abuse, a medication) or another medical condition. 
F. If there is a history of autism spectrum disorder or a communication disorder of 
childhood onset, the additional diagnosis of schizophrenia is made only if 
prominent delusions or hallucinations, in addition to the other required symptoms 
of schizophrenia, are also present for at least 1 month (or less if successfully 
treated). (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p. 99)
 187
Obviously, an operational definition along the above lines will include people 
with very divergent symptom clusters. Indeed, several patients can be diag-
nosed with schizophrenia without sharing a single symptom. On that back-
ground, it is not surprising that schizophrenia is a severely heterogeneous and 
poorly demarcated category.
The symptoms described above all appear to presuppose an objective ob-
server able to discriminate whether the patient lives up to certain norms or is, 
in fact, out of touch with reality. From a naïve point of view, experiencing a 
hallucination seems to rule out the possibility of being aware that what you are 
experiencing is not real or has no objective cause. Similarly, delusions involve 
false beliefs, and it seems contradictory to believe that your own beliefs are 
wrong.
In reality, however, matters are not that simple. Patients suffering from 
schizophrenia often maintain a »double bookkeeping« (Sass 2014). This 
means that they, on the one hand, may be convinced that a certain nurse 
wants to poison them, but, on the other hand, are happy to eat the food the 
nurse provides (despite having no death wish). Or they may be convinced that 
aliens drink their blood while they sleep, but readily admit that this is, of 
course, nonsensical.88
What is EASE, then?
EASE is a research project which attempts to encompass psychiatric as well 
as psychopathological aspects of schizophrenia. The main people behind the 
project are Josef Parnas (professor of psychiatry at the University of Copen-
hagen, co-founder of the Centre for Subjectivity Research), Dan Zahavi 
(professor of philosophy at the University of Copenhagen, co-founder of the 
Centre for Subjectivity Research), and Louis Sass (Professor of Clinical Psy-
chology at Rutgers University, New Jersey). A number of clinical and research 
psychiatrists and psychiatric, psychological, and philosophical PhD-students 
and PostDocs are affiliated to the project.89
To some extent, the developers of EASE have internalised the sociologic-
ally orientated approach to evaluating interdiscipinarity. It is explicitly stated in 
various places that the project is interdisciplinary, since it
[…] integrates recent psychiatric research and European phenomenological 
psychiatry with some current work in cognitive science and phenomenological 
philosophy. (Sass & Parnas 2003)
 For interesting philosophical discussions of delusions and double bookkeeping, see 88
(Bortolotti 2010a; Bortolotti 2010b; Murphy 2012).
 It would not be unreasonable to describe EASE as mainly proceeding in the polymath 89
mode with all the associated risks discussed in chapter 3 above. Even though it is an 
interesting topic, I shall refrain from providing anecdotal evidence for this claim, since it is not 
central to the goal of this case study.
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This is, of course, far from a satisfying level of specificity by the standards 
developed in the above chapters. »Some current work in cognitive science« 
could hardly be less specific. I will engage further with this lack of specificity 
below.
Further, it is stated that »The EASE construction […] involved senior inter-
disciplinary scholars from 3 European countries« (Nordgaard & Parnas 2014, 
p. 1301). There is no doubt that a number of the involved researchers have 
impressive track records. But as argued above, this tells us little, if anything, 
about the epistemic merits of the integrated approach they produce. Further, 
their geographic locations seem irrelevant to an epistemic assessment.
The basic aim of the EASE-project is to revitalise psychopathology and 
psychiatry by an injection of philosophical phenomenology. More specifically, 
the goal is to add nuance to the standard construal of schizophrenia by point-
ing out some structural changes of subjective experience which, allegedly, 
correlate with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. In this way, EASE is at the 
outset a de-idealising project in the sense that it aims to reinstate nuances 
which have (more or less deliberately) been idealised away within contempo-
rary psychiatry.
It does not detract from this de-idealisation that it is a case of re-de-ideali-
sation in the sense that psychopathology and psychiatry have previously been 
less idealised in this particular way. Indeed, phenomenology has been con-
sidered a vital part of psychopathology by very influential theorists in the 20th 
century. Most notable, perhaps, is Karl Jaspers’ efforts to develop a »Phäno-
menologische Forschungsrichtung in der Psychopathologie« (Jaspers 1912) 
(translated into English as: »The phenomenological approach in psychopatho-
logy« (1968)). Jaspers’ main contributions were published quite early in the 
history of phenomeology—written before central works by Husserl, Heidegger, 
and Merlau-Ponty were available (Berrios 1992; Sass 2013, p. 96). Conse-
quently, a new attempt at integrating psychopathology and phenomenology 
using updated phenomenological elements could make  good sense.
Indeed, EASE differs considerably from Jaspers’ phenomenological psy-
chopathology. First, Jaspers considered schizophrenia to be fundamentally 
closed to empathy, thereby placing it outside the domain of reasonable targets 
for phenomenological inquiry (Jaspers 1963, p. 447). It is not entirely clear ex-
actly what Jaspers meant by ‘empathy’, though. As he stated: 
Subjective symptoms cannot be perceived by the sense-organs, but have to 
be grasped by transferring oneself, so to say, into the other individual's 
psyche; that is, by empathy. They can only become an inner reality for the 
observer by his participating in the other person's experiences, not by any 
intellectual effort. (Jaspers 1963, p. 1313)
Second, Jaspers stated that a psychiatrist
[…] can share the patient's experiences—provided this happens spontan-
eously without his having to take thought over it. In this way he can gain an 
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essentially personal, indefinable and direct understanding, which, however, 
remains for him a matter of pure experience, not of explicit knowledge. (ibid., 
p. 1315)
In contrast, EASE targets subjective experiences related to schizophrenia di-
rectly and certainly attempts to develop explicit, quantifiable knowledge there-
of. What is also new, is that with EASE, phenomenological analysis is turned 
into a readily applicable tool.
An important part of the motivation for developing EASE is that current 
psychiatry is plagued by:
[…] a systematic underemphasizing of the patient's subjective experience […]. In fact, 
no account of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity is to be found in the contem-
porary psychiatric manuals, not even in the textbooks specifically dedicated to the 
nature of psychiatric interviewing. (Parnas & Zahavi 2002b, p. 140) 
EASE is intended fill this cavity by means of psychopathological phenomeno-
logical analysis, the aim of which is »to disclose the essential, invariant pro-
perties of abnormal phenomena« (Parnas & Zahavi 2002b, p. 157).
In EASE it is suggested that closer attention should be paid to the group of 
negative symptoms:
Until recently, Anglo-American psychiatry had made little effort to explore the 
subjective dimension of the so-called negative symptoms. (Sass & Parnas 
2003, p. 433)
It is hypothesised that
[…] the subjective experience of patients with so-called negative symptoms 
may involve "positive" phenomena that differ sharply from what the overt 
behavioral lack seems to suggest. (Sass & Parnas 2003, p. 431)
Central to EASE, then, is the attempt to capture the hidden »positive« pheno-
mena assumed to generate the well-established negative symptoms. An im-
portant tool for this purpose is a method for conducting semistructured inter-
views consisting of five more or less overlapping domains, which collectively 
cover 57 items related to disturbances of the so-called basic self.
To give an impression of the content of this method, the five domains and 
their items  are (Parnas et al. 2005):90
1. Cognition and stream of consciousness 
1.1.  Thought interference
1.2.  Loss of thought ipseity (‘Gedankenenteignung’)
1.3.  Thought pressure 
 All items are discussed in some detail and exemplified in (Parnas et al. 2005, p. 240-256), 90
to which I refer the interested reader.
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1.4.  Thought block 
1.4.1. Subtype 1: blocking 
1.4.2. Subtype 2: fading 
1.4.3. Subtype 3: combination 
1.5.  Silent thought echo 
1.6.  Ruminations-obsessions 
1.6.1. Subtype 1: pure rumination 
1.6.2. Subtype 2: secondary rumination 
1.6.3. Subtype 3: true obsessions 
1.6.4. Subtype 4: pseudo-obsessions
1.6.5. Subtype 5: rituals/compulsions 
1.7.  Perceptualization of inner speech or thought 
1.7.1. Subtype 1: internalized 
1.7.2. Subtype 2: equivalents 
1.7.3. Subtype 3: internal as first-rank symptom 
1.7.4. Subtype 4: external 
1.8.  Spatialization of experience 
1.9.  Ambivalence 
1.10. Inability to discriminate modalities of intentionality 
1.11. Disturbance of thought initiative/intentionality 
1.12. Attentional disturbances 
1.12.1. Subtype 1: captivation by details 
1.12.2. Subtype 2: inability to split attention
1.13. Disorder of short-term memory 
1.14. Disturbance of time experience 
1.14.1. Subtype 1: disturbance in subjective time 
1.14.2. Subtype 2: disturbance in the existential time (temporality)
1.15. Discontinuous awareness of own action
1.16. Discordance between expression and expressed 
1.17. Disturbance of expressive language function 
2. Self-awareness and presence
2.1.  Diminished sense of basic self 
2.1.1. Subtype 1: early in life 
2.1.2. Subtype 2: from adolescence 
2.2.  Distorted first-person perspective 
2.2.1. Subtype 1: mineness/subjecthood 
2.2.2. Subtype 2: experiential distance
2.2.3. Subtype 3: spatialization of self 
2.3.  Psychic depersonalization (self-alienation)
2.3.1. Subtype 1: melancholiform depersonalization
2.3.2. Subtype 2: unspecified depersonalization 
2.4.  Diminished presence
2.4.1. Subtype 1: not being affected
2.4.2. Subtype 2: distance to the world 
2.4.3. Subtype 3: as subtype 2 plus derealization
2.5.  Derealization 
2.5.1. Subtype 1: fluid global derealization
2.5.2. Subtype 2: intrusive derealization
2.6.  Hyperreflectivity; increased reflectivity 
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2.7.  I-split (‘Ich-Spaltung’)
2.7.1. Subtype 1: I-split suspected
2.7.2. Subtype 2: ‘as if’ experience
2.7.3. Subtype 3: concrete spatialized experience
2.7.4. Subtype 4: delusional elaboration
2.8. Dissociative depersonalization 
2.8.1. Subtype 1: ‘as if’ phenomenon 
2.8.2. Subtype 2: dissociative visual hallucination
2.9.  Identity confusion
2.10. Sense of change in relation to chronological age
2.11. Sense of change in relation to gender
2.11.1. Subtype 1: occasional fear of being homosexual
2.11.2. Subtype 2: a feeling as if being of the opposite sex
2.12. Loss of common sense/perplexity/lack of natural evidence
2.13. Anxiety
2.13.1. Subtype 1: panic attacks with autonomous symptoms
2.13.2. Subtype 2: psychic-mental anxiety
2.13.3. Subtype 3: phobic anxiety
2.13.4. Subtype 4: social anxiety 
2.13.5. Subtype 5: diffuse, free-floating pervasive anxiety
2.13.6. Subtype 6: paranoid anxiety
2.14. Ontological anxiety
2.15. Diminished transparency of consciousness 
2.16. Diminished initiative
2.17. Hypohedonia
2.18. Diminished vitality
2.18.1. Subtype 1: state-like
2.18.2. Subtype 2: trait-like 
3. Bodily experiences
3.1.  Morphological change
3.1.1. Subtype 1: sensation of change
3.1.2. Subtype 2: perception of change
3.2.  Mirror-related phenomena
3.2.1. Subtype 1: search for change
3.2.2. Subtype 2: perception of change
3.2.3. Subtype 3: other phenomena
3.3.  Somatic depersonalization (bodily estrangement)
3.4.  Psychophysical misfit and psychophysical split
3.5.  Bodily disintegration
3.6.  Spatialization (objectification) of bodily experiences
3.7.  Cenesthetic experiences
3.8.  Motor disturbances
3.8.1. Subtype 1: pseudo-movements of the body
3.8.2. Subtype 2: motor interference
3.8.3. Subtype 3: motor blocking
3.8.4. Subtype 4: sense of motor paresis
3.8.5. Subtype 5: desautomation of movement
3.9.  Mimetic experience (resonance between own movement and others’ 
movements) 
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4. Demarcation/transitivism
4.1.  Confusion with the other
4.2.  Confusion with one’s own specular image
4.3.  Threatening bodily contact and feelings of fusion with another
4.3.1. Subtype 1: feeling unpleasant, anxiety provoking
4.3.2. Subtype 2: feeling of disappearance, annihilation
4.4.  Passivity mood (‘Beeinflussungsstimmung’)
4.5.  Other transitivistic phenomena 
5. Existential reorientation
5.1.  Primary self-reference phenomena
5.2.  Feeling of centrality
5.3.  Feeling as if the subject’s experiential field is the only extant reality
5.4.  ‘As if’ feelings of extraordinary creative power, extraordinary insight into 
hidden dimensions of reality, or extraordinary insight into own mind or the 
mind of others
5.5.  ‘As if’ feeling that the experienced world is not truly real, existing, as if it was 
only somehow apparent, illusory or deceptive
5.6.  Magical ideas linked to the subject’s way of experiencing
5.7.  Existential or intellectual change
5.8.  Solipsistic grandiosity 
Most of these items are closely related to the established symptomatology of 
schizophrenia. One might specifically detect the influence of phenomenology 
in items such as 1.10 (»Inability to discriminate modalities of intentionality«), 
1.14 (»Disturbance of time experience«), and 2.2 (»Distorted first-person per-
spective«) among others.
The EASE procedure is to go through all of these items in a semistructured 
interview. That is, one is not required to start from the top and go through all 
of the items one by one. Rather, one should attempt to have a semi-natural 
conversation with the patient, in which all the above issues are covered. The 
ideal is a mutual, interactive reflection involving patient and interviewer in 
which the interviewer prompts the patient to talk in her own words about ex-
periences of the relevant kinds (Parnas et al. 2005, p. 238).
The interviewer is to score all items on a five point Likert-type scale defined 
as below:
0 — Absence: Definitely absent / never experienced.
1 — Questionably present: Perhaps experienced, but either recollected only at few 
occasions, or very dimly, during the patient’s life.
2 — Present Mild: Definitely experienced, at least three times in total (usually more 
frequently), but 2 at irregular occasions; the symptom does not constitute a 
major problem or source of distress for the patient.
4 — Moderate: Symptom is present either daily for extended periods of time (e.g. at 
least daily in one week twice a year) or frequently but sporadically over at least 
12 months (may constitute a problem or a source of distress).
5 — Severe: Almost constantly present (e.g. daily during recent 2 weeks); typically 
stressful, 5 source of suffering and dysfunction.
Blank — Not scorable.
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Usually when a Likert-scale is used, the person examined is asked to choose 
herself between the different scores. In EASE, the interviewer scores the 
patient’s experiences and the patient is not explicitly made aware of the scor-
ing at all. Patients are not informed about the specific content or topics the 
interview is targeting. And they are not asked to confirm the scoring.
This is not necessarily invalidating. Indeed, it could be considered as a way 
of blinding the study in order to avoid situations in which patients attempt to 
behave in accordance with expectations, or, to the contrary, deny having had 
such experiences in order not to appear »insane«.  Nevertheless, it does ap-91
pear somewhat peculiar to blind participants from the topics of the interview, 
when the interview is about their private, phenomenological experiences.
Certainly, the epistemic authority of Likert scaling is far from impressive 
even in its original form. Certainly, there is not much to gain from purism with 
regard to the use of this tool. But all in all, the third-person quantitative as-
sessment of subjective structures of EASE is quite far from original philoso-
phical phenomenological method in any of its versions (as will be discussed 
in more detail below).
On this backdrop, we are ready to embark on the specific analysis of the 
NP2014 approach.
The NP2014 approach
The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to an approach based analysis 
of the approach of (Nordgaard & Parnas 2014). The NP2014 approach is 
quite complex and incorporates a number of parallel agendas. What is pre-
sented in the following is therefore a somewhat idealised representation of 
this interdisciplinary approach. I will focus on what is presented as ‘Aim (1)’ 
»To examine the specificity of Examination of Anomalous Self-Experiences 
(EASE) measured SD to the schizophrenia spectrum disorder in first contact 
inpatients« (p. 1300), since I consider this to be the primary investigation of 
the article. The remaining three aims will not be discussed. What will be dis-
cussed, nevertheless reveals a number of interesting issues. The analysis 
shows, that NP2014 incorporates a number of significant weaknesses which 
appear to arise from the attempts to combine elements from quite distant 
parent approaches. It also points out possible steps to ameliorate some as-
pects of this situation. Thus, the analysis shows that, at least in this case, the 
approach based approach can deliver interesting and relevant results—even 
in a fairly concise format.
Parent approaches? 
One of the basic steps in approach based analysis is to figure out (to the ex-
tent possible) what the specific parent approaches are. The next step is to 
determine which elements of the parent approaches are combined in the inte-
grated approach in focus.
 Recall Hacking’s notion of “interactive kinds” briefly mentioned above.91
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As discussed above: For all practical purposes, when working on an inter-
disciplinary project, you need a base somewhere (i.e. within some discipline). 
And when you are working from within some base discipline, you have to 
abide by its rules to a certain extent. This applies even if your interdisciplinary 
project suggests that certain basic assumptions of your home discipline are 
fundamentally flawed. As determined above in this chapter, EASE is based 
firmly within psychiatry. Most of the publications are in psychiatric journals or 
edited volumes related to psychiatry. This is quite reasonable, since the prac-
tical issues related to the problem addressed (how to best understand schizo-
phrenia) is ultimately handled within psychiatry.
So, standard contemporary psychiatry is the base discipline. It is, however, 
difficult to identify one specific psychiatric approach as the psychiatric parent. 
In this case, though, standard contemporary psychiatry has very well estab-
lished norms for carrying out their science. This means that there are a num-
ber of standard tools, requirements, and assumptions, which are quite firmly 
established across the discipline. Consequently, it may be acceptable to con-
sider psychiatry as one generalised parent »approach« in this instance. And, 
indeed, in EASE the goal is to de-idealise by adding nuance which would 
affect most if not all approaches relying on the established understanding of 
schizophrenia.
What are the other involved approaches, then?
As is evident from several of the above quotations, phenomenological 
philosophy is highlighted as one of the most important inputs combined with 
the base in psychiatry. Phenomenological philosophy is, however, a quite 
heterogenous bundle of approaches, and it is required to narrow things down. 
The most well known representatives of phenomenological philosophy are 
Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Each of these defended a dis-
tinct variety of phenomenology and phenomenological method, and they all 
reached different results (Smith 2013). Further, none of these agree with Karl 
Jaspers’ take on a psychopathological phenomenology.
In NP2014 few of the elements explicitly discussed appear to be imported 
from classical phenomenological approaches. The influence is obvious, how-
ever, especially on the language used in certain parts of the article. Indeed, 
one indication of some difficulties related to the integration is that the authors 
appear to have trouble integrating the different elements even at the linguistic 
level. Most of the elements drawn from (or rather inspired by) phenomenology 
are described in quite rich and metaphorical language in the section entitled 
»Introduction«. As an example, it is stated that in normal functioning cognition, 
»I am always already aware of “I-me-myself,” with no need for introspection or 
reflection to assure myself of being myself« (p. 1301). In the following section, 
entitled »Methods«, language and focus changes considerably. In this section 
we hear of samples, inclusion criteria, exclusion criteria, informed consent, 
polydiagnostic checklists, Likert scales, Cronbach’s alpha, ANOVA, and simi-
lar. None of these are discussed in any classical phenomenological writings I 
have come across.
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We need to look at earlier EASE-related publications to figure out which 
elements are imported from phenomenology.
One example is Husserl's distinction between noematic and noetic aspects 
of consciousness:
Noema are the intentional objects, that which consciousness is directed 
against, whereas noetic refers to subjective processes or structures that 
shape consciousness. The noetic structures in focus include distinct modes 
of intentionality (e.g., you may perceive, remember, or imagine the same 
object. Perceiving, remembering, or imagining are different modes of inten-
tionality) as well as certain structures of ongoing self-awareness and em-
bodiment the distortion of which are assumed to be fundamental in 
schizophrenia (Sass & Parnas 2003, p. 429 f.). 
The inspiration from these concepts is clear in some of the items of the EASE 
interview guide (especially 1.10 and 1.11). Another example is the assumption 
that through phenomenological reduction we are able to reach the (necessary 
and universal) core of what phenomena are (as they appear to the »reduc-
tionist«). »[P]henomenological reduction […] is a specific kind of reflection en-
abling our access to the structures of subjectivity« (Parnas & Zahavi 2002a, p. 
158).
In EASE, and NP2014, these elements are somewhat distorted, though, 
given that in EASE the target is not the structure of ones own subjectivity nor, 
importantly, for that matter universal or necessary aspects of subjectivity. It 
cannot be, since by considering the subjectivity of schizophrenia patients as 
fundamentally disturbed their subjectivity is considered to be operating differ-
ently from the »normal« way. Structural elements or dysfunctions which are 
not part of well functioning subjectivity can neither be universal nor necessary, 
of course. The targets in EASE are derived disturbances of structures which, 
through phenomenological analysis, are concluded to be necessary for the 
healthy operation of subjectivity. The disturbances themselves are out of 
reach for the phenomenological investigator (unless the investigator suffers 
from self-disturbances which none of the central members of the EASE team 
apparently do).
The targets in EASE are thus made up from phenomena which the reduc-
tionist does not have first-person access to. Phenomenological reduction is 
transformed into a method for accessing the core structures of subjectivity of 
psychiatric patients. Reaching these core structures is attempted through the 
interpretation of texts and verbal expressions by schizophrenic patients.
This immediately adds another complication. Noting that detailed first per-
son descriptions of negative symptoms are extremely rare, the french sur-
realist dramatist and poet Antonin Artaud is invoked as »virtually the only per-
son with schizophrenia who has described negative symptoms in real detail«. 
(Sass & Parnas 2003, p. 435).
There are some significant problems related to using the Artaud-case. Due 
to his considerable success as an actor, playwright, and poet, he was certain-
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ly not your average schizophrenia patient. That he was an opium addict since 
the age of 22 and that some of his writings were produced in states of abstin-
ence cast serious doubts on their status as descriptions of typical experiences 
of someone suffering from schizophrenia. Further, it is at least somewhat iron-
ic to include a case such as Artaud’s in historical accounts of self-disturban-
ces, when substance abuse is an exclusion criteria for participating in EASE 
studies (as discussed below) as well as for being diagnosed with schizo-
phrenia (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p. 99).
It is not unfair to say that in this version, what remains of original pheno-
menological approaches is transformed almost beyond recognition and put to 
use in ways quite different from originally intended. There are reasons to 
doubt whether using this distorted version of phenomenology is suitable for 
the purposes of EASE.
How distant are the parent approaches? 
Contemporary operationalised psychiatry and philosophical phenomenology 
appear to be quite distant. There are few, if any, overlaps in terms of tools and 
assumptions between the two disciplines. Most significantly, current psychia-
try is very much a quantitative, »objective« enterprise, whereas the phenome-
nological focus on qualitative, subjective states and structures pulls in a quite 
different direction.
Jaspers’ phenomenological psychopathology could perhaps be considered 
a middle ground between the two. It is, obviously, more closely related to 
psychiatry, and since this is a central source for EASE elements and assump-
tions (as has been specified in (Parnas et al. 2013)) the parent approaches 
may be more proximate than initial impressions admit. However, it is worth re-
membering that the phenomenological as well as the psychiatric elements of 
Jaspers’ hybrid approach were very different from current psychiatry and 
phenomenology. Further, it is worth bearing in mind that Jaspers encountered 
significant difficulties with his attempt to develop a phenomenological psycho-
pathology, and that some very central problems were never solved (Fulford et 
al. 2006, ch. 9).
When proximity is »measured« by the number of shared elements and as-
sumptions, contemporary psychiatry and phenomenology (in any version) are 
quite distant.
The vehicle of the integrated approach 
What is the vehicle of representation in NP2014 and how is it related to the 
other approaches of EASE? The NP2014 article does not present a novel 
vehicle of representation. The specific NP2014 approach is constructed to test 
the specificity of disturbances of the basic self to schizophrenia spectrum dis-
orders (Nordgaard & Parnas 2014, p. 1300). Thus, what is presented in 
NP2014 are further reasons in favour of a previously presented vehicle. The 
vehicle of representation of NP2014 is therefore the same one used in other 
EASE publications (this appears to be quite stable). We have to look else-
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where for clear expressions of what this vehicle is: Across the EASE frame-
work, schizophrenia is represented as an ipseity disturbance—a disturbance 
of the so-called basic self. 
Schizophrenia, we argue, is fundamentally a self-disorder or ipseity distur-
bance (ipse is Latin for "self" or "itself) that is characterized by compl-men-
tary distortions of the act of awareness: hyperreflexivity and diminished self-
affection. (Sass & Parnas 2003, p. 427)
In the concluding section of the same article, this is repeated in slightly 
different terms:
We have argued that schizophrenia is best understood as a particular kind of 
disorder of consciousness and self-experience. We described specific 
alterations of self-experience and the self-world relationship that we see as 
fundamental to the illness, especially diminished self-affection, hyper-
reflexivity, and related disruptions of the field of awareness. (Ibid., p. 439)
This, I believe, quite clearly defines a propositional model of what is believed 
to be fundamentally wrong with people suffering from schizophrenia. On a 
very soft version of the medical model, this might even be considered an 
acceptable explanation for the illness (though not necessarily a good one, of 
course).
But how, more specifically, are self-disturbances construed? Referring to 
(Zahavi 2005) it is stated that:
Phenomenology and neuroscience operate here with the notions of “minimal” 
or “core” self to describe a structure of experience that necessarily must be 
in place in order for the experience to be subjective, ie, to be someone’s ex-
perience. (Nordgaard & Parnas 2014, p. 1301)
Throughout the EASE texts the expressions ‘core self’, ‘minimal self’, ‘basic 
self’, and ‘ipseity’ appears to be used synonymously (Nordgaard & Parnas 
2014; Parnas 2000; Parnas et al. 1998; Parnas et al. 2005; Raballo & Parnas 
2011; Sass & Parnas 2003). It is this core, pre-reflective self which is assum-
ed to be disturbed in schizophrenia. That assumption implicates another as-
sumption, namely that normal functioning lives up to the ideal of an undisturb-
ed basic self. At least this appears to be part of the background for stating 
that:
The minimal sense of self is always coupled with an automatic, unreflected 
immersion in the shared social world, variously designated, eg, “common 
sense,” “sense of reality,” “fonction du réel.” The world is always there, tacitly 
grasped as a real and self-evident background of all experience and 
meaning. (Nordgaard & Parnas 2014, p. 1301)
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It is even more clearly expressed in the following:
Tacitness is crucial; it is […] the pre-reflective subjecthood, ipseity, or self-
awareness that is in turn the medium through which all intentional activity is 
realized. Any disturbance of this tacit-focal structure, or of the ipseity it im-
plies, is likely to have subtle but broadly reverberating effects; such disturban-
ces must necessarily upset the balance and shake the foundations of both 
self and world. (Parnas 2000, p. 122)
These are quite radical statement of an (a priori) assumption about the nature 
of normal cognition. Can we really rule out that well-functioning individuals 
sometimes have slips of »self-cognisance«? Do we know that this »automatic, 
unreflected immersion in the shared social world« is always fully functional? 
Would we (through phenomenological analysis) be able to tell whether our 
own sense of self is sometimes disturbed or confused? Is such a generali-
sation reasonable?
The assumption that self-disturbances are central to schizophrenia is sup-
ported by references to a number of historical accounts in psychopathology.
The notion of a disordered self in schizophrenia as its core phenotypic feature 
was articulated, in various terms and clarity in all classic texts on schizo-
phrenia (Kraepelin, Bleuler, Minkowski, Berze, Gruhle, Jaspers, Kronfeld) […] 
Kraepelin considered “disunity of consciousness” as a generative disorder in 
schizophrenia, whereas Eugen Bleuler listed the experiential disorders of the 
ego among the so-called “complex fundamental” (diagnostic) schizophrenic 
symptom. Jaspers observed that in schizophrenia, “Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo 
sum’ (I think therefore I am) may still be superficially cogitated but it is no 
longer a valid experience”. (Nordgaard & Parnas 2014, p. 1300)
It is unclear, though, to what extent these notions of “disunity of conscious-
ness”, “experiential disorders of the ego”, or a “superficial sense of existence” 
are in fact similar to the notion of a disturbed »pre-reflective subjecthood«. To 
invoke these as support for the claim that disturbances of the basic self plays 
a significant causal role in schizophrenia (without further explication) is at 
least a stretch.
Schneider’s discussion of a »“radical qualitative change” in the field of con-
sciousness, comprising a disturbed first personal perspective (“Ichheit”) and a 
disturbed sense of “mineness” of experience (“Meinhaftigkeit”)« (quoted in: 
Nordgaard & Parnas 2014, p. 1300) seems more obviously related to the 
EASE perspective. However, it is worth noticing that Schneider understood 
the phenomena he described to be generating the first-rank symptoms (i.e. 
the positive symptoms). In contrast, in EASE the disturbances of the basic self 
is mainly understood as causing negative symptoms and formal thought dis-
order (Nordgaard & Parnas 2014, p. 1301; Sass & Parnas 2003). It is, to put it 
in plain terms, not entirely clear to what extent these examples from the 
history of psychopathology can reasonably be invoked in support for the cen-
tral assumptions of the EASE framework.
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In NP2014 it is clearly stated that self-disturbances are considered to con-
stitute a symptom generating foundation of schizophrenia:
In other words, SD should not be considered as sequelae of psychosis. 
Rather they seem to reflect a more fundamental and generative layer of 
psychopathology. (Nordgaard & Parnas 2014, p. 1305)
The claim that self-disturbances play a causal role in the generation of nega-
tive symptoms and formal thought disorder is certainly intriguing. But until 
some account for this causal chain is presented, it is merely a bold conjecture.
As an interesting note, according to Karl Jaspers, phenomenology can tell 
us nothing about genesis. As Jaspers stated in his phenomenologische 
psychopathologie: 
[…] [P]henomenology has nothing to do with the genesis of psychic pheno-
mena. Though its practice is a prerequisite for any causal investigation it 
leaves genetic issues aside, and they can neither refute nor further its 
findings. Causal studies […] are alien to it; yet such factual investigations 
have been less of a danger than those “cerebral mythologies” which have 
sought to interpret phenomenology and replace it by theoretical constructions 
of physiological and pathological cerebral processes. (Jaspers 1968)92
EASE is not claiming anything about what causes self-disturbances, but only 
about the effects of having them. What Jaspers would have thought about this 
analysis of causality is elusive.
In EASE and NP2014, then, the vehicle of representation is a hybrid incor-
porating the standard model of schizophrenia from DSM and ICD with all the 
established symptoms retained. Added to this is the notion of a basic self 
working in a particular way, which can be disturbed. Such disturbances are 
considered to play a causal role in the generation of a subset of the symptoms 
characterising schizophrenia.
The target
Succinctly put, the general target of EASE is people suffering from schizo-
phrenia. These are represented as having certain disturbances of the basic 
self which are considered to generate a series of (other) symptoms.
The special contribution from NP2014 to the EASE project is that EASE-
scores are compared between groups with different psychiatric diagnoses. 
Comparisons are between (W1) a group of patients diagnosed with schizo-
phrenia and other nonaffective psychosis, (W2) patients diagnosed with schi-
 Apart from his opinion about the utility of phenomenology in studies of genesis, it is 92
interesting that Jaspers appear to express a strong disdain for interdisciplinarity in this quote. 
The danger of »cerebral mythologies« can best be understood along the lines of »the 
seductive allure of neuroscience« discussed in chapter 3 (Weisberg et al. 2008). Certainly, 
Jaspers did not endorse a strong medical model.
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zotypal personality disorder (SPD), and (W3) a group of patients with other 
diagnoses (e.g. bipolar disorder, major depression, anxiety disorders, OCD, 
and non-schizotypal personality disorders).
The NP2014 approach thus has a trident-structure as illustrated in figure 
17. Each spearhead is targeting a distinct group of people with different 
psychiatric diagnoses.
This means that (almost) identical approaches are applied to three different 
(though closely related) targets and the results are compared (primarily by 
means of ANOVA) before conclusions are drawn about the vehicle.
The coloured background fields are meant to illustrate how the approach 
starts out by using standard psychiatric elements only to make a sharp shift 
into the use of elements picked from qualitative approaches. These are follow-
ed by a gradual return to psychiatric standards through a step-by-step quanti-
fication in order to meet the psychiatric requirements of statistically significant 
results.
The main conclusion is, that the application of the NP2014 approach dis-
plays a significantly higher level of self-disturbances in group (W1 = schizo-
phrenia patients) and (W2 = SPD patients) compared to (W3 = patients with 
other diagnoses).
FIGURE 17: THE NP2014 APPROACH.
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An interesting detail is that the third spearhead, the application of the ap-
proach to (W3), is included in order to falsify that the vehicle is a good repre-
sentation of this particular group. The aim of this falsification is, of course, to 
strengthen the conviction that self-disturbances are specific to schizophrenia 
(and SPD).
In the following section I will go through the most important elements and 
assumptions of the intermediate layer. I will outline the perspective of each 
element and how it transforms its inputs.
The intermediate layer
There is a tension between two fundamental assumptions of EASE. These in 
turn characterise the two classes of elements which the integration aims to 
combine.
1) The importance of in-depth qualitative analysis 
Drawn from Jaspers is the central assumption that in-depth analysis of 
individual cases are of central importance:
First, examination of single cases, as already pointed out by Jaspers, is very 
important. Reports from few patients, able to describe their experiences in 
detail, may be more informative of the nature of the disorder than big N 
studies performed in a crude, simplified way. Subjective experience or first-
person perspective, by its very nature, cannot be averaged, except at the cost 
of heavy informational loss. (Parnas & Zahavi 2002a, p. 156) 
Unfortunately, such assumptions are difficult to combine with well entrenched 
standards of medicine where the attitude towards N is »the more the merrier«. 
Indeed, the assumption about the importance of in-depth analysis ends up in 
marked tension with the other most basic assumption of EASE, namely:
2) The significance of quantification 
The second assumption is about the importance of quantification in general 
and statistical significance in particular. From a standpoint within the humani-
ties, the suggestion that phenomenology could inform psychopathology may 
appear interesting in itself. But in order to be acceptable to large parts of the 
psychiatric community, data must be quantified. It is quite difficult to publish 
research papers in psychiatric journals without having statistically significant 
results to back your conclusions (Cohen 1994; Everitt 1987). This forces the 
EASE team to quantify their phenomenological results and introduces strong 
incentives for biased representation, in case significant results are not readily 
achieved.
Importantly, I do not mean to suggest that NP2014, or EASE for that matter, 
involve deliberate attempts at scientific fraud. But as recent quite heated 
discussions, for instance in psychology, have shown, demands for publication 
involves implicit incentives to exploit »researcher’s freedom« when seeking 
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statistically significant results (so-called »p-hacking«) (Simmons et al. 2011; 
Simonsohn et al. 2014). In some cases p-hacking may be unintentional—in 
other cases researchers may believe that their goals justify the means.
The elements
The vehicle of representation used in NP2014 is quite clearly a hybrid be-
tween current psychiatry and phenomenology in some form. But how and to 
what extent is the intermediate layer hybridised? The analysis hereof will 
show some interesting issues related to the epistemic merits of the NP2014 
approach.
In the following, I will go through the most important elements of the inter-
mediate layer. I suggest the reader keep an eye on the colourful »Figure 17« 
above for reference.
Target group delimitations (definitions/algorithms) 
Operational definitions of the DSM VI are used to pick out the target groups 
among first admitted patients at the Psychiatric Centre Hvidovre. Importantly, 
all patients were diagnosed by the authors collectively, on the basis of video 
interviews, notes, and hospital charts (Nordgaard & Parnas 2014, p. 1302). 
The importance of this aspect will be evident in several places below.
The first thing worth noticing is that the diagnostic categories of current 
psychiatry are retained. This choice in itself raises several interesting issues. 
Above (in chapter 1) I argued that the vehicle itself does not serve to pick out 
the target. One might, however, pick out one’s target in ways that are more or 
less true to the vehicle used. In the case of EASE, the target, i.e. people suf-
fering from various mental illnesses (most importantly schizophrenia), are 
picked out by means of standard DSM diagnostics. 
Self-disturbances may be more common in groups of people diagnosed 
with schizophrenia. But this does not mean that self-disturbances do not occur 
among people not diagnosed with schizophrenia.  Consequently, the exten-93
sion of »people who are or will be diagnosed with schizophrenia« and the 
extension of »people who suffer from self-disturbances« may differ consider-
ably. If one believes that self-disturbances should be included in the definition 
of schizophrenia, it appears odd to select one’s target group by means of a 
tool which ignores these core aspects.
However, in spite of clear awareness of the problems related to operational 
definition in psychiatry,  the EASE team’s hands are tied due to their base in 94
psychiatry. Using official diagnostic criteria is one of the rules by which you 
 This is likely to be the case even if we ignore the significant problems of false positives and 93
false negatives which plague psychiatric diagnostics (Cohen 1994, p. 998 f.).
 Josef Parnas, has published extensively on various problems of contemporary psychiatry, 94
for instance those related to operationalisation, e.g. (Parnas & Bovet 2014).
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simply have to abide in order to get your papers published as well as your 
projects funded.
Refusing to use official taxonomy and instead stipulating a new qualitative 
definition of schizophrenia relying on continental philosophy would amount to 
bibliometric suicide. When »publish or perish« rules, that strategy is out of the 
question. It seems safe to assume that the people involved in EASE are well 
aware of these issues.
Obviously, then, the targeting elements derive from psychiatry.
Exclusion criteria 
In medical research, sets of exclusion criteria are standard tools. These are 
used as a means to obtain a more homogeneous target group. The exclusion 
criteria in NP2014 exclude patients who are aggressive, agitated, severely 
psychotic, or who have clinically dominating alcohol or substance abuse, a 
history of brain injury, mental retardation, or organic brain disorder. Involun-
tarily admitted and legal patients are also excluded (Nordgaard & Parnas 
2014, p. 1302).
This is a pragmatic, and widely accepted, solution to a significant difficulty 
inherent to studies of psychiatric disorders, namely that diagnostics is entirely 
based on symptoms. Some patients will display symptoms simply due to drug 
abuse or brain damage which are not considered identical to the psychiatric 
disorders in question. Exclusion criteria similar to those employed in NP2014 
are commonsensical solutions to problems following from ignoring aetiology in 
diagnostics.
In NP2014, as in many other studies, the exclusion criteria also introduce 
substantial distortion, however. A very large proportion of first-admitted 
patients in the schizophrenia group (W1) are excluded on these criteria. On 
the other hand, a considerably smaller proportion of patients in (W2) and (W3) 
are excluded. 
Excluding a large part of the most severely plagued patients in a study of 
what characterises members of a specific diagnostic category certainly raises 
considerable doubts about whether conclusions drawn can be generalised to 
the entire category. Further, it is an empirical question whether the more »diffi-
cult« patients have higher or lower levels of self-disturbance. One could even 
imagine that a lower level of self-disturbance might contribute to their propen-
sity for drug abuse or aggression. Low levels of self-disturbance would mean 
that they were better equipped to grasp their situation in all its difficult details
Input:
Output:
Issues:
First admitted patients at Psychiatric Centre Hvidovre.
These very patients sorted in three (more or less complex) 
categories.
1) All the problems discussed in chapter 6 regarding operational 
definition. 2) The problem of delimiting the target without taking its 
(alleged) essential features into account.
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—and consequently they might be more prone to seek comfort in »self-medi-
cation«.
Exclusion criteria as a tool is a psychiatric element.
Semistructured interviews, expertise, and the Likert scale 
In the following section, three distinct elements will be treated as a unit, since 
they are the essential components of the EASE interview method. These also 
constitute the central methodological contribution to the study of schizo-
phrenia.
1) Semistructured interview
Semistructured interviews are used as a tool for gaining access to the raw 
data, i.e. the subjective states and structures of the patients. This is a com-
plex tool involving propositional algorithms determining the rules for how this 
kind of interview is carried out. There is an element of chaos  involved, 95
though, in the sense that it is not possible to predict the structure a semi-
structured interview will end up having. This is assumed not to be a problem 
though, as long as the interview ends up having covered all the items of the 
interview guide.
The semistructured interview is an example of an anonymised tool im-
ported from qualitative science. It has especially been used in areas such as 
sociology, anthropology, and psychology (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, p. 130 ff.). 
Semistructured interviews are often considered to provide reliable, compar-
able qualitative data.  Indeed, as part of the EASE project the interrater reli-
ability of the EASE interview guide has been assessed to be »good to ex-
cellent among trained interviewers« (Møller et al. 2011; Nordgaard & Parnas 
2014, p. 1301).
In EASE, the purpose of the semistructured interview is to contribute to 
bridging the gap between the qualitative focus of phenomenology and the 
qualitative focus of psychiatry.
It is worth noting that the particular EASE interview guide is itself hybridised 
by incorporating phenomenological concepts among established conceptuali-
sations of schizophrenic symptomatology.
Input:
Output:
Issues:
The three groups of patients.
A reduced and homogenised version of the W1, W2, and W3. 
Especially the schizophrenia group is significantly distorted since 
the most severely affected patients are excluded. This significantly 
reduces the reliability of generalisations made on the basis of the 
sample.
 In the technical sense of a dynamical system which is highly sensitive to initial conditions. 95
See (Kellert 2009) for an interesting discussion of chaos theory and interdisciplinarity.
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2) Specialists’ categorisation
The EASE guide explicitly rely on the skills for categorisation (i.e. the ability to 
recognise prototypical instances of certain classes of phenomena) of »well-
trained« clinicians:
Prototype can be empirically established by examining the co-occurrence of 
its various features; this happens tacitly in the formation of a diagnostic skill, 
due to pre-reflective sedimentations of experiences and acquisition of theore-
tical knowledge. (Parnas & Zahavi 2002b, p. 156 f.)
In this way the categorisation skills of the »properly trained« psychiatrist are 
used as an instrument for measuring self-disturbances in the patients during 
semistructured interviews.  As discussed in chapter 6, there is a large and 96
interesting literature in cognitive psychology focused on expert categorisation 
(e.g. Medin et al. 1997). Indeed, there is convincing empirical evidence that 
experts categorise more accurately than laymen in some contexts.
Still, there are troubling issues of calibration and bias involved. Calibration 
first: Ian Hacking has discussed problems of calibration related to the deve-
lopment of new ways of measuring intangible phenomena. Already estab-
lished norms and facts may prevent one from reaching too divergent results. 
One of Hacking’s examples was certain established convictions which IQ-
tests were not allowed to challenge when originally developed. When, at first, 
women did better on IQ-tests than men, the tests had to be changed. It was 
ruled out a priori that women could be more intelligent than men, so the test 
required »calibration« to increase its »fidelity« to a satisfying level (Hacking 
1998, p. 173). Similarly, the EASE framework involves (synthetic) a priori 
stipulations about which categories of people may suffer from self-disturban-
ces. EASE tests will have to align with these framing assumptions.
A related issue is that EASE-interviewing and categorisation is liable to be 
affected by interviewer bias to a considerable extent. During an interview, the 
interviewer will be less motivated to pursue topics that indicate evidence to 
the contrary of what is the expected (and desired) outcome. This effect is 
especially strong when, as in NP2014, measurement relies on the expert 
categorisation of one of the persons who have diagnosed the participants in 
the first place (and who, as co-author of NP2014, has a strong professional in-
terest in reaching clear and interesting results).
3) The Likert Scale
The most significant gap to bridge, then, is that between the qualitative data 
gained from the phenomenologically inspired interviews and the quantitative 
 In a less friendly tone, Kieran Healy criticises reliance on the sophisticated judgment of 96
people in possession of esoteric expertise. He claims that, a »weak methodological core 
invites connoisseurs«, and that »[…] connoisseurship thrives best in settings where judgment 
is needed but measurement is hard«. (Healy forthcoming)
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standards of psychiatry. It is in the effort to make these odd ends meet that 
the most troubling issues arise.
Qualitative data addressed in the semistructured interviews are, via expert 
categorisation, quantified by means of a five point Likert scale. The Likert 
scale was originally developed for measuring attitudes by asking people to 
state the extent to which they agree with a series of statements about a given 
topic (Likert 1932). In an original Likert-type test, respondents are thus offered 
the choice between a number of fixed responses. The possible responses in 
EASE were noted above.
Importantly, as mentioned above, in EASE it is not the interviewee who 
gets to choose the answer, but the interviewer who decides whether some 
particular aspect of self-disturbance is present. 
Using semistructured interviews in this way, i.e. in connection with assess-
ments of subjective structures, is quite unusual in psychiatry. Perhaps this is 
why other standards normally taken for granted are apparently overridden. 
Blinding to the extent possible is considered highly desirable throughout 
medical science. Especially in observational studies, blinding is recommend-
able in order to reduce suspicions, as well as the impact, of bias. It is interest-
ing, that these basically sound elements of standard psychiatric research are 
»forgotten« in this interdisciplinary context.
This triad constitutes the way the subjective, experiences of the patients are 
registered and transformed into objective, quantitative data.
Dichotomisation 
Probably no one would consider the Likert-scale to be a terribly exact instru-
ment in any of its versions. However, it certainly does not constitute an im-
provement that in NP2014 the five point responses are idealised into dichoto-
mous results. Even though one does gain something in terms of simplicity, 
one pays a costly price in the currency of fidelity.
The dichotomisation is achieved by means of a very simple algorithm. All 
items scoring »0« or »1« are subsumed as »absent«. All items scoring is »2«, 
»4«, or »5« are subsumed as »present«. In spite of its simplicity, this man-
oeuvre is central and therefore deserves a brief discussion of its own.
There can be little discussion that this dichotomisation is dubious. In one 
blow, it removes a very significant part of the quantitative nuance supposedly 
obtained. It is obvious that very different results on the five point scale may 
Input:
Output:
Issues:
The qualitative responses of the patients in the reduced and 
homogenised versions of W1, W2, and W3.
A quantitative measure of the disturbances of subjectivity of the 
patients in each group.
How reliable are specialist categorisation? Especially: how reliable 
are the categorisations of unblinded specialists’ categorisations 
when they have a professional interest in obtaining particular 
significant results?
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end up identical in the dichotomised version. Just think of the most extreme 
situation in which all patients in one group are scored as »0« (absence) on all 
items while all patient in a second group are scored as »5« (severe) on all 
items. Compare this to the situation in which all patients in group one are 
scored as »1« (questionably present) on all items and the patients in group 
two are scored as »2« (present mild) on all items. These two radically different 
results would appear identical after being dichotomised. Importantly, in all but 
the first mentioned extreme scenario the effect in the dichotomised version 
will be stronger than the original result.
Even more seriously, it is apparently the dichotomised figures which are fed 
into the statistical calculations upon which conclusions are drawn. Thus, 
ANOVA is used to analyse variance after most of the »measured« variance 
has been idealised away. I use the word ‘apparently’ since the data and 
calculations are not included in the article (and are not made publicly available 
elsewhere).
Seemingly, the dichotomisation algorithm is invented for the occasion. 
Obviously not dichotomisation itself, but rather the way it is used. There is no 
explanation of why this is done. One might thus get the impression, that this 
might be a necessary move to get the statistical apparatus to produce the 
desired  (significant) results.
The fairly rich qualitative nuances of the original data from the semi-
structured interviews are increasingly reduced through the central steps of the 
approach. The end result is a sub-representation so radically idealised that 
fidelity is reduced to an absolute minimum. With no discussion of the details of 
these idealisations, no mentioning of the related trade-offs, and consequently 
no attempts to justify their use, these idealisations appear suspect at best.
Statistical tools 
The dichotomised figures are fed into the usual statistical apparatus:
The analytic strategy was straightforward: in exploring the diagnostic dis-
tribution of the EASE scores, the diagnostic groups served as independent 
variable whereas the EASE scores constituted dependent variables, explor-
ed by ANOVA with polynomial (post hoc tests) analysis exploring between-
group differences. (Nordgaard & Parnas 2014, p. 1303)
It is peculiar to explore the variance between three groups of patients after 
having eliminated most of the nuances of the measured variance. The analy-
sis of the variance between dichotomised quantitative representations of a 
Input:
Output:
Issues:
The quantitative five-point Likert-scale data.
A dichotomous version hereof.
This manoeuvre significantly distorts the results of the central 
measuring method. A significant amount of nuance is removed in 
one blow.
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rich and complex qualitative phenomenon is certainly very far from capturing 
actual variation in the structures of subjectivity of psychiatric patients.
On the background of the discussion of problems related to ANOVA above, 
the use of this tool should ring a bell (if not an alarm-clock). Especially since 
the NP2014 does not provide any information about issues deemed crucial 
above. Nowhere in the article are we provided with the data or the calculat-
ions related to this exploration. We see no power calculations or estimations 
of effect sizes. We are left only with the conclusion that deviation from the 
mean is significantly higher in W1 and W2 compared to W3. Further, if the 
mean is the non-disturbed subjective state of healthy individuals (determined 
a priori?), this in itself is a rather dubious reference point.
The vehicle 
The output from the statistical calculation fits one aspect of the vehicle of 
representation neatly, in that it displays a correlation between schizophrenia 
(and SPD) and self-disturbance as measured via the EASE method.
The approach does not show anything about the causal role of self distur-
bances in relation to negative symptoms and formal thought disorder. Neither 
does it indicate that self-disturbances are fundamental to schizophrenia.
The verdict
One can hardly deny that there is a phenomenological side to suffering from 
schizophrenia. Since the subjective aspects of schizophrenia are absent in 
current diagnostics, it seems perfectly reasonable to attempt to develop a 
phenomenologically enriched perspective in order to capture the phenomena 
of schizophrenia more adequately. The quite striking responses of patients 
during EASE interview sessions clearly indicate that the EASE project is in-
deed on to something significant.  At the outset, then, the de-idealising aspi-97
ration of EASE and NP2014 seems justified. 
The authors of NP2014 describe their interdisciplinary enterprise as
[…] a systematic qualitative and quantitative, semistructured exploration of 
SD […] based on the empirical data from extensive, in-depth interviews with 
schizophrenia spectrum patients, a review of classic and contemporary 
German, French, and English language literature, and conceptual inputs from 
philosophy of mind and phenomenology. (Nordgaard & Parnas 2014, p. 1301) 
Input:
Output:
Issues:
The dichotomous data.
A significant difference between the results obtained in W1 and W2 
compared to W3. These appear to corroborate that the vehicle of 
representation captures central aspects of the target.
No further comments.
 This is most apparent in live interview sessions and video recordings. For examples in 97
print, see (Parnas et al. 2005).
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The impression one gets from this description, however, does not correspond 
very well to the results of an approach based analysis. The general claim that 
a phenomenologically enriched account has been developed tells us very little 
about how this act of representation is carried out. Zooming in by means of 
approach based analysis reveals that very little of phenomenology is actually 
retained once the data is fitted to the vehicle.
As discussed above, the review of European psychopathological literature 
does not seem entirely convincing. And though the approach does include 
quantitative as well as qualitative elements, it seems the influence of the latter 
on the final results are negligible. When processed through the elements of 
the hybridised intermediate layer of NP2014, the qualitative data are idealised 
to an extent that the remains bears little resemblance to the outputs of 
»extensive, in-depth interviews«. 
The problems detected through an approach based analysis of NP2014 
appear to be partly the result of integrating elements which do not readily 
combine. In fact, forcing the quantitative standards of psychiatry onto pheno-
menology appears to corrupt both in this approach. On the one hand, the 
qualitative data obtained through the phenomenological elements are dis-
torted almost beyond recognition in the attempt to fit these into the psychiatric 
framework. On the other hand, perfectly sound elements of standard 
psychiatry are either ID-distorted or simply left out of the integrated approach.
Unfortunately, then, the reasonable aspirations of de-idealisation appear to 
be stopped in their tracks by the strict demands of the base discipline. Some 
of the requirements of psychiatry (especially regarding diagnostics and 
quantification) are not up for negotiation if one wishes to publish results in 
psychiatric journals. Attempts to change these aspects would be considered 
»unscientific« and would be met with great resistance. It is thus the basic 
requirements of psychiatry which prevent the desired (and, indeed, highly de-
sirable) increase in accuracy and nuance which was the aim of EASE in the 
first place.
In NP2014 (and EASE in general) the elements transferred from phenome-
nology are transformed and used quite differently compared to the original 
settings:
First, they are used to target the subjective structures of psychiatric 
patients, not the person carrying out the analysis. This is a requirement for 
using the elements in psychiatry. Obviously, it is the patients who are of 
interest, not the psychiatrist. This requires a shift from the first person per-
spective of the phenomenologist to the third person perspective of the 
psychiatrist.
Second, it is disturbances, not healthy operation, which are in focus. Con-
sequently, the tools of phenomenology are no longer used to study the 
universal and necessary structures of subjectivity, but rather disturbances of 
structures of subjectivity. Does this mean that the targeted »structure of 
experience that necessarily must be in place in order for the experience to be 
subjective« is not necessary after all? At least it does not seem that patients 
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diagnosed with schizophrenia lack subjective experience as such. One could 
argue that EASE is targeting minor disturbances which do not undermine 
subjective experience in general, but still have detrimental effects on aspects 
of mental health. Even in this case, though, there is no doubt that the use of 
phenomenology is changed considerably, and that the altered use appears 
less reliable than the original one.
Third, processing the qualitative data from the phenomenological inter-
views through expert categorisation, quantification via Likert-scale, and dicho-
tomisation is a process of strong idealisation which almost entirely removes 
the qualitative richness of the raw data.
The alterations of the qualitative and phenomenological elements in the 
integrated approach are quite considerable. They are implemented in order to 
make these elements fit better to the requirements of the base discipline.
There are considerable changes in the base discipline as well, however.
In many approaches to qualitative science, there is little utility of tools such 
as blinding, randomisation, and control groups. That qualitative elements are 
involved in the NP2014 approach does not make elements such as these 
superfluous, however. 
Not having a control group is equal to deciding a priori on what is the 
normal level of self-disturbances. It should be clear that this is not part of a 
virtuous scientific method. How common is »magical thinking«  (item 5.6), 98
»cenesthetic experiences« (item 3.7), or »a feeling as if being of the opposite 
sex« (item 2.11.2). Controversies related to pathologising issues of gender 
and superstition aside, it seems unwarranted to decide a priori on the preva-
lence of these »disturbances« in the population at large. Until some empiric-
ally supported understanding of how common self-disturbances are among 
healthy individuals is established, it is difficult to determine wether including 
items such as those discussed above constitutes distortions of what is indeed 
pathological.
Moreover, the lack of normal controls potentially threatens the fragile 
significant differences between the different diagnostic groups studied. In 
case it turned out that healthy controls have a higher level of self-disturbance 
than people suffering from major depression  the statistical significance might 99
just vanish in thin air.
Abandoning tools for constraining bias, such as blinding in various forms, is 
not a healthy move either. It certainly reduces one’s trust in the impartiality of 
the study. But the inclusion of healthy controls and double blinded study-
 That is, »Ideas Implying Nonphysical Causality« (Parnas et al. 2005, p. 255). Examples 98
could be the belief that hoping for something to happen will affect whether it happens or not, 
or that the weather is somehow affected by one’s mood.
 Certainly it would not take a talented evolutionary psychologist very long to come up with a 99
list of advantages related to an optimum level of self-disturbance. For instance, it might be 
easier to maintain a high spirit if one’s somewhat disturbed view at the world would facilitate 
the »reinterpretation« of facts to fit ones preferences better.
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designs are gold standards in psychiatry (and somatic medicine).  One may 100
only speculate as to why these scientifically sound elements have been aban-
doned in NP2014. There are no discussions of (and apparently no legitimate 
reasons for) this lowering of standards in NP2014 and other EASE-related 
approaches. Leaving out these fundamental elements is a significant neglect, 
which can hardly be defended. Unless, of course, one accepts the a priori 
phenomenological characterisation of the state of a normal cognitive system 
and firmly believes in the neutrality of semistructured interviews and the proc-
ess of quantification.
A further unfortunate consequence of the integration is that through the use 
of statistical tools and the reporting of impressive significance levels, self-
disturbances appear as if they have been measured with a fair degree of 
certainty and accuracy. Reality is quite different: In fact, self-disturbances are 
strongly idealised and operationalised as score on the EASE scale. On this 
background, one must conclude that the approach of NP2014 is a very low 
fidelity approach indeed.
The output of NP2014 is that to make progress in the study of schizo-
phrenia we should include phenomenology in our scientific and clinical 
approaches to schizophrenia. Intuitively, this suggestion seems reasonable. 
But based on an approach based analysis, it is doubtful that this recommen-
dation carries much weight. This interdisciplinary approach does not seem to 
deliver as promised.
A more reasonable conclusion might have been that »our studies so far 
indicates that there are some very interesting subjective disturbances 
correlating (to some extent) with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Unfortu-
nately, fundamental disciplinary requirements and restrictions of psychiatry 
prevents us from studying these in the most optimal way (or at least publish-
ing the results). Our conclusion is that psychiatric science needs to be less 
focused on quantifiable measures and more inclusive with regards to qualita-
tive research methods and results in order to allow studies of these issues to 
move forward.«
This is quite far from the actual output of NP2014, with its conclusive 
declamations that disturbances of ipseity have been measured quantitatively 
with a fair degree of certainty.
On closer inspection, it is clear that one cannot reasonably conclude that 
self-disturbances constitute a fundamental generative aspect of schizo-
phrenia. Rather, one can conclude far more modestly that in an EASE test 
you are more likely to get a somewhat higher score if you are also diagnosed 
with Schizophrenia, SPD or non-affective psychosis.
We cannot conclude anything about causal relations. Indeed, it does not 
seem that there is much reason to make assumptions about causal relations 
between SD and schizophrenia, since non-schizophrenic patients score quite 
high on the EASE scale as well (despite the bias). Remove the dichotomisa-
 Which the authors of NP2014 are well aware of, of course, and make use of in other 100
contexts (Parnas et al. 2011, p. 201).
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tion. Remove bias. Add blinding and a control group. What effect would be 
left? It is impossible to tell, but perhaps nothing. On this background it is it dif-
ficult to assess to what extent NP2014 adds nuance to the discussion of schi-
zophrenia.
Whether EASE and NP2014 are epistemically more or less virtuous than 
the parent disciplines is of course the central question. In the perspective of 
approach based analysis, the answer is »less«. 
The phenomenological elements deliver far more rich and nuanced 
descriptions in the parent disciplines than in NP2014. In EASE and NP2014 
there is less direct access to the phenomena targeted, and explorations of 
these phenomena are less reliable. Rather than focusing on the essence of 
something which you can observe, focus is on disturbances of essences of 
something which is not directly observable. The means for capturing the 
phenomena of interest are dubious at best, and the same goes for the 
quantitative sub-representations produced. 
On the other hand, standard psychiatric methods are more rigorous and 
devoted to avoiding bias than NP2014. Avoiding bias by means of blinding is 
indeed a virtue usually associated with psychiatric approaches. Not even 
attempting to blind very central parts of the NP2014 approach is certainly less 
virtuous in this respect. No doubt, standard psychiatry is also plagued by p-
hacking, bias, the file-drawer problem, calibration to fit established norms and 
related issues. But in NP2014 some of the standard tools for handling these 
difficulties are removed with nothing to replace them.
The good news 
Though NP2014 involves low fidelity representation it does reveal some 
significant issues. One thing it points out convincingly (though, perhaps, not 
surprisingly) is that standard psychiatry inadequately represents schizophre-
nia (as well as other ways of being mentally disordered). It would probably be 
a good idea to retain categories such as schizophrenia and schizotypal 
personality disorder until something better is established. In the meantime, 
EASE and other »deviant« psychiatric research programmes should continue 
pointing out aspects of mental illness which future developments of 
psychiatric and psychopathological theory will need to take into account.
In spite of the weaknesses of NP2014 discussed above, there are indica-
tions that approaches of the EASE project corroborate at least some of the 
distinctions made in the official taxonomies in the sense that a high EASE 
score is, after all, more common among patients diagnosed with schizo-
phrenia and SPD and less common among patients with most other 
diagnoses. Especially interesting in this respect, is that high EASE scores 
appear to be predictive of future diagnoses of schizophrenia.
This certainly indicates that there are good reasons to continue developing 
the research programme. The integration of phenomenology and psychiatry 
may at some point develop into a fruitful enterprise. Indeed, attempts to do so 
may highlight weaknesses in the parent approaches which researchers would 
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do good to address. But one should carefully consider the combined elements 
to avoid importing and combining bad habits such as the assumption that 
achieving a statistically significant result (once) demonstrates anything 
(Goodman 2016).
If the difficulties discussed above are addressed adequately, future more 
refined approaches relying on the EASE framework may contribute to increas-
ing both dynamic and representational fidelity of scientific representations of 
schizophrenia. This could increase possibilities of prediction, which would 
constitute a significant step forward regarding early detection and prognosis 
(especially regarding prodromal and pre-psychotic patients). Such develop-
ments will, however, require more meticulous efforts in the construction of 
approaches as well as more flexibility in the base discipline.
What causes the problems? 
The phenomenological elements of the vehicle of representation are pale 
versions of the rich and nuanced qualitative representations one might have 
hoped for. The remnants of phenomenology in the vehicle of representation 
have little left of the qualitative richness of the data from the original empathic 
in-depth interview. This is partly a consequence of maintaining the demand for 
statistical significance and delimiting target groups by means of operationa-
lised diagnostics.
Even though the problems just mentioned (as well as those related to 
quantification, bias, and lack of blinding) are distinctly epistemic in nature, a 
significant part of their causes are social. Looking at the social dimension of 
EASE provides more than a hint of an answer to why NP2014 and EASE are 
constructed as they are, namely that the EASE project is deeply embedded in 
psychiatry. Innovative interdisciplinary studies such as EASE are almost per 
definition in opposition to established standards. But the base discipline (and 
to some extent other disciplines involved) constrains the interdisciplinary 
scientist's creative and innovative freedom.
This is worth noting, since it illustrates that even though approach based 
analysis highlights central epistemic aspects of interdisciplinary representa-
tion, in many cases we need to draw on the social and purpose related dimen-
sions of the involved disciplines in order to explain why these particular ele-
ments have been chosen and combined in a particular way. In many cases, a 
detailed historical account is required in order to explain why a particular 
element plays some particular role or how some assumption ended up as fun-
damental in a given discipline. The discussion of operational definition in 
chapter 6 is a good example hereof.
To do-list: 
The following is a list of potential adaptions that would considerably heighten 
the scientific quality in future updates of EASE and NP2014:
First, blind the approach (to the extent possible). There are a lot of difficult-
ies related to fully blinding studies which involve direct interaction with psychi-
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atric patients. For instance, the trained clinician will often easily distinguish 
patients liable to receive a schizophrenia diagnosis from, say, patients with a 
major depression. Nevertheless, the person who interviews and scores the 
patients on the EASE scale should, to the extent possible, be unaware of 
diagnosis and other clinical information. Especially in cases where semistruc-
tured interviews are used, the interview process is highly sensitive to bias. At 
the very least, the scoring on the EASE scale should not be carried out by a 
person with obvious professional interests in obtaining specific results.101
Second, always include a group of healthy controls. Even if related ap-
proaches have shown certain characteristic differences between the sample 
and healthy controls, a new (perhaps slightly altered approach) may reach 
different results. That there are significant differences between two groups of 
patients, may certainly point to something interesting. However, as discussed 
above, if variances were measured against a backdrop of healthy controls 
who scored somewhere in between the groups of diagnosed patients, signifi-
cance might vanish into thin air.  This is all very speculative, of course. But 102
so is the a priori decision to consider self-disturbance to be absent in healthy 
individuals. 
Third, the mathematics should be upgraded in order to retain more nuance. 
This would perhaps also hurt statistical significance, but that is hardly a well 
founded reason for retaining sloppy standards. Certainly, capturing the five 
point variance mathematically is much more complex than handling the 
dichotomised version. But fidelity is also much lower in the dichotomised ver-
sion (and it wasn't too impressive in the first place).
Fourth, claiming that some specific disturbances of basic structures of con-
sciousness only to delimit one’s target by means of operational definitions 
which pay no attention to these structures is odd, to say the least. It would be 
quite remarkable (if not miraculous) if the sample pointed out by the operatio-
nal definition of schizophrenia corresponded exactly to those with the strong-
est self-disturbances.
 The importance of this point is not diminished by (EASE) studies suggesting high interrater 101
reliability such as (Møller et al. 2011; Nordgaard & Parnas 2012). High interrater reliability 
does not suggest neutrality (i.e. immunity towards bias). Further, these interrater reliability 
studies are not terribly convincing. Though the raters compared were blinded to diagnostic 
and clinical information in these studies, they did not rate on the basis of independent 
interviews but were either both present during the interview or rerated on the basis of 
videotaped interviews. Since a central reason for doing semistructured interviews is the 
possibility of addressing interesting issues in detail, it is hardly surprising if a second rater 
notices the same interesting topics.
 In spite of these hypothesised smaller effect sizes one might still get significant results, of 102
course, but that might require substantially larger samples.
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When one might apparently detect these disturbances in »patients to be« 
even before the prodromal  phase of the illness (Møller & Husby 2000; 103
Parnas et al. 1998; Parnas et al. 2011), why not replace the expression 
»People with schizophrenia tend to display ipseity disturbance« with »people 
with ipseity disturbances tend to end up with a diagnosis of schizophrenia«? 
Why retain schizophrenia as the primary category? In fact, if self-disturbances 
are as fundamental as suggested, why not go all in and opt for defining what 
would be a truly revolutionary natural kind-like category of an »ipseity distur-
bance disorder«? One response might be that self-disturbance is only one 
aspect of the »coherent« clinical picture of schizophrenia. However, if indeed 
disturbances of the basic self are fundamental to schizophrenia, and detect-
able in prodromal and earlier phases, it seems reasonable to at least attempt 
using this as the basic distinction.
Fifth, if one wants to use literature reviews to add a scholarly dimension to 
one’s studies, one should put in considerably more effort. The literature review 
of NP2014 is a strongly ID-idealised version of the careful and thorough lite-
rary reviews we know from the humanities. The best example, since the topic 
is closely related, may once again be Patricia Kitcher's work on Freud (1992; 
2007). Compared to such analytical efforts, the literary reviews of EASE come 
to appear cursory at best. As the discussion above suggests, a number of 
weaknesses of the discussions of the history and literature of psychopatho-
logy are quite easily pointed out. Thus, the literature review in its present form 
does not lend much support to the central assumptions of EASE. However, in 
a more thorough version, it might do so.
Summing up
There is no doubt that the interdisciplinary EASE project contains good ideas. 
Capturing the subjective experience of what it is like to suffer from schizo-
phrenia would certainly enrich our best representations of schizophrenia 
considerably. And further, if specific disturbances to structures of conscious-
ness could be determined, this ought to attract a lot of attention in psycho-
pathological research and might have considerable impact on future develop-
ments in psychiatric nosology and diagnostics.
I do not mean to conclude that EASE in general or NP2014 in particular are 
tokens of bad science or bad interdisciplinarity for that matter. However, on an 
approach based analysis it appears that there are a number of issues related 
to the integration of the involved parent approaches which are neither explicit-
ly addressed nor easily overcome. If these issues were to be handled ade-
quately, however, EASE in its current form may constitute a significant step on 
 “Prodromal” is used to capture a phase in which symptoms of an illness are experienced 103
before the full-blown syndrome has developed. The concept implies that the development of 
the full-blown illness is inevitable (Phillips et al. 2005). In the case of schizophrenia it is often 
negative symptoms that appear in the prodromal phase. This is in part a consequence of the 
requirement of at least one positive symptom for being diagnosed with schizophrenia.
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the way towards developing richer and more adequate representations of the 
class of sufferings currently labeled as ‘schizophrenia’.
Approach based analysis reveals that at least some of the problems derive 
from not paying sufficient attention to difficulties specific to the integration of 
distinct and rather distant approaches. These problems are particular to inter-
disciplinarity, I claim.
The difficulties detected through approach based analysis may not neces-
sarily be unsolvable. But solving them would require more meticulous care 
and attention to details of disciplinary integration. This said, it is rather difficult 
to imagine an integration of these particular (or related) parent approaches 
which would not result in distortion of some of the involved elements.
As discussed, EASE is a de-idealisation project. EASE does not purport to 
make bold conjectures or to leap into unknown territory leaving already estab-
lished knowledge behind. To some extent this is the Achilles’ heel of the 
project. For instance, one central problem is that the attempt at de-idealisation 
involuntarily imports the poor tools for diagnosis inherent to standard psychiat-
ry. Would this have been obvious on existing approaches to analysing inter-
disciplinarity? I think not. Especially not if social aspects were kept in central 
focus.
One could certainly do a much more detailed analysis. For instance, one 
could dissect the interview guide in closer detail and analyse the different con-
cepts picked from various phenomenological and psychopathological sources. 
This might reveal further interesting issues. However it does not seem requir-
ed in order to gain an impression of some central problems in NP2014, to 
point out reasonable »next steps« if one wants to improve upon the NP2014 
approach, or, importantly, to illustrate the utility of approach based analysis.
On the above background, one cannot draw general conclusions about 
interdisciplinary science, of course. Perhaps the difficulties of integration are 
specific to the EASE project. But one can conclude that such difficulties do 
appear to exist, and that at least in some cases they are sufficiently debilita-
ting to justify careful analysis along similar lines in other cases.
Indeed, even if some were to disagree with (or even take offence at) the 
conclusions reached about EASE and NP2014 above, I hope to still leave the 
impression that approach based analysis constitutes a viable method for dis-
entangling elements of interdisciplinary projects and for making progress to-
wards being able to deal with the epistemic assessment thereof. 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9 — Conclusion
It is the mark of an educated person to look for precision in each class of 
things just so far as the nature of the subject admits: it is evidently equally 
foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand 
from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs. (Aristotle, 1094b 24-25)
In this final chapter, I will briefly sum up and comment on the discussions 
above.
In this thesis, I have developed a framework for epistemic assessment of 
interdisciplinarity in the sense of integration of scientific approaches. I have 
discussed epistemic assessment as the evaluation of whether a particular 
integrated approach is more or less virtuous than its parents when measured 
against more or less well-established epistemic ideals. That is, for instance, 
whether integrated approaches deliver increased explanatory power, addition-
al detail or nuance, improved accuracy (e.g. in terms of prediction or distinc-
tion), increased scope, more general implications, superior conceptual coordi-
nation, improvements in terms of cognitive economy (a.k.a. simplicity), im-
proved ability to control, produce, or prevent specific phenomena, improved 
empirical adequacy, improved dynamical and representational fidelity, in-
creased transparency, strengthened replicability, improved reliability, or 
increased explicitness regarding idealisations and distortions.
Bad interdisciplinarity is bad science. The central question is whether there 
are pitfalls specific to interdisciplinary science? I believe I have provided an 
affirmative answer to this question above. When we disentangle an interdis-
ciplinary approach and determine the elements out of which it is constructed, 
it is clear that these have often been developed for particular uses in particu-
lar circumstances. Due to the non-universality of the elements of representa-
tion, moving elements between contexts will involve the risk of violating cete-
ris paribus clauses. When we add to this, that scientists constructing interdis-
ciplinary approaches in many cases do not be possess deep expertise with 
respect to the disciplines from which they import elements, it is likely that the 
background knowledge required for using each element »properly« is often 
absent. I have discussed this issue under the heading of ID-idealisation.
I believe approach based analysis brings us a good deal closer to being 
able to draw conclusions about epistemic issues related to interdisciplinary 
science. It does so by revealing a number of central aspects of scientific 
crossbreeding which have hitherto been covered in darkness. As illustrated 
above, there are many complex questions regarding the epistemic value of 
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interdisciplinary activities. Since a lot of these questions are entirely unad-
dressed in the central literature and debates on interdisciplinarity, approach 
based analysis constitutes a step forward in this respect.
The extent to which the efforts invested in the development of approach 
based analysis have payed off cannot be determined conclusively on the 
evidence provided in this thesis, however. A philosophical discussion and a 
single case study hardly suffices in this respect.
Obviously, the argument in favour of approach based analysis would have 
been stronger had I been able to present a number of different case studies 
each revealing interesting additions to prima-facie impressions of their 
integration. This point is crucial, since a central conclusion above has been, 
that whether interdisciplinary science result in better acts of representation 
must be evaluated through careful analysis on a case-by-case basis.
Though the single case study above cannot settle all the relevant issues, it 
does indicate that a good place to start such case-by-case analyses is by 
determining the vehicles used, identifying the elements of the intermediate 
layer, figuring out how the use of these are changed as part of the integration, 
and how all this affects various epistemic standards. In this way, this thesis 
presents good reasons for increasing the focus on representational aspects, 
as well as issues of distortion, when analysing interdisciplinarity. Articulating 
epistemic aspects of the integration of approaches as suggested above, thus 
has the potential to significantly affect how we evaluate particular cases of 
interdisciplinarity.
Indeed, there are a few more reasons to be optimistic with regard to the 
general utility of approach based analysis, I believe. One is that approach 
based analysis has proven to be quite easily applicable in the case study in 
chapter 8. Another is that the EASE case study drew out a number of interest-
ing aspects which would not have shown on conventional accounts of inter-
disciplinarity. In this way, approach based analysis appears to be useful for 
disentangling what it is exactly that makes, for instance, particular approaches 
in cognitive psychology »cognitive«, approaches in neuro-aesthetics »neuro-
like«, and approaches in evolutionary art theory »evolutionary«.
One complication, however, is that in order for approach based analysis to 
be useful as a widely applicable tool it must to some extent seem accessible 
and meaningful to other people than the author of this thesis. I am in no 
position to judge the extent to which this is the case.
A further challenge already discussed (in chapter 2) is that representations 
in their published form rarely (if ever) contain exhaustive accounts of all the 
tacit assumptions, which are part of a particular representational practice. And 
not even the most rigorous analysis will be able to spell out all the propositio-
nal structures as well as conventional and skill-like practices involved in any 
given scientific approach.
As should be evident, then, I have no illusions that my discussions in this 
thesis will provide the final word in the debate regarding the epistemic virtues 
of interdisciplinarity. On the other hand, though, I do believe that my suggest-
ions may contribute to moving these debates forward.
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A brief reflexive moment 
I have argued above that no elements of representation are neutral. Neither 
tools, vehicles, assumptions, algorithms, observations, measurements, cate-
gorisations, nor theories. They all involve distortion to a certain extent. They 
are all perspectival, that is.
Is approach based analysis itself neutral? Far from it, obviously! I have 
addressed this issue several times throughout the thesis. There is no doubt 
that approach based analyses emphasise certain aspects while ignoring 
others and thereby represent targeted activities in somewhat distorted ways. 
Approach based analysis is deliberately and consciously constructed in this 
way (as has been made quite clear above, I believe). It is the explicit aim of 
approach based analysis to highlight issues hitherto neglected. This can only 
be achieved by paying less attention to the issues usually in central focus. 
Since I openly admit that social aspects of scientific activities are important in 
many ways, it is obvious that approach based analysis, which bracket these 
aspects, cannot be exhaustive or undistorted.
From the perspective of approach based analysis, interdisciplinary science 
is represented as combining elements from different parent approaches, 
whereas science in general is represented as an immense bundle (of bund-
les  (of bundles )) of approaches. Certainly there are many other ways to 104 105
represent science which might reach different but, perhaps, equally well 
founded conclusions. Social frameworks, historical frameworks, logical frame-
works, and so on each contribute informative perspectives on science.
So even though I have argued that many of the social aspects on which 
conventional assessment of interdisciplinarity relies are more or less irrelevant 
to an epistemic assessment, I have also made it clear that these in many 
cases have a central role to play in explanations of why cases of integration 
end up having one particular structure rather than another. Science is certain-
ly social, and social forces are very influential, of course—but they do not 
determine the epistemic vices and virtues of scientific representations.
In spite of the involved idealisations, I believe that approach based analysis 
is a more viable tool for assessing epistemic aspects of interdisciplinary scien-
ce than any existing approaches to the study of this phenomenon.
Future opportunities 
Perhaps a final conclusion can be that the above discussion has implications 
not just for the understanding of interdisciplinarity, but also for how to consider 
transdisciplinarity (in the sense of knowledge disseminating outside of acade-
mia). Even if we make the (idealised) assumption that what is disseminated 
are solely the outputs of the scientific activities, it does not seem unreason-
able to assume that dynamics such as ID-idealisation are involved also when 
 i.e. disciplines.104
 i.e. research projects.105
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»knowledge« is imported and exported between scientific approaches and 
extra-scientific practices.
Interesting future research possibilities therefore include the application of 
approach based analysis to transdisciplinary cases. This would include track-
ing the impact of (increasingly ID-idealised?) scientific knowledge as it moves 
through different sections of society. This should go hand in hand with further 
case studies of interdisciplinary science, of course.
A further interesting research question could focus on the extent to which 
using the framework of approach based analysis during design phases might 
affect the development and outcomes of interdisciplinary projects.
Even though little of what has been discussed above is uncontroversial, and 
there is clearly a long way to go before matters of scientific evaluation are 
settled, it is my hope that the efforts invested in this thesis have resulted in an 
approach to the analysis of interdisciplinary cases which might help evaluate 
concluded cases of interdisciplinary science as well as detect potential for 
fruitful adjustments in ongoing interdisciplinary activities. In this respect, it is 
worth emphasising once again that explicit discussions of the ways in which 
interdisciplinary activities are supposed to result in scientific improvements 
are largely absent in existing treatments of the topic of interdisciplinarity. So 
just setting the stage for such discussions, and providing some means for 
carrying it out, constitutes considerable steps forward.
It is my hope (and belief actually) that the attentive reader will not leave this 
thesis empty-handed, but will have original, readily applicable tools at his or 
her disposal.
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English summary
This thesis presents an alternative approach to the analysis of interdiscip-
linarity. One of the basic reasons for developing an alternative method for 
evaluation of interdisciplinary activities is that epistemic issues are insuf-
ficiently dealt with in the existing literature on the topic. To develop a more 
adequate way of capturing what is at stake in interdisciplinarity, I suggest 
drawing inspiration from the contemporary philosophical literature on scientific 
representation. The development of a representation based approach to the 
analysis of interdisciplinarity, and the discussion of the consequences of 
representing interdisciplinarity in this way, are the two main contributions 
offered by this thesis.
The treatment of these topics proceed in the following steps:
In chapter 1, I introduce the general enterprise and define central concepts.
In chapter 2, I provide an in-depth analysis of the concept of “scientific 
discipline” and disciplinary difference. This chapter provides reasons to 
assume that conventional scientific taxonomies do not provide a good basis 
for analysing epistemic aspects of interdisciplinary science. On this back-
ground it is argued that the concept of “approaches” is a more fruitful alter-
native.
In Chapter 3, I provide a number of examples of interdisciplinary science 
and go through some relevant aspects of the present state of the discipline of 
Interdisciplinarity Studies. I provide my best account of why interdisciplinarity 
is such a topical subject in academia today, and why I consider the existing 
literature on the topic to be lacking in certain central respects.
In chapter 4, I address the question of whether philosophy is relevant to the 
study of interdisciplinarity at all. My answer is »Yes!« It is worth discussing, 
however, since there are widely accepted arguments against the relevance of 
philosophy to understanding scientific activities (in general).
In chapter 5 and onwards I argue in favour of construing interdisciplinarity 
and interdisciplinary activities in light of the philosophy of scientific represen-
tation. I go through discussions of the nature of modelling and representation. 
I further introduce Ronald Giere’s framework for analysing representational 
activities and discuss the vices and virtues of this take on scientific represen-
tation.
In chapter 6, issues related to scientific pluralism are discussed. This in-
cludes Giere’s perspectivism and his one-world-(working-)hypothesis. Primi-
tively put, scientific pluralism denotes the conviction that there are numerous 
ways to perform scientific activities and, importantly, these are not readily 
interchangeable between contexts. This leads to a discussion of a number of 
pitfalls related to transferring tools and other theoretical elements between 
scientific settings.
In chapter 7 the Giere Duplex is introduced as a framework for analysing 
interdisciplinary integration. Analysis based on the Giere Duplex leads to a 
fuller understanding of the notions of “approach” and “distance”. It also leads 
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to some recommendations that run directly counter to established assump-
tions about interdisciplinarity.
In chapter 8, the developed framework is applied in a case study of a 
specific interdisciplinary project within schizophrenia research. I go through 
the background of the project, as well as the contemporary status of schizo-
phrenia research, psychiatry, and psychopathology. The result of applying the 
method for assessment developed in this thesis is quite interesting, I believe.
Finally, in chapter 9, I sum up the entire thesis and discuss the consequen-
ces of viewing interdisciplinarity in the suggested way. I briefly remark on what 
might have been better as well as questions which would be good to address 
in future research.
 243
Dansk resumé
I denne afhandling præsenterer jeg et bud på en måde at evaluere inter-
disciplinær videnskab. Baggrunden for at forsøge at udvikle en sådan metode 
er at epistemiske konsekvenser af integration af forskellige discipliner frem-
står underbelyst (eller måske er det mere rammende at sige ‘overbelyst’) i den 
eksisterende litteratur om interdisciplinaritet. Med henblik på at udvikle en 
sådan metode, foreslår jeg at tage udgangspunkt i den del af videnskabs-
filosofien der placerer videnskabelig repræsentation centralt. Udviklingen af 
en repræsentationsbaseret tilgang til analyse af interdisciplinær videnskab 
samt diskussionen af at forstå interdisciplinaritet på denne måde er de to 
vigtigste bidrag jeg leverer med denne afhandling.
Behandlingen af disse emner vil forløbe i følgende trin:
I kapitel 1 introducerer jeg emnet og gennemgår en række af de mest cen-
trale aspekter og begreber.
Kapitel 2 består af en dybere analyse af begrebet ”videnskabelig disciplin” 
og leverer bud på hvordan man bedst kan forstå disciplinære forskelle. Kapit-
let leverer gode grunde til at antage at konventionelle videnskabelige takso-
nomier udgør et dårligt udgangspunkt for analyser af epistemiske aspekter af 
interdisciplinær videnskab. Jeg argumenterer på den baggrund for at mit  be-
greb om ”videnskabelige tilgange” (”approaches”) er et mere frugtbart alter-
nativ.
I kapitel 3 gennemgår jeg en række eksempler på interdisciplinær viden-
skab og gennemgår state of the art af den »disciplin« jeg tillader mig at kalde 
‘Interdisciplinarity Studies’. Jeg leverer mit bedste bud på hvorfor interdiscipli-
naritet er et så allestedsnærværende og indflydelsesrigt begreb i den viden-
skabelige verden i dag. Derudover gennemgår jeg en række mangler i den 
eksisterende akademiske litteratur om emnet.
I kapitel 4 adresserer jeg spørgsmålet om hvorvidt filosofi overhovedet har 
noget at bidrage med i studiet af interdisciplinaritet. Mit svar er »Ja!« Grunden 
til overhovedet at tage dette spørgsmål op er at ganske mange af deltagerne i 
debatten vedrørende interdisciplinaritet synes at være uenige med mig.
I kapitel 5 og fremefter fremlægger jeg mit positive bidrag til debatten. Mit 
forslag om at basere en metode til analyse af epistemiske aspekter af inter-
disciplinaritet en filosofisk forståelse af videnskabelig repræsentation kræver 
underbygning. Jeg gennemgår diskussioner af forskellige aspekter af model-
lering og repræsentation. Derudover introducerer jeg Ronald Gieres bud på 
hvordan videnskabelig repræsentation kan begrebsliggøres, og diskuterer 
fordele og ulemper ved denne tilgang.
I kapitel 6 diskuterer jeg emner relateret til litteraturen om videnskabelig 
pluralisme. Dette inkluderer Gieres perspektivisme og hans »der-er-kun-en-
verden-(arbejds)-hypotese«. Udtrykt meget simpelt indebærer videnskabelig 
pluralisme at der er utallige forskellige måder at repræsentere fænomener og 
at disse forskellige måder ikke nødvendigvis er kompatible. Dette leder videre 
til en diskussion af forskellige faldgruber forbundet med at overføre værktøjer 
og andre teoretiske elementer mellem forskellige videnskabelige kontekster.
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I kapitel 7 introducerer jeg en flerlagsversion af Gieres forståelse af viden-
skabelige repræsentationsrelationer. En analyse heraf leder til en dybere for-
ståelse af mine begreber om ”videnskabelig tilgang” og ”disciplinære forskel-
le”. Det leder også til nogle anbefalinger som er i direkte modstrid med 
standardantagelser om interdisciplinær videnskab.
I kapitel 8 applicerer jeg den ovenfor udviklede metode i et case studie af 
et interdisciplinært projekt indenfor skizofreniforskning. Jeg gennemgår bag-
grunden for dette projekt, samt den aktuelle status indenfor psykiatri og 
psykopatologi. Resultatet af applikationen af den udviklede metode er, synes 
jeg, interessant.
Alsutningsvis, i kapitel 9, opsummerer jeg afhandlingen og diskuterer kon-
sekvenserne af at anskue interdisciplinaritet på den foreslåede måde. Jeg 
vender også kort diverse aspekter der kunne have været udført mere optimalt, 
samt diverse spørgsmål som fremtidig forskning med fordel kunne adressere.
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